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ABSTRACT 
Twice in the twent ie th century the scourage of war brought 
untold sorrow to mankind and a f t e r each war mankind pledged to 
e s t « b l i s h condi t ions which would ensure a be t t er world order — a 
world in v*iich v io l ence could be reduced s i g n i f i c a n t l y ; peace and 
s e c u r i t y could be ensured; and condi t ions for economic welfare* 
s o c i a l j u s t i c e and respec t for human r i g h t s and fundamental 
freedoms could be crea ted . Thus, the League of Nations came into 
e x i s t e n c e a f t e r the F i r s t World War, which, unfortunately, f a i l e d 
and then came the United Nations, a r e v i s e d vers ion of the League 
— undoubtedly, ixaprhved in many r e s p e c t s and .representing a a 
f r e s h approach to the world problems with the pxxrpose t o maintain 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y ; to develop f r i end ly r e l a t i o n s 
among nat ions; and to cooperate i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y in so lv ing 
in ternat iona l problems of economic* s o c i a l , cu l tura l or humani-
tar ian charac ter , and in promoting and encoxiraging respec t for 
human r i g h t s and fundamental freedoms for a l l . 
The s e c u r i t y Council has been g iven the primary r e s p o n s i -
b i l i t y for the maintenance of in ternat iona l peace and secur i ty and 
the Member-States of the United Nations have agreed to accept ^ti6 
carry on the d e c i s i o n s of the Securi ty Council . But due to 
e x c e s s i v e use of ve to , the Secur i ty Council had been unable to 
decide matters r e l a t i n g to in ternat iona l peace and s e c u r i t y . 
(2) 
It may be pointed out that the creation of the Unified 
Command in KOrea by the Security Council was possible solely 
because of the fortuitous absence of the Soviet representative. 
Hence* it was realized by the General Assembly that to prevent 
matters relating to peace and security from being "frozen" on 
the Security Council agenda which reduced to "impotence" the 
organization as a whole, it should assume some of the responsi-
bility of the council. Consequently, the General Assembly adopted 
three closely connected resolutions, the first of which is 
usually termed the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution.-' Its iatention 
was to create a nucleus of collective security outside the Secu-
rity Council. 
The adoption of the uniting for peace Resolution was 
virtually an amendment of the Charter making an additional provi-
sion as it were to Chapter VII, providing for the contingency of 
the failure by the Security Council to exercise its primary 
responsibility by reason of the lack of the unanimity of the Perma-
nent members. 
Thus, the importance of the Security had been lowered in 
the eyes of the nations and the General Assembly became the only 
hope for maintaining world order. 
The General A ssembly of the United Nations has become 
over the years the predominant political body of the world orga-
nization. The frequent inability of the Security Council to 
discharge its functions assigned to it by the Charter has brought 
(3) 
a change in the r e l a t i v e powers of the Securi ty Council and the 
General Assembly. Member-states have increas ingly extended the 
Assembly's r o l e in quest ions involving the maintenance or 
r e s t o r a t i o n of i n t e rna t iona l peace and secur i ty and many of them 
have looked with ever widening hope to t h i s organ for the so lu t i i on 
of t h e i r problems. Assembly resolut ion* moreover/ while t echn i -
c a l l y only recoimendations/ have been viewed by some member 
c o u n t r i e s , with regard to c e r t a i n matters and within ce r t a in l imi ts 
as l ega l ly binding dec is ions . 
The inpor tan t changes in the p r i o r i t i e s of the United 
Nations/ too , have s i g n i f i c a n t consequences for the ro le of i t s 
organs , p a r t i c u l a r l y the General Assembly. The organizat ion has 
come to give higher p r i o r i t y to economic and soc i a l development, 
decolonizat ion and the e l iminat ion of r a c i a l discr iminat ion than 
to the maintenance tff i n t e rna t iona l peace and secur i ty and the 
matters to which the highest p r i o r i t y i s given, i s pr imari ly the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the General Assembly. 
The s h i f t of emphasis from the Securi ty Council t o the 
General Assembly has na tu ra l ly changed the balance of power and 
inf luence . The Big Five do not enjoy the same p r iv i l eged pos i t ion 
which they have in the Securi ty Council. This logica l jy weakens 
t h e i r g r ip over the organiza t ion . Furtherftore, as the r e s u l t 
* 
of the expansion of the membership of the General Assembly i t has 
(4) 
grown from a body of f i f t y o n e (51) members to one hundred 
f i f t y n i n e (159) because the "Universal i ty" not "Se l ec t iv i ty" 
was to guide the p r i n c i p l e of admission in to the united Nations. 
The majority of which i s non-Western/ underdeveloped and who 
have gained t h e i r independence r e c e n t l y . Roughly three f i f t h s of 
the t o t a l membership belongs t o the Afro-Asian reg ions . Many 
of them belong to the Third World including min i s ta tes which 
are underdeveloped and the product of the deco lonizat ion process . 
They view full-membership in the organizat ion as the f ina l stainp 
of approval on t h e i r independence. In addit ion* the Third-W6rld 
majority f e e l s t h a t further min is ta te membership would add to 
t h e i r preponderance in the uni ted llations as t h e i r voting behaviois 
r e v e a l s an ant i -wes tern a t t i t u d e . I t may be of- i n t e r e s t to 
descr ibe b r i e f l y the change in voting behaviour in the General 
Assembly s ince i t s es tabl i shment . In fact# the United States 
Commanded an "automatic majority" or an "automatic two-third 
majority" in the General Assembly during the years before 1955 
and t h i s e x e r c i s e d nearby complete control over the Assembly's 
d e c i s i o n s . In the fo l lowing y e a r s , from 1955 to I960, the newly 
admitted members behaviour l e s sened America's control but the 
United S ta te s p o s i t i o n was s t i l l s t rong . F i n a l l y , the considerable 
increase in membership s i n c e 1960, i t i s s a i d , has ended America's 
dominance. Undoubtedly, so far as the vot ing r e s u l t s of the 
General Assembly are concerned, the p o s i t i o n of the USA i s weakenec 
(5) 
a f t e r I960 but in conparison to the USSR on the combined c a t e -
g o r i e s of cold-war, peace-keeping# arms contro l and disarmament 
i s s u e s r the United Sta tes continued to bw genera l ly unsuccsessful 
However, anti-Western a t t i t u d e of Third World - (which includes 
microstates ) has been a source of i r r i t a n t for Western nat ions . 
Natural ly , i t i s a source of i r r i t a n t to the Big powers. Because 
the Third World s t a t e s now became more prominent framework of the 
United Nat ions . Hence, th i Big Powers become day-by-day d i s i n -
t e r e s t e d in the fvinctioning of the United Nations . Then there 
i s a need of s t ruc tura l and funct ional changes of the United Nations 
Organs, Consequently, the amendment of the Charter in such a way 
as to s a t i s f y a l l - Big and Small - i s needed. 
The suggested amendments are summarised as fo l l ows : 
(1) The idea of weighted voting has been suggested to arres t 
or reverse the voting behaviour in the United Nations (General 
Assembly) and for the surviva l of the United Nations one-nat ions-
one vote formula heis to be changed. 
(2) Un iversa l i ty not S e l e c t i v i t y should be the guiding p r i n c i -
p l e of admission in the united Nations . A l l peace- loving nations 
are to be admitted. Consegiiently, the admission-process needs 
amendment so tha t the admission of the peace - lov ing nations could 
not be prevented unnecessari ly* 
(6) 
(3) The p r iv i l eged pos i t ion of the permanent members in the 
Secur i ty Council enjoying veto power has a l so come in sharp 
c r i t i c i s m . The power is given to them. But t h i s power should 
be amended in such a way t h a t i t is not unnecessari ly abused . 
(4) Ar t i c l e 2(7) i . e . provis ion for noninterference in 
domestic a f f a i r s have been suggested for amendment as under 
the p r e t ex t "domestic jur isdic t ions '* nations t ry to prevent the 
UN to impose upon them some s o r t of amiable so lu t ion . 
(5) The in te rna t iona l court of j u s t i c e lacks compulsory 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . Consequently/ an in te rna t iona l legal order through 
the j u d i c i a l process is d i f f i c u l t to give the cour t , compulsory 
jxorisdict ion to make i t an a u t h o r i t a t i v e i n t e rp re t e r of the 
Char te r , so the Charter needs amendment. 
(6) In add i t ions provision for the establishment of permanent 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Mil i ta ry Force i s e s s e n t i a l to help innocent s t a t e s 
to rearm them in time to take on the aggressor . Hence, for th i s 
purpose the Charter needs amendment. 
But seeking amendment of the Charter means opening a 
pandora ' s box and some of i t : , may even lead to the questioning of 
the bas ic pos tu la t e s of the Charter and Big powers hegemony. 
(7) 
Hence any attempt to compel the Big powers to agree with 
what they disagree wi l l certainly not be in the interest of 
international community. A very cautious approach is therefore# 
required. 
Changes in the United Nations system may come about in a 
variety of ways other than by amending the Charter. The Charter 
has been profoundly influenced by interpretation, custom and 
usage/ the fai lure on the part of member s tates to implement 
certain a r t i c l e s / the conclusion of various treat ies or agreements 
including regional defence pacts , and by the changed conditions 
in international s i tuat ion . Furthermore, if the United Nations 
Charter is viewed as a "constitution** that creates a * government", 
i t may be interpteted gradually changed by custom, and subject 
to a process of growth similar to that which has taken place 
with respect t o the constitution of the most sovereign s ta te s . . 
But if the Charter i s viewed as a "treaty" or a **contract" i t i s 
not a f l ex ib le instrument and i s not subject to the informal change 
in a fundamental sense. I t i s of course, v ir tual ly impossible, 
to draft any instrument whether i t be ca l led a treaty, a contracts 
or a const i tut ion, that does not have some element of f l e x i b i l i t y 
about i t . A document such as the United Nations Charter is 
unavoidably more f l ex ib le in nature than many other written 
instrviments • 
(8) 
Consequently, i f the United Nations i s to develop without 
^tnendtnent to the Charter, i t i s necessary to s t r i k e a balance 
somewhere between the extreme p o s i t i o n s of loose and s t r i c t cons-
t i t u t i o n . The ictea tha t the Charter in an instrument so f l e x i b l e 
t h a t , i f an amendment i s not f e a s i b l e , the same r e s u l t may be 
obtained by i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or by the passage of s p e c i a l r e s o l u -
t i o n , may be dangerous not only for indiv idual memberstates 
but for the organizat ion i t s e l f - even without the area of 
balance between two extremes of loose and s t r i c t construct ion 
there i s considerable room for gradual growth and development* . 
But t h i s must be an evolut ionary process accepted by the great 
majority of members, i t i s e s s e n t i a l in considering the proposals 
tha t the techniques of change not endanger the proposals themselves, 
However, from the above arguments we reach to the conclusion 
t h a t the amendment of the Charter, i s not the course l i k e l y to 
further the cause of world peace a t present t ime. Since the 
nat ions of the world are e n t i r e l y not ready now any more than 
in 1945, to turn the United Nations in to a Super-national body, 
endowed with the m i l i t a r y and economic power to enforce i t s 
d e c i s i o n upon unwil l ing members, i t would be p o i n t l e s s to make 
a l t e r a t i o n s i n the l e g a l s tructure which did not correspond to 
the r e a l i t i e s of the world community. 
C9) 
Any arnendrnent of the Charter cannot prove a helpf\i l method 
for strengthening the United Nations. Any change in the functions 
and operat ions of the United Nations should come about by way of 
convention and precedent . This i s a slow process and in many 
ways an unsat i s fac tory l i m i t a t i o n s beyond which i t cannot be used 
e f f e c t i v e l y ; and to the ex tent that i t c r e a t e s a divergence between 
what the Charter says and what in p r a c t i c e the members presume i t 
means, i f makes for uncertainty« i f not actual d ishonesty , and 
weakens the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the Charter as the fundamental law* 
Nonethe les s , i t i s a process with which a l l . c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t e s 
are f a m i l i a r , and which indeed i s e s s e n t i a l i f the c o n s t i t u t i o n 
i s to process the necessary f l e x i b i l i t y , in adoptation to the 
changing need of modern in ternat iona l s o c i e t y . So long as the 
process enables the United Nations to carryout more e f f e c t i v e l y 
i t s b a s i c purposes, i t w i l l be a method through which i t s e v o l u -
t i o n can proceed in harmony with the development of world opinion, 
the ul t imate foundation on which the United Nations mixst r e s t . 
No a n a l y s i s of the United Nations Charter and i t s operation 
i n p r a c t i c e and no p o s i t i v e sugges t ions can lead t o any substant ia l 
improvement in the work of the organizat ion so long as there i s 
s u s p i c i o n and lack of good w i l l and understanding among i t s 
members p a r t i c u l a r l y amongst major powers. Even i f the memberstata 
were able to reach agreement on important matters such as the 
l i m i t a t i o n of armaments, world s t a b i l i t y w i l l remain precarious 
(10) 
unt i l there i s a change of heart. But the memberstates forget , 
that under the provison of the Charter; i t i s the duty of the 
members of the United Nations to endeavour to remove ca\2ses of 
international fr ic t ion; not increase them by answering one 
unjxostified threat to t l» peace with another. Moreover, i t should 
be at once help to cease tension and reduce bitterness in the 
United Nations now proceeding# and give real cause for hope that 
cooperation between a l l powers, great or small, wi l l be achieved 
on a basis not of mere tolerance, but of real coinpadeship. So 
that the United Nations could be in a posit ion to work ef fect ive ly 
for peace and progress and there wi l l be a healtl:iy, happy and 
prosperious international soc ie ty . 
Fortunately, the present international s i tuat ion i s very 
hopefuLl. For the St:^er powers, owing to statemanship of Reagan 
and Gorbachey, the UN is no more a talking shop or debating club. 
The UN i s acknowledged, otiue ayaixi; an instrument of peace rather 
than a platform of dlssention. Therefore, the necessary amenaneats 
in th i s relaxed international s i tuat ion , could be possibly made 
with the consent of the two Super-powers, of course necessarily 
to the sa t i f i ca t ion of the Third-World s t a t e s , who, undoubtedly 
need the UN more than anyone e l s e . 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United NatioBS i s e s t a b l i s h e d for t h e purpose of 
m a i n t a i n i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y ; t o develop f r i e n d l y 
r e l a t i o n s among na t i ons and t o coope ra t e in s o l v i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
problems of economic, s o c i a l • c u l t u r a l , human i t a r i an c h a r a c t e r and 
encourag ing r e s p e c t fo r human r i g h t s and fundamental freedom. 
The S e c u r i t y Council has been g iven t h e pr imary r e s p o n s i -
b i l i t y for t h e maintenance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and secvurity but 
t h e s e c u r i t y Counc i l , due t o e x c e s s i v e use of ve to f a i l e d ; and t h e 
Genera l Assembly which was p r i m a r i l y a d e l i b e r a t i v e body with power 
of d i s c u s s i o n , i n v e s t i g a t i o n , rev iew and s u p e r v i s i o n in r e l a t i o n t o 
t h e work of e n t i r e Uni ted Nations system became t h e only hope of 
ma in t a in ing world o r d e r . Consequent ly , Uni t ing fo r Peace Resolu-
t i o n was p a s s e d . The adop t ion of u n i t i n g fo r peace Reso lu t ion 
g r e a t l y e n l a r g e d t h e func t ions and competence of the General 
Assembly* 
•Vke s t u d y d e a l s wi th the impor t an t changes on the p r i o r i t i e s 
o f t h e Uni ted N a t i o n s , which have s i g n i f i c a n t consequences for the 
r o l e of i t s o r g a n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e General Assembly. The a rgu -
ment of the p r e s e n t s tudy i s t h a t t h e General Assembly has become 
a predominant p o l i t i c a l body and i s now being t r e a t e d as the 
I 
cen t r a l organ of the united Nations. The growing importance of the 
i i 
General Assembly with i t s increased membership worries the Big 
powers as they have no veto theke. 
The changing p a t t e r n of power and influence in the United 
Nat ions, demands some amendments. In t h i s context , some contem-
p l a t e d s t r u c t u r a l changes have been dea l t with. The d e s i r a b i l i t y 
of any change in the functions and s t ruc tu re s of various organs 
of the United Nations by way of conventions and precedent i s not 
to be ignored. 
The present study is an attempt to focus upon the above 
i s s i i e . 
For the completion of t h i s work, I am highly grateful to 
Dr. Akhtar Majeed for supervising the e n t i r e p ro jec t from i t s 
beginning. I t i s due to his able and i n t e l l e c t u a l guidance, 
cons tant help t h a t the work could be completed in time. My grat i -
tude to him i s unbounded. 
I am thankful a l so to the Faculty members, in p a r t i c u l a r . 
Professor A.F. Usmani, Chairman, Department of P o l i t i c a l Science, 
AMU, for the keen i n t e r e s t he has shown in my research , I am 
equal ly gra tefu l to professor A.p. Sharma and a l l members of the 
Department of P o l i t i c a l ' s c i e n c e , AMU for t h e i r concrete and 
e l l i gh tened suggestions on the sub jec t . 
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CHAPTER - I 
DECLINE OP THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S AUTHORITY 
Decline of the Securi ty Counci l ' s Authority 
The aims of the United Nations are d iverse , generous 
and ambit ious . They range from the feeding of s t a rv ing peoples 
t o the development of self-government in baclqi^ard t e r r i t o r i e s . 
But the keystone of the whole s t r u c t u r e i s the maintenance of 
peace. Without peace, there can be no economic or soc ia l 
progress ; there can be no r a i s i ng of the s t a t u r e of mankind; 
none of the noble purposes s e t out in the opening words of the 
cha r t e r can possibly be achieved. Indeed the two t e r r i b l e wars 
through which we have l a t e l y passed not only obstructed 
humanity's na tu ra l progress but s e t c i v i l i z a t i o n back many 
years ; and in any future war in which atomic weapons were used, 
c i v i l i z a t i o n i t s e l f might ea s i ly go under Peace then, roust be 
1 
the f i r s t and most e s s e n t i a l object ive of the United Nations. 
However/ the p r inc ipa l organ es t ab l i shed by the United 
Nations to preserve peace and secur i ty i s the s ecu r i t y council 
which cons i s t s of f i f t een members - f ive permanent and ten 
non permanent. The number of members has been increased from 
11 to 15 (5-flO) . I t is the organ t h a t is given primary 
1 . Boyd Andrew, the uni ted Nations Organization. Hand Book, 
London, The P i l o t press Limited, 1946, p . 56. 
2 . I b i d . , 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by the Charter for the maintenance of in terna-
t i o n a l peace and secu r i t y and the Member-States of the United 
Nations have agreed to accept and carry on the decisions of the 
3 
Secur i ty Council. Ar t i c l e 24(1) provides ; 
" In or<ter t o ensure prompt and e f fec t ive ac t ion 
by the uni ted Nations, i t s members confer on the 
Securi ty Council primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the 
maintenance of in t e rna t iona l peace and secur i ty / 
and agree t h a t in carrying out i t s dut ies under 
• 
this responsibility the Security Council acts on 
4 
their behalf. 
Hence/ the Security Council is not allowed to wait 
until somebody else points out a menacing situation to it. It 
can at any time/ decide to consider a threat to the peace at 
the request of one of its members/ or of any other state/ or 
of the General Assembly, or of the Secretary General; but it 
is clearly the intention of the Charter that the Security 
Council itself must always be on the watch for signs of trouble/ 
3. Palk/ A. Richard and Mendlovitz H. Saul, The unite^ 
Rations, Vol, 3, World Law Fund/ New York, 1966/ p. 165. 
4. Brownlie Ian (Ed.) Basic Documents in InternationaT T.aw. 
Oxford/ Clarendon Press, 1967, p. 10. — 
and it is presunably for this reason that the Secretary-
General , who as an international official should be free 
from the natural reluctance of anyone nation to involve 
itself or others in unpleasantness, is empowered to draw the 
attention of the Security Council which in his opinion may 
5 
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. 
The United Nations Charter places all the authority firmly in 
the hands of the Security Council. The Security Council has 
complete discretion in determining whether peace is threatened. 
It does not have to decide whether the O^arter is being violated/ 
which could involve all sorts of quibblings over the interpre-
tation of the text. It has only to decide the simple question: 
6 
does a threat to, or breach of, the peace exist? It deals 
with "dispute" or "situation" likely to endanger peace and 
recommends appropriate methods of settlement. Article 33 to 
51 lay down their appropriate methods which the Security Council 
may adopt to maintain international peace, such as "negotiation", 
"inquiry" "mediation", conciliation "arbitration", "judicial 
settlement" and setting the matter through regional arrangements. 
5. Boyd Andrew, op.cit., p. 58. See also Article 99 of the 
Charter. 
6« Ibid., p. 59. 
A country may use any other way of settling the dispute peace-
7 
fully that it likes. 
Purthernore, a considerable portion of the UN Charter 
is directed towards the establishinent and maintenance of a 
system of collective secujrity (collective security means 
collective action taken by the security Council) and in effect 
particularly all the rest of it may be regarded as ancillary 
to this over all objectives. The main provisions in Chapter 
VI and VII are devoted respectively to the pacific settlement 
of disputes and to measures designed towards of threats to the 
peace to supress aggression. The Charter assigns primary 
responsibility for all actions that may require enforcement, 
including the use of arm force to the Security Council, and 
the members of the United Nations obligate themselves to join 
in carrying out of the decisions of the Security Council in 
this respect. The Charter also gives priority to the Security 
council in the handling of disputes or situation likely to 
endanger international peace and security. It has the authority 
to investigate disputes or situations likely to endanger 
international peace and security to call on the parties, to 
settle them by peaceful means - as all members are pledged 
to do - and to take over, when the parties to a dispute fail to 
7. parsad Krishan, The United Nations and power politics. 
Seal Publication Centre* OM Niwas, Raja Mandi/ Agra, 
1956, p. 12* 
settle It, and recommend "such terms of settlement as it may 
consider appropriate*. The General Assembly is debarred from 
making recommendations on any dispute or situation while the 
Security Council is occupied with it except at the Security 
8 
Council's request. 
It is worthy of note that little attention has been 
given to the "enforcement* provisions set out in Chapter VII, 
although particularly all of them make suggestions, proposals, 
and comments bearing on the pacific settlement of disputes. In 
the early years of the United Nations, there was much contro-
versy among the major powers over the interpretation and 
implementation of the provisions of Chapter VII - especially 
over the designation of armed forces that members were to 
make available to the united Nations and for the marshalling 
and direction of these forces to preserve the peace or prevent 
9 
aggression. 
According to the theory of the Charter, should the 
Security Coiincil fail to halt the progress of a threat to or 
breach of peace, it is then expected to employ some form of 
8, Maclver M. Robert, The Nations and the United Nations^ 
Manhattan Publishing Company, New York, 1959, pp. 84-5, 
9- JtkMt' p. 85. 
enforcewent action. The decision on the collective measures 
to be taken, is binding on all members of the yr^ ited Nations 
since they, in Article 25, 'agree to accept and carry on the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the 
present Charter. The Council may also make recommendations on 
the measures which should be adopted, as it did in Korea such 
recommendation is not binding and leaves to each member the ^^ 
ultimate decision whether to proceed with collective measures. 
Consequently, power is conferred on the Security 
Council in such cases to recommend appropriate procedures or 
methods of adjustment. Should the parties to the dispute fail 
to settle it by the means indicated by the Security Council, 
they shall refer it to the Security Coui^ciX, which may 
recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appro-
priate. Chapter VII confers jurisdiction on the Security 
Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommen-
dations, or decide what measures shall be taken with Articles 
41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security". It is empowered, in oir<3er to prevent an aggravation 
10. Good Speed, S.S,, The Nature and Function of international 
Organization, Oxford university press. New York, 1959, 
p. 222. 
of the s i t u a t i o n before making i t s recomniendations or deciding 
upon the measures provided for in Ar t i c l e 39/ to c a l l upon 
11 
measures as i t deems necessary or d e s i r a b l e . 
However, A r t i c l e 41 empowers the Securi ty Council to 
decide upon measures not involving the use of armed force to 
give e f f ec t to i t s dec i s ions . These may include comfcjlete or 
p a r t i a l i n t e r rup t ion of economic r e l a t i o n s and of r a i l , sea , 
a i r , pos t a l , t e l eg raph i c , radio and of other means of communi-
12 
c a t i o n , and the severance of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s " . 
Sanctions in t h i s category are to be exerc ised by the 
members themselves s ince the council i s authorized only to 
" c a l l upon the members of the United Nations to apply such 
measures. These may be as e f fec t ive as the use of armed force . 
An economic bycot t can be p a r t i c u l a r l y severe and destroy or 
s e r ious ly weaken the mi l i t a ry establ ishment of a s t a t e . Once 
sanct ions have been ordered, even if they are non-mil i tary only, 
the duty of the council has been f u l f i l l e d . I t is not obl iga ted 
13 
to go beyond such measures. 
1 1 . Setalvad, C. Mot i l a l , The Role of the united Nations In 
fehe Maintenance of World Peace^ Asia Publishing House, 
Bombay, 1969, p . 49 . 
12. I b i ^ . , pp. 19-20. See Goodspeed, S.S. also> p . 222 and 
a l so see Brownl i^an , Basic Documents in In terna t ional 
iavLt The Clarendon Press , Oxford, 1967, p . 13. 
13 . Setalvad, C. Mot i la l , o p . c i t . . p . 49. 
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And Article 42, empowers the Security Council, should 
it consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate, to take such action by air, sea or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or resotre International peace 
and security. Such action may include demonstration, blockade, 
and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members 
14 
of the united Nations. 
By Article 43, All members of the united Nations, in 
order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace 
and security, undertake to make available to the security 
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement 
or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and fadilities, 
including rights of passage necessary for the purpose of maintai-
ning international peace and security. Such agreement or 
agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their 
degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of 
the facilities and assistance to be provided. The agreement 
or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the 
initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded 
between the Secturity Council and members or between the Security 
Council and groups of members and shall be sUoject to ratifi-
cation by the signatory states in accordance with their 
^*' TcST^li^ Ian (ed.) op.cit;,., p. 14, Also see Setalvad, C , 
"^222!' °^''^^'' P* ^° ^ "^ ^ ^^° «ee Goodspeed, s.S. op.cit.. 
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respective const i tut ional process. 
Fxirthermore/ Article 46 provides that "plans fbr the 
application of; armed forces shall be made by the Security 
Council with the assistance of the military staff committee". 
And Article 4 7 provides for the establishment of a military 
committees to advise and a s s i s t the Security Council on a l l 
questions relat ing to the Council's military requirements for 
the maintenance of international peace and securi ty . I t also 
16 
provides for i t s consti tution and i t s respons ib i l i t i es . The 
"teeth" of the Security Council are to be found in Articles 
41 to 59 of the Charter• These a r t i c l es not only empower the 
security Council to use effective force in the event of a 
threat to the peace; they also give i t every fac i l i ty for making 
i t s preparations, so that the force will be ready at an 
ins t an t ' s notice if an emergency a r i s e s . I t is proved that the 
over-riding authority of the Security Council is the most 
s t r iking feature of the Seciirity System. ^ 
15. Brownlie Ian (ed t . ) , o p . c i t . , p . 14. 
16. Setalvad, C. Motilal, o p . c i t . . p. 20. 
17. Boyed Andrew, o p . c i t . , p . 60. 
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Though these provisions in Chapter VII do not contain 
any specific power entitling the Security Council to establish 
a force of the United Nations itself, it contains large powers 
to take enforcement measures to deal with threats to the peace/ 
breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. The Council has 
exercised the powers vuider Chapter VI and VII on a number of 
occasions with significant success in the cause of international 
peace. By reason* however/ of the dissensions among its 
permanent Members/ it has failed to act at several critical 
junctures, particularly when the action called for is in respect 
of the threats to y or breaches of, the peace by one of the 
18 
Permanent Members. Even in relation to the Security Council 
and enforcement action, certain aspects of the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals were opeh to serious objection. Firstly)^ it was 
necessary to lay down at San Francisco that action by the 
Security Council should be based not upon political considera-
tions but upon accepted principle of just international 
behaviour. Second;Ly,under the voting formula agreed upon at 
Yalta, the Big Five were given a privileged position in the 
Security Council not only in being made permanent members of 
the Security Council they were also given the right of individual 
18. Setalvad, C. Motilal, op.cit;^ ., pp. 2o,l. 
11 
"veto" on all questions of substance; thirdly/ no provisions 
were made in Chapter VIII, section C of the Dumbarton Oaks 
draft (regional arrangements) which clearly protected ,the 
right of individual or collective self-defence if a country-
were attacked and the Security Council failed to take action. 
Fourthly, while situations or disputes arising out of matters 
which by International Law are solely within the domestic juris-
diction of the state concerned were excluded from the operation 
of Chapter VIII section A (pacific settlement)/ there was no 
corresponding exception in Chapter VIII, section B (enforcement 
19 
action) 
However, as written at San Fransicisco, after a lengthy 
process of elaboration in which the United States played a 
leading role« the Charter set the maintenance of international 
peace and security as the first purpose of the organization. It 
prescribed two principle approaches to the achievement of this 
purpose: Colective measures for preventing or removing threats 
to the peace or breaches of the p)eace, and adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situation by peaceful 
means. The regulation of armaments was made a subsidiary 
approach«B with emphasis upon agreements to make armed forces 
19. Evatt. Vere, Herbert, The united Nations, Oxford University 
press, London, Melbourine, 1948, pp. 12-3. 
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and f a c i l i t i e s ava i l ab le to the Securi ty Council and upon 
achieving "the l e a s t d ivers ion for armaments of the world's 
human and economic resources'* cons i s t en t with the assured 
20 
maintenance of i n t e rna t i ona l peace and s e c u r i t y . 
The primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for doing these things was 
placed on the Securi ty Council and with voting procedures so 
defined t h a t no decis ion other than a procedural one could be 
taken except with concurrence of the Big Five. This gave 
assurance t h a t no ac t ion could be taken aga ins t a permanent 
members or without h is consent . The powers given to the 
Secur i ty Council were such as to give assurance t h a t once the 
permanent members were in agreement and had the support of 
* 
two other members - which would in all likelihood not be 
difficult to achieve effective action could be taken to 
maintain peace and security. The requirement of unanimity, 
moreover, was regarded as assurance that the coercive power 
veted in the Security Council would not be abased. Thus, 
in effect, the maintenance of international peace and security 
was to be made the responsibility of a "concert of the perma-
21 
nent members. 
20. Falk, A. Richard and Mendlovitz, H. Saul, op.cit., p. 170. 
% Now four members. 
13 
Hence/ the Great powers realised that every nation has 
an equal interest in the maintenance of peace and security, 
the tnain burden of maintaining that peace ultimately and 
necessarily would fall upon their shoulders. They also know 
that political decisions could be reached and implemented only 
to the event that they corresponded to the political realities 
and that important international decisions would be taken mostly 
in the context of prevailing power. In other words, they were 
conceived the united Nations more as a political then as a legal 
or doctrine instrument for the presentation of peace and 
22 
security. 
The framers of the Charter of the United Nations gave 
up the traditional unanimity rule that had been observed in the 
covenant of the League of Nations, except in the case of Big 
Five (the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., France and the People's 
Republic of China) of the Security Council, Since they felt 
that peace required the unanimity or not all powers but only of 
those who had the means of maintaining it, they recognized in 
the scheme of the organisation thei special role to be played 
by the permanent members and modified the principle of the 
sovereign quality of states on which the organization was based 
by granting them special voting privileges in the Security 
23 
Council. In this connection Article 2 7 of the Charter provides 
22. M.v. Sabarao, Unpublished thesis on the use of veto in 
relation to the pacific settlement of Disputes of the United 
Nations, 1946 to 1956, submitted in 1970, p. 48. 
23. Ibid. 
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that: 
1 . Each member of t h e S e c u r i t y Council s h a l l have one vo te 
2 . Dec is ions of t h e S e c u r i t y Council on p r o c e d u r a l m a t t e r s 
s h a l l be made by an a f f i r m a t i v e vo te of n ine members. 
3 . Dec is ions of t h e S e c u r i t y Council on a l l o t h e r m a t t e r s 
s h a l l be made by an a f f i r m a t i v e vo te of n ine members 
i n c l u d i n g t h e concu r r ing vo t e s of the permanent members, 
p rov ided t h a t in d e c i s i o n s under Chapter VI, and under 
pa rag raph 3 of a r t i c l e 52 , a p a r t y t o a d i s p u t e s h a l l 
24 
a b s t a i n from v o t i n g . 
p r o c e d u r a l q u e s t i o n s may be decided by an a f f i r m a t i v e 
25 
v o t e of any seven members of t he Counc i l , 
On any p o i n t of subs t ance a permanent member of t h e 
S e c u r i t y Counc i l , can t h e r e f o r e b lock a d e c i s i o n which i s 
d i s t a s t e f u l to him. This " v e t o power* has been f i e r c e l y c r i t i -
c i z e d over s i n c e i t was ag reed upon by p r e s i d e n t Rooseve l t , 
Marsha l l S t a l l i n and Church i l a t t h e Ya l t a Conference in 
February 1945. I t was a t t a c k e d a t San F r a n c i s c o , dur ing the 
General Assembly 's London s e s s i o n , and in some of t h e f i r s t 
24. Brownlic, Ian, op.cit., p. 10. 
25. Boyd, Andrew, The united Nations Organization, Hand Book, 
The Pilot Press Limited, London, 1946, p. 66. 
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meetings of the Security Council itself. To justify it, some 
of the creators of the United Nations point out that the Big 
Five will in any case have to play the main parts in preventing 
any future aggression, and their armed forces will be the 
Security Council's real weapon; that these powers would not 
adhere to the united Nations if they were thereby liable to 
lose control of their armed forces; and that it is essential 
to the very existence of the organization that the great powers 
should not leave it as they left the league. Their opponents 
reply that the veto gives the powers an implicit right to 
violate the Charter when they please, and protects them from 
26 
the consequences. 
Furthermore, the "veto" described as the use of negative 
vote by a permanent members to prevent the adoption of a propo-
27 
sal which has received the required number of affirmative votes. 
But decisions regarding the preliminary questions as to whether 
a matter is procedural or not, must be taken by the vote of nine 
members including the concurring vote of Five Permanent members. 
It means ,that a permanent members can prevent any matter to be 
26. Boyd, Andrew, The united Nations Orqanizati<nn. Hand Book, 
The Pilot Press Limited, London, 1946, p. 66. 
27. Goodrich, L.M., Hambro, E., and Simons, A.P. , Charter 
of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1969, p. 227. 
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c l a s s i f i e d as procedural aga ins t i t w i l l . I t i s here "Double 
28 
veto** ope ra t e s . 
This i s open t o abuse. H@wever there i s a way ou t . 
The pres ident of the Secur i ty Council has the power to ru le 
whether a matter i s procedural or not and the pres ident ru l ing 
s t and unless r eversed by a majority of nine members. Thus^ 
i n t h i s way the double veto can be by-passed. Members who seek 
to r e s t r i c t the app l i ca t ion of the so -ca l l ed ""double veto" s t r e s s 
the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Rule 30 and argue t h a t if the President 
r u l e s t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r vote i s procedxaral, h i s ru l ing stands 
unless overruled by a procedural vo te . Following the vote on 
the proposal t o inv i t e a r ep resen ta t ive of the, complaint of 
armed invasion of Taiwan, the pres ident declared the proposal 
adopted even though a permanent member voted agains t i t . After 
the r ep resen ta t ive of the Republic of China invoked the San 
Francisco statement« the Pres ident asked the Council to vote on 
the quest ion whether the vote taken was procedural . The vote was 
90 to 1 (China) With one abs tent ion in favour of the procedural 
nature of the proposal . The President declared the proposal 
t he proposal adopted and then, i n t e rp re t ing the Cinese represen-
t a t i v e ' s statement as a challenge to t h i s r u l i n g , he put the 
chal lenge to a vote under Rule 3o. There were no votes in favour. 
28 . Goodrich, L.M., Hambro, E . , and Simons, A .p . , o p . c i t . . 
p . 225 • 
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no votes against, and no abstentions. The President then 
declared that his decision stood. However, great care is 
to be taken by the President while giving this ruling because 
all the Big Five want to retain veto power and misuse of the 
power by the president may xindermine the principle of Great 
power hegemony upon which the Council and the Charter is 
30 
based. 
The Charter makes e x p l i c i t provis ion for only in t h e 
case of Securi ty Council decisions under Chapter VI and Ar t i c l e 
52(3)^ when a par ty to the dispute roust abs ta in from vot ing . 
Neither the Charter nor the counc i l ' s provis ional Rules of 
procedure contain any provis ions e x p l i c i t l y defining the e f fec t 
t o be given to an abs ten t ion or an absence in Securi ty Council 
31 
vo t ing . However, voltintary abs tent ion is not in te rp re ted 
as v e t o . Absence i s a l so not a v e t o . The Securi ty Council 
has adopted a number of decisions in the absence of a permanent 
member. This occurred in 1946 when the Soviet r epresen ta t ive 
withdrew in p r o t e s t aga ins t the Council*s decision to keep the 
29. Goodrich, L.M., Harobro, E . , and Simons, A.P . , op .c i t i : 
p . 227. 
3 0 . Greig, D.W., In t e rna t iona l Law^ London, Butterworths, 
1970. p . 544. 
3 1 . Goodrich, L.M., Hambro, E . , and Simons, A .p . , o p . c i t . , 
p . 229. 
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I ran ian complaint on i t s agenda and in 1950 when the Soviet 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e was absent for a period of seven months in 
p r o t e s t aga ins t the sea t ing of the r ep resen ta t ive of Nationa-
l i s t China, During the f i r s t per iod, the decisions taken by 
the Securi ty Oouncil were not so c l ea r l y of a non-procedural 
charac te r as to c o n s t i t u t e firm precedents , and, furthermore, 
i t could be t h a t , even if present , the Soviet Union would have 
been obl iga ted as a par ty to the dispute to a b s t a i n . During 
the second per iod, however, a number of important decisions 
were taken by the s e c u r i t y Council in respec t to the complaint 
of aggression aga ins t the Republic of Korea t h a t were indubi-
t ab ly non procedural and came under the provisions of Chapter 
VII* The g r e a t majority of the uni ted Nations members viewed 
these as va l id decis ions and thereby t r e a t e d an absence, l ike 
32 
an abs ten t ion , as not cons t i tu t ing a ve to . Consequently, 
the absence of a permanent members from the Securi ty Council 
p r e c e i p i t a t e d even more ser ious problems for the smooth funcr-
t ion ing of the Secur i ty Council. 
However, due t o A r t i c l e 27 of the United Nations Charter 
which provides the r i g h t of veto for the Big Five became the 
p o l i t i c a l p ivo t of the system, although i t did not spe l l out 
32 , Goodrich, L.M., Hambro, E . , and Simons, A.P . , o p . c i t . . 
p . 231. 
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what would happen in the event of the^e Five Pillars of Peace 
and security using the right of veto to neutralize one another. 
The veto was a weapon powerful enough against small and middle 
powers but impotent against the Sup)er powers. This impotence 
was a natural consequence of the internal schism and enmity 
obtaining among the great power themselves. Furthermore, the 
development of the cold war# however, doomed the continued 
collaboration among the great powers that was necessary for 
effective security council action. Growing disagreement mani-
fested itself in the increasing use of veto by the Soviet 
Union in stalemate in trying to agree on effective measures for 
Security Council action, and in the use of special sessions and 
other devices by which peace and security questions could be 
transferred to the General Assembly. The nadir of Security 
Council activity was reached in 1959 when that body met only 
five times. In recent years the Security Council's'role and 
activity have somewhat reviewed in part to the east-West detente 
and the common interests of the United States and the Soviet 
Union in resisting mounting pressures of small- underdeveloped, 
nations that can, and often do, dominate voting in the General 
Assembly. In spite of this recent trend, the Security Council 
has not measured up to its anticipated prominent role in the 
20 
33 
un i t ed Nations. 
However* in the performance of the primary function 
t h a t the Securi ty Council had achieved a considerable measure 
of success in dealing with those s i t u a t i o n where i t s permanent 
members for whatever reasons, have had a s u f f i c i e n t i n t e r e s t in 
the maintenance of i n t e rna t iona l peace and s e c u r i t y to agree 
34 
on a common course of a c t i on . In the course of doing so# 
the following cases w i l l be c i t ed ; 
The Indonesian Case; 
The s i t u a t i o n in Indonesia c rea ted by Dutch "pol ice" 
a c t i on to r e - e s t a b l i s h the au thor i ty of the Netherlands in 
Indonesia/ the Securi ty Council was able eventual ly to ge t the 
p a r t i e s to agree to the ceJEPation of h o s t a l i t i e s leading to an 
acceptable p o l i t i c a l se t t l ement . I t roust be recognized however, 
the Secur i ty Council ac t ion alone might not have been e f fec t ive 
without s t rong supporting ac t ion of an economic nature by the 
United S ta tes and c e r t a i n Asian S t a t e s . The major powers were 
35 
unwill ing however, t o use mi l i t a ry force to achieve t h e i r purpose. 
33 . Bennet, A.L. , ;;r;te,rnatt^iqrffl,l_ Organizat ion; p r i n c i p l e s and 
I s s u e s , p r i n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , Englewood Chiffs , New Jerey, 
1977, p . 56. 
34 . Falk, Richard, A. and Mendlovitz, S.H., o p . c i t . , p . 174. 
3 5 ' I h i d . , See a l so padelford, Norman, J . and Goodrich, L.M. (ed) The Upited Natioy^s in Balance^ Fedricka, Praeger, 
pub l i she r s . New York, Washington, p . 69. 
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Pa le s t i ne f^xaestlop: 
In dealing with the Pa les t ine quest ion during the 
i n i t i a l per iod of c r i s i s the Securi ty Council achieved cons i -
derable success . After having refused to accept the General 
Assembly's i n v i t a t i o n to a s s i s t in the implementation of i t s 
recommendations of November 3o, 194 7, for the se t t lement of the 
Pa le s t ine ques t ion , the Securi ty Council by a s e r i e s of 
progress ive ly i n s i s t e n t requests cont r ibuted to including I s r a e l 
and the Arab s t a t e s to accept a cease - f i r e and, with the 
a s s i s t a n c e of a UN mediator, t o conclude a rmis t i c agreements. 
By a decis ion of the Securi ty Council the United Nations Truce 
superv is ion Organization (UNTSO) was e s t ab l i shed with a corps 
of UN observers , thus providing a precedent and experience 
personnel for the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) which 
was e s t ab l i shed in 1956. UNTSO, in close co l labora t ion with 
the four mixed Armistic Commissions e s t ab l i shed by agreements of 
the p a r t i e s has provided procedures for continuous observation 
and the order ly cons idera t ion of the a rmis t i c terms, i n i t i a l l y 
by the commissions and then by the Securi ty Council on appeal . 
These i n i t i a l arrangement, re inforced a t a l a t e r time by UNEF, 
have succeeded well in keeping violence under con t ro l . Success 
in the e a r l y year e spec i a l l y was due la rge ly to the comrron 
i n t e r e s t of the major powers in preventing the s i t u a t i o n from 
22 
g e t t i n g out of hand i t for no other reason tha t to avoid 
giving a i^ival power an excuse to interven m i l i t a r i l y in the 
36 
a r e a . 
Success in controlling the use of violence in Palestine 
was not accompanied by a corresponding measure of success in 
achieving the settlement of basic issues in the conflict between 
Israel and the Arab states. At an early stage it was concluded 
that the work of the acting mediator in assisting the parties 
in the conclusion of armistic agreements was compromised by the 
exercise of mediatory functions in the political dispute. 
Consequently/ the fvtnction of peaceful settlement was given to 
the UN conciliation commission for Palestine established by the 
General Assembly in December 1948. All the efforts of commission 
to achieve agceed settlement of the issues separating the parties 
37 
hai»e been marked by failure. 
36. padelford/ Norman/ J. and Goodrich, L.M. (ed) The united 
Nations in Balance. Predricka, praeger. Publishers, New 
York, Washington/ p. 70. 
3 7. Ibid./ also see Falk and MendlovitZ/ The united Nations, 
vol. 3/ World Law Pvmd New York, 1966, p. 174. 
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Only under exceptional conditions, the Security Council 
has been effective in dealing with threats to or breaches of 
the peace where the vital interest of the permanent members 
have been directly in conflict. When following the communist 
coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the complaint of 
Soviet intervention in that covuotry was brought before the 
co^cil, any action, even the appointment of a committee to 
study the situation, was prevented by Soviet vetoes, it is 
difficult to see how an effective action could have been taken 
in any case, even if the right of veto had not existed, unless 
the Western powers were willing to risk the unleashing of a 
38 
general war. 
In September 1948, the Secur i ty Council was asked to 
consider the s i t u a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from the Soviet Blockade of 
Ber l in . The Soviet union, by i t s ve to , prevented any act ion 
from being taken. Again i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see what the Secu-
r i t y Council could have done, even without the ve to , without 
r i s k i n g a general war, o ther than provide, as i t did, the 
occasion for r ep resen ta t ives of the i n t e r e s t ed p a r t i e s to meet 
39 
and negot ia te* 
38 . paik and Mendlovitz, The uni ted Nations, vo l . 3 , World Law 
Fund, New York, 1966, p . 174, 
39 . Ibid. 
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Furthermore, the Securi ty Council has the pov?er to appoint 
and send observat ion groups and sub-cornniittees to f u l f i l l i t s 
primary function of i n t e rna t iona l peace and s e c u r i t y . However, 
as xinder A r t i c l e 29 the Securi ty Council has an express power 
" t o e s t a b l i s h such subsidiary organs as i t deems necessary for 
the performance of i t s funct ions" . The roost notable examples 
of the use of t h i s power have been sub-committees created to 
ca r ry out the Secur i ty Council ' s i nves t iga t ing function under 
40 
A r t i c l e 34. For example as in Greece case . I t s t a r t e d with 
the c i v i l war following the ending of German occupation. Again 
i t was f i r s t brought to the Securi ty Council in January 1946 
by the Ukraine with a complaint t h a t the presence of Br i t i sh 
t roops cons t i t u t ed intufence in Greece in te rna l a f f a i r s l i ke ly 
to endanger peace and s e c u r i t y . The quest ion was removed from 
the agenda a f t e r the pres ident of the Secur i ty council took 
note of B r i t i s h and Greek dec lara t ions denying any such i n t e r -
fe rence . B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin Overoptimis-
41 
t i c a l l y s a i d : "The case of Greece i s f in i shed" . 
40. Greig# D.W., In te rna t iona l Law^ London, Butterworth, 
1970, p . 562. 
4 1 . F e l l e r , A.H., United Nations and V?orld Community # L i t t l e 
Brown and Company, Bostan, 1952, p . 53, 
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I t was back w i t h i n a yea r (DeceroJ^er 1946) . This t ime 
on t h e compla in t of Greece t h a t t h e Greek i n s u r g e n t s were 
r e c e i v i n g a i d from G r e e c e ' s n o r t h e r n n e i g h b o u r s . Yougs lav ia , 
B a l g a r i a and A l b a n i a . The S e c u r i t y Council e s t a b l i s h e d a 
conunission of i n v e s t i g a t i o n which oo-nducted e x t e n s i v e o b s e r -
v a t i o n and h e a r i n g s on the s p o t and r e p o r t e d , by a ma jo r i t y 
42 
v o t e , g e n e r a l l y upholding t h e Greek c h a r g e s . 
A more ambi t ious " s u b s i d i a r y organ was the obse rve r group 
s e t up in Lebanon. In 1958, t he Lebanese government accused 
t h e UAR of **massive, i l l e g a l , and unprovoked i n t e r v e n t i o n , 
" t h r e a t e n i n g i t s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . On t h e p roposa l of Sweden, 
t h e S e c u r i t y Counci l dec ided t o send on " o b s e r v a t i o n group" 
t o Lebanon " t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e r e i s no i l l e g a l i n f i l t r a t i o n 
of pe r sonne l or supply of arms or o t h e r , m a t e r i a l a c r o s s the 
43 
Lebanese b o r d e r s " . 
In J u l y , 1960, t h e breakdown of i n t e r n a l law and o rde r 
on ly a few days a f t e r t h e Congo became independent , brought a 
t e l eg ram from t h e Congolese p r e s i d e n t and t h e prime M i n i s t e r 
42, Feller, A.H., op.cit., p. 54. 
43. Gooiarich, L.M., The Unit^ ed Nations in a Changing World, 
Columbia University press. New York and London, 1947, 
p. 144. 
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r eques t ing the 'u rgen t d ispatch of mi l i t a ry a s s i s t a n c e " . The 
Secur i ty Council adopted a r e so lu t ion author is ing " the Secretary-
General to take the necessary s t e p s , in consu l ta t ion with the 
government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the govern-
ment with such mi l i t a ry a s s i s t ance as may be necessary, u n t i l , 
through the e f fo r t s of the Congolese government with the 
technica l a s s i s t ance of the United Nations, the nat ional secur i ty 
force may be a b l e , in the opinion of the government, to meet 
fu l ly t h e i r t a s k s " . The force conprised troops from a number 
of African, Asian and European s t a t e s supported by services 
(notably the a i r l i f t of contingents and supplies) provided by 
European s t a t e s and the United S t a t e s . I t was c l e a r l y of a 
m i l i t a r y na tu re , bu t , i t had of i t s primary t a sk the r e s to ra t ion 
of i n t e rna l order within a s t a t e . Even when au thor i ty was 
f i n a l l y given by the Secur i ty Council for ONUC to use force in 
the face of constant harrassment by rebel troops of the province 
of Katanga which had purported to recede from the Congolese 
Republic, the au thor i ty was couched in the most cautious terms. 
The r e so lu t ion concerned urged the United Nations to •"take 
immediately a l l appropr ia te measures to prevent the occurrence 
of c i v i l war in the Congo, including arrangements for c e a s e - f i r e s , 
the ha l t i ng of a l l mi l i t a ry opera t ions , the prevention of 
27 
c l a shes / and the use of force , if necessary/ in the l a s t 
44 
r e s o r t . " 
The Congo opera t ion was con t rovers ia l because there was 
no c l e a r mandate for the ONUC or the chaot ic in t e rna l condit ions 
in the Congo for t h e i r own ends. The secretaryH3eneral _ 
Hammerskjald attempted to follow a non in te rven t ion i s t course in 
r e s t o r i n g order and in a s s i s t i n g a Congo government to acquire 
the c a p a b i l i t y for handling i t s own p o l i t i c a l , economic, and 
s o c i a l problene. But in the process they were a t tacked by 
se l f - seek ing in t e rna l and ex t e rna l spokesman and were denied the 
45 
f inanc ia l simport to keep the uni ted Nations so lven t . 
The Securi ty Council t r i e d i t s bes t and passed many 
r e so lu t ions from time to time for peace and order and the unity 
46 
and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of the Congo. 
La te r , by September, 1960, the Unanimity of the g rea t 
powers could no longer be obta ined. Following the veto of a 
r e so lu t ion sponsored by Tunisia and Ceylon, an emergency spec ia l 
sess ion of the General Assembly was ca l l ed under the unit ing 
44. Greig, D.W., op.cit., p. 566. 
45. Bennet, A.L., op.cit., p. 145. 
46. Greig, D.W.,, International Law fseconri I;:r^^^--i,^r.^  London, 
Butterworths, 1976, p. 740. 
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for Peace procedure. The countr ies of the Soviet bloc at tacked 
Hammerskjold's handling of the Congo operation# but the Assembly 
voted by 70 votes to none (the Soviet b loc , France, and South 
Africa abstaining) to confirm and s t rengthen the Secre ta ry-
47 
General ' s mandate. Hence, on t h i s way the Congo operat ion 
was t rans fe red from the Security Council to the General Assembly 
In Suez Canal d i spu te , the secu r i ty council formulated 
c e r t a i n p r inc ip l e s or courses of ac t ion and recommended them to 
the d isputants - or even s e t up machinery for implementing them 
i t s e l f . Thus, in r e l a t i o n to the canal dispute the Securi ty 
Council l a i d down t h a t any s e t t l ement should meet various 
requirements , such as freedom for users from a l l d iscr iminat ion , 
r e spec t for the sovereignty of Egypt, and the a l l oca t i on of a 
f a i r propor t ion of the dues to the development. Pew tasks 
a re harder for the Securi ty Council than the framing of such 
recommendations. They must conform to the Char t e r ' s standards 
of j u s t i c e and the p r inc ip l e s of In te rna t iona l Law, a t the same 
t ime, s ince they depend for t h e i r e f f ec t pr imari ly on the p a r t i e s ' 
wi l l ingness to implement them, they must be framed e i t h e r with 
a r e a l i s t i c eye to t h i s p r a c t i c a b i l i t y or as a kind of long-term 
47 . Falk, R.A., and Mendlovitz, S.H., o p . c i t . . p . 339. 
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investment in Fial Jnstitia. yuat coclum.. The veto generally 
prevents the Security Council (by contrast with the General 
Assembly) from too ready a resort to the later procedure. 
but often at the price of the Security Council's being unable 
48 
to make an agreed recommendation at all. Consequently# 
however/ due to the use of veto the major handling of questions 
like Hungry and Suez Canal etc. were shifted from the security 
49 
Coxmcil to the General Assembly. 
When the North Korean forces attacked the Republic Korea 
on June 25, 1950, the Security Council was presented with a 
unique opportunity to take action in a situation involving the 
conflicting vital interest of the permanent members, A unified 
command under the UN flag with General Mac Arthur of the US 
supreme commander was sent to assist the South Korea against the 
50 
North Korea. It may be pointed out that the creation of the 
Unified command in Korea by the Security C&uncil was possible 
solely because of the fortuitous absence of the Soviet represen-
51 
tative in protest against the seating of the Chinese 
48. Nicholas, H.G., The United Nations as a Political Institu-
tion, Oxford university Press, London, Oxford, New York, 
1971, p. 89. 
49. Ibid., p. 96. 
50« Benroet, A . L . , o p . c i t . , p . l 3 9 . 
5 1 . G r e i g , D.W., o p . c i t . . p . 577 . 
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52 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e appointed by the Na t iona l i s t government. Hence/ 
i t was r e a l i z e d by the General Assembly t h a t to prevent matters 
r e l a t i n g t o peace and secur i ty from being '•frozen* on the 
53 
s e c u r i t y Council agenda which reduced to "impotence'* the 
o rgan iza t ion as a whofce, i t should assume some of the responsi -
b i l i t y of the s ecu r i t y Council . Consequently the General 
Assembly adopted three c lose ly connected r e so lu t ion / the f i r s t 
54 
of which is usually termed the "uniting for Peace Resolution". 
Its intention was to create a nucleus of collective security 
55 
outside the Security Council. It provides: 
"If the Security Council because of the lack of the 
unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise 
its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in any case where there 
appears to be a threat to the peace/ breaches of the 
peace or act of aggression* the General Assembly will 
consider the matter immediately with a view to making 
appropriate recommendations to Members for collective 
measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace 
52. Falk, R.A.z and MendlovitZ/ S.H., op.cit./ p. 175. 
53. j.c. Stark©/ Introduction to International Law, Butterworths, 
London/ 1972, p. 603. 
54. Greig, D.w./ op.cit., p. 577. 
55. Reuter, Paul, International Institutions, George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., London, 1958, pp. 276-77. 
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or a c t of aggression/ the use of armed force when 
necessary/ to maintain or r e s t o r e i n t e rna t i ona l peace 
and s e c u r i t y . If not in sess ion a t the time the 
General Assembly may meet in an emergency spec ia l 
s e s s ion within twenty-four hours of the request 
56 
therefor . . . " . 
However/ Andrew G. vyshins)^ the sov ie t r epresen ta t ive 
vehemently c r i t i c i z e d a l l the three r e s o l u t i o n s , vyshinsky sa id 
t h a t " the Secretary-General then would be the commander-in-
chief of the armed-forces of the General Assembly . . . r id ing on 
57 
a white horse ...**. 
The adoption of the uni t ing for peace Resolution/ 
Setalvad points out/ ""was v i r t u a l l y an amendment of the Charter/ 
making an add i t iona l provis ion as i t were to Chapter VII/ 
providing for the contingency of the f a i l u r e by the Security 
Council to exerc ise i t s primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by reason of the 
58 
lack of the unanimity of the Permanent members. . .*. 
56 . Falk/ R.A., and Mendlovitz* S.H./ o p . c i t . * p . 251, Also 
see Goodrich/ LM./ Hambro Edward and Simons / A.P./Charter 
of tpe uni ted Nations? Coninentarv a t Documents. Columbia 
University p r e s s , hev York, London, 1959, p . 123; Setalvad/ 
M ' C , o p . c i t . , p . 32; Nicholas, H.C., o p . c i t . , p . 117. 
57 . Trygvelie/ in the Cause of peace, Macmillan Co., London 
New York/ 1954, p . 374. 
58 . Setalvad, M.C., op .c i t^ p . 32, 
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This t rans fe r -dev ice g rea t ly enlarged the functions and 
competence of the General Assembly. I t i s the important s h i f t 
of emergency power from the veto-r idden Securi ty Council to the 
59 
Veto-less General Assembly. 
However/ a v i t a l development in the functioning of the 
o rgan iza t ion , which has caused deep controversy/ has been the 
decl in ing r o l e of the s ecu r i t y council and the growing impor-
tance of the General Assembly even in matters concerning In terna-
t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y . This phenomenon i s the d i r e c t outcome 
of the disagreement t h a t arose between the Al l i e s in the 
Second World War. The wr i te rs of the Chapter envisioned complete 
agreement among the, Five Permanent members of the Securi ty 
Council/ who would be c o l l e c t i v e l y responsible for keeping the 
peace by supplying arms and men in c e r t a i n contemplated s i t ua t i ons 
These s i t u a t i o n s , however, did not come about. History took a 
new turn; the Securi ty Council could not ac t in the manner i t 
was intended to a c t , and the General Assembly assumed, or has 
had to assume, c e r t a i n function not o r i g i n a l l y contemplated in 
the Charter . This epitomizes the r e a l cause of the r e l a t i v e 
change in the functions of these two organs of the United 
Nations. The very bas i s on which the founding fa thers of the 
59 . Trygve Lie , o p . c i t . , p . 344. 
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Chatter built their scheme of collective security failed to 
work, in important matters the Security Council found itself 
unable to function and there were deadlocks. The members tried 
boldly to fill the gap by making the General Assembly the 
Supreme body, and made it assume functions which really did not 
belong to it under the Charter, parties to the controversy 
have put reliance on the language of different Articles of the 
Charter either to deprecate the new role assumed by the General 
Assembly or to justify it. This, however, is not too much 
purpose. The stark fact remains that the General Assembly has 
60 
s tepped in because the Securi ty Council has f a i l ed to a c t . 
However, i t i s t rue t h a t the execessive use of the 
61 
veto has been the cause of the Security Council 's f a i l u r e . 
Hence, a f t e r the Indonesian a f f a i r in 194 7 (in which there was 
unanimity and Unti l the Congo c r i s i s of July 1960, there had 
been no occasion on the Secur i ty Council e f f ec t ive ly used i t s 
povers under Chapter VII, except tha t of Korea in 1950, and 
t h i s only due to the f ron t i e r s absence of the USSR. The 
successive c r i s i s of Ber l in , Pa l e s t i ne , Indo-China, Hungry and 
Suez, to pick random examples have a l l involved the East-West 
60. Setalvad, M.C., op.cit., pp. 26-27-28. 
61. Falk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S.H., op.cit;., p. 178. 
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conflict of interests and* therefore, the Security Council 
has never used its enforcement powers. The East-West conflict 
destroyed the principle of unanimity upon which the whole 
structure of Chapter VII (and indeed the United Nations 
organization itself) depends for its ability to work as intended 
62 
under the Charter. 
A secondary but important function of the Security 
Council is its participation in the elective process that it 
shares with the General Assembly. Before the General Assembly 
can admit a state as a new member of the united Nations, the 
Security Council must recommend admission. Since admission of 
a state is a substantive matter, any permanent member of the 
Security Council may bloc. admission by a negative vote. The 
process of selecting a Secretary-General is identical to the 
requirements for admission of members and is# therefore, also 
subject to the veto. The only instance in which a majority vote 
of the Security Council is sufficient for a decision is in the 
selection of the judges of the International Court of Justice. 
The judges are elected by an absolute majority vote of the 
General Assembly and of the Security Council proceeding inde-
63 
pendently of each other. 
^ 2 . Palk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S .H. , o p . c i t . , p . 189, 
6 3 . Bennet, A . L . . o p . c i t . . p , 58 . 
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Throughout t h e h i s t o r y of t h e u n i t e d Nat ions the p r e s t i g e 
of the S e c u r i t y Counci l has f l a c t u a t e d g r e a t l y . From an op t imis -
t i c b e g i n n i n g , th rough a p e r i o d of growing f r u s t r a t i o n manifes-
t e d by f r equen t e x e r c i s e of the ve to and the use of the S e c u r i t y 
Counci l as an Eas t -West propaganda a r e n a , t h e S e c u r i t y Council 
sank i n world esteem t o a low p o i n t i n t h e 1950s. As d i s i l l u -
s ionment wi th t h e e f f e c i v e n e s s of t h e S e c u r i t y Council grew, 
a t t e m p t s were made t o s t r e n g t h e n the General Assembly or t o u t i -
l i z e t h e i n i t i a t i v e of t h e S e c r e t a r y General t o f i l l t he gap . 
i n t h e 1960s some s i g n of r e w e t a l i z a t i o n of t h e r o l e of t he 
S e c u r i t y Council began t o a p p e a r . Meetings were more f r e q u e n t , 
and s t a l e m a t e was avoided by t h e i n c r e a s e d use of a b s t e n t i o n s , 
r e s t r a i n t in the e x e r c i s e of t h e v e t o , and e f f o r t s accommodate 
c o n f l i c t i n g views in t h e fo rmula t ion of r e s o l u t i o n s before they 
were b rought t o v o t e . The e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t he S e c u r i t y Council 
i s i n e x t r e a b l y t i e d t o the u t i l i t y of t h e whole of the u n i t e d 
N a t i o n s , and t h a t u t i l i t y u l t i m a t e l y depends on t h e a t t i t u d e 
64 
and c o o p e r a t i o n of t h e member governments . 
C l e a r l y t h e S e c u r i t y Counci l has f a i l e d t o d i scha rge 
i t s Cha r t e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n t h e manner and wi th the degree 
6 4 . Bennet , A . L . , o p . c i t . * p . 58 . 
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of ef fec t iveness which the authors of the Charter envisaged. 
Furthermore, there can be l i t t l e doubt t h a t the Security 
Council has decl ined g rea t ly in p re s t ige and has seemed to 
most members of United Nations l ess useful than in the begin-
ning. This decl ine has been accompanied by a corresponding 
65 
increase in the p re s t i ge and use of the General Assembly. 
From the above discussion we can say t h a t the following 
fac to rs have helped the Secur i ty Council ' s f a i l u r e ; 
1. The one reason upon which most people would seem to 
agree is the •"veto*. I t i s common to c i t e the number of 
vetoes c a s t and to draw the conclusion tha t the exessive 
use of veto has been the cause of the Securi ty Council 's 
f a i l u r e . 
2 , The primary cause of the decl ine of the Securi ty Council 
and e spec i a l l y of i t s ro l e in r e l a t i o n to the General 
Assembly must be sought in the breakdown s ince 1945 of 
wartime a l l i a n c e of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, 
and tlte united Sta tes - the a l l i a n c e whose cont inuat ion 
65 , Palk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S.H., o p . c i t . , p . 178. 
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was the assumption upon which the idea of the Security 
Council as the guarantor of peace was constructed. The 
rivalry among the major powers induced them in many cases 
to use the Security Council as a tool for propaganda 
purposes to advance their divergent political objectives 
rather than to harmonize the action of nations in the 
attainment of common purposes, as intended by the authors 
of the Charter. Furthermore, these same powers discovered 
that for the purpose of appealing to world opinion, and 
gaining support for their respective policies and 
programmes in the cold war the General Assembly provided 
a more effective forum than the Security Council. Hence, 
the work of the Security Council has been hampered by the 
conflicts among the former Allied powers over the peace 
settlement. 
3 « Another cause contributing to the diminishing role of 
the Security Ctouncil has been the post-war emergence of 
numerous new nations in Asia and Africa, their crucial 
role in the world balance of power, and their general 
preference for the General Assembly than the Security 
council for beginning their influence to bear in connection 
with the issues of colonialism, human rights and 
38 
disarroainent. The anxiety of the major powers to win 
resoundirjg political victories by the support of these 
newly independent states has helped the General Assembly 
66 
to gain further importance. 
However* the failure of the Security Council to fulfill 
its primary purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security has led to two major developments which are as followsj 
1. The first is the assumption by the General Assembly of 
a role which was certainly never intended for it/ namely 
that of determining a breach of peace or an act of 
aggression* and recommending action by members* including 
the use of armed forces. 
2. The second is the development of powerful regional security 
systems of alliances outside the United Nations, such as 
NATO or the Warsaw Treaty Organization, a development 
symptomatic of the breach of Unity between the permanent 
members and the kack of confidence in the efficacy of the 
67 
general collective security based on the Security Council. 
66 . Bennet, A.L. , o p . c i t . , pp. 177, 178, 179. 
67 . Falk, R.A., and Mendlovitz, S.H., o p . c i t . , p . 192. 
CHAPTER - II 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S STRENGTHENED POSITION 
Chapter » I I 
The General Assembly's Stxengthened Posi t ion 
In judging the work of the United Nations organizat ion 
i t should always be s t r e s sed t h a t the General Assembly has no 
l e g i s l a t i v e or executive powers. I t i s not a world government, 
run in accordance with a par ty system, with one party in 
power responsible to a world e l e c t o r a t e having a common basic 
approach to the in t e rna t iona l problems under cons idera t ion . I t 
i s a world forum where diverse views are publ ic ly expressed. 
I t s s t r eng th l i e s in open discuss ion, in persua t ion in the 
molding of publ ic opinion. At the most, the General Assembly 
can only make recommendations to member governments or to the 
other organs of the United Nations. The moral force of such 
recommendation i s of course very g rea t but the General Assembly 
1 
has no means of enforcing d i r e c t compliance with i t s r eques t s . 
So, however, i t was for the f i r s t importance to ensure t h a t 
the most democratic organ of the United Nations, the General 
Assembly, should have the widest poss ib le powers of discussion 
and recommendation, so t h a t the pressure of world publ ic 
opinion could be brought to bear upon count r ies not l iv ing up to 
2 
t h e i r i n t e rna t iona l o b l i g a t i o n s . 
1 . Eva t t , H.V., The United Nations^ Geoffery Cambridge Oxford 
University Press , London, Melbourine, 1948, p . io6 . 
2» I b i d . , p . 19. 
40 
Yet the General Assembly has already acquired an a tnos-
phere of i t s own, and the long and d i f f i c u l t process of building 
up a common* corporate s p i r i t i s well under way. If anyone 
doubts whether the United Nations Organization has a futiare, 
he should remember t h a t the mere exis tence of t h i s complex 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l machinery is i t s e l f a fac t of g rea t importante. 
I t i s much harder to s t a r t to move a heavy object than to keep 
i t moving; indeed* once s t a r t e d , i t may in some circumstances 
be d i f f i c u l t t o s t o p . The c rea t ion of the uni ted Nations is 
thxxs not only a splendid achievement in i t s e l f ; there is also 
some guarantee of continuance. For a machine, once created 
and s t a r t e d to tends to keep on working. I t acquires a ce r t a in 
i n t e r t i a or even s t a b i l i t y , pos i t ive ac t ion to s top or destroy 
3 
i t . 
However, if the work of the Security Council since the 
establishment of the United Nations has been largely frustrated* 
leading to a sense of disappointment and pessimism, the work of 
the General Assembly, on the other hand, has been successful. 
By and large, however, no one who has participated in the 
debates which have taken place in the Assembly and in its main 
3. Evatt, H.V., op.clt., p. 107, 
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committee wi l l deny t h a t the Assembly has in f ac t become a 
v i t a l world forum, where a l l subjects w ^ h i n the scope of the 
Charter can be and is being kept fu l ly informed on the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems of the day. Not only does the Assembly 
he lp to shape world opinion. I t i s i t s e l f shaped by world 
opinion. I t i s the most democratic organ of the united Nations, 
and i t can and does ac t as a watch dog. If the other organs 
a r e working badly, the Assembly soon recommend ac t ion to deal 
4 
with the s i t u a t i o n . 
Hence the growing s t r eng th of the United Nations reads 
an o f f i c i a l r epor t " i s due to the evolution of the General 
Assembly in to one of the s t ronges t force for peace t h a t the 
world has ever seen". The General Assembly has a lso been 
described as the supreme source of In te rna t iona l ini t ia t ive**. 
However, the General Assembly wr i tes prof, schuman, " i s no 
more a l e g i s l a t i v e body than any other conference of diplomats. 
I t s delegates t a l k , l i s t e n , support , s tudy, d i scuss , purpose, 
vote e t c what they do not , and in the nature of the case cannot 
do ia to make ru les of law binding on ind iv idua l s . Apart from 
moral persuat ion ne i the r can they make ru les binding on any 
5 
government which decl ines to approve". 
4 , Evatt# H.V., Q p , c i t . , p . 72, 
5, Krishan Parsad, The United Nations and Power politics. 
Seal publication Centre, Om Nivas, Rajamandi, Agra,1955, 
p. 11. 
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consequently, the Security Council has been given the 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of International 
peace and security and the member-states of the united Nations 
have agreed to accept and carry on the decisions of the 
Security Council. Article 24(1) provides: "In order to ensure 
prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of International peace and Security, and agree that 
in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the 
6 
Security Council acts on their behalf. 
The important function which the Security Council has 
been assigned to discharge "gives the impression that it is the 
central organ of the United Nations'* and, in fact, it has been, 
though Setalvad emphatically argues that the pivotal organ of 
the United Nations is the General Assembly (undoubtedly it has 
become now) . He says, "a look at the Charter is in my view, 
enough to show that having regard to the multitude of very 
important functions entrusted to it, all designed to ensure 
lessening the possibilities of war, it is the General Assembly 
8 
which is the pivotal organ of the United Nations". 
6. Brown Lie Ian (Ed.) Basic Documents in International Law, 
Oxford, Clarendon press, 1967, p. IcTT — ^ 
7. Setalvad, M.C., The Role of the United Nations in the 
Maipt^napce of peacf,, Asia Publishing Hpuse, Bombay,'1967,p. 16 
8. Ibid. 
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Apart from the functions assigned to the General 
Assembly, the frequent inability of the Security Council to 
decide natters relating to international peace and security 
owing to excessive use of veto, the importance of the Security 
council has been lowered in the eyes of the nations and the 
General Assembly became the only hope of maintaining world 
9 
order* 
However/ the use of veto has been widely considered 
as very frequent and this was quickly identified as the prime 
reason for the inefficiency of the Security Council in dischar-
ging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace 
and Security^.^ Consequently, the secondary responsibility of 
the General Assembly has been pressed into service to remedy 
the situation. Furthermore, the need for the increasing parti-
cipation of the General Assembly in the maintenance of world 
peace felt as early as 1945 and efforts were made to the 
effect at the San Francisco conference while drafting the 
Charter of the United nations. The US Department of States 
proposal of 1944 for a general international organization sugges-
ted a strict separation of the respective roles of the General 
9* Ahmad Ishtlaq,''The General Assembly of the United Nations: 
A Study of Changing Structure", Ir^ dian CTourna 1 of_^olitics^ 
Vol. XII, 1-2, April-August 1978. 
10. Wilcox, Fand Carl M., Marcy Prpposal for Change in the 
ffnited Nations, Washington, D.C. 1966, p. 339. 
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Assembly and the Secur i ty Council in the management of post-war 
problems of i n t e rna t iona l o rder . The t e n t a t i v e proposals of the 
United S ta tes submitted for the considerat ion of the other 
p a r t i c i p a n t s of the Durobartan Oaks. The Conference of 1944 
gave the Council the prime r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the peaceful 
se t t l ement of i n t e rna t i ona l d i spu te s , for the prevention of 
t h r e a t s to peace and breaches of peace, and for such other 
a c t i v i t i e s as might be necessary for the maintenance of in te rna-
t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y , and empowered the assembly to deal 
with matters not a l l oca t ed to other organs . The proposal 
spec i f i ed t h a t the assembly was: 
(a) to make on i t s own i n i t i a t i v e or on request of a 
member-state, r epor t s on, and recommendation for 
the peaceful adjvistment of any s i t u a t i o n or contro-
versy , the cont inuat ion of which i t deems l i k e l y to 
impair the general welfare, 
(b) to a s s i s t to executive counc i l , upon i t s r eques t , 
in l i s t i n g the cooperation under considera t ion in 
or decided upon by the Coyncil with respec t t o ; 
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1, The settlement of a dispute the continuation of which 
is likely to endanger security or to lead to breach of 
the peace. 
2, The maintenance or restoration of peace. 
11 
3 , Any other matter within the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Council. 
The Dumbarton Oak proposal of 1944 c l ea r ly demarcated 
the r e spec t ive powers of the General Assembly and the Security 
Council on quest ions of peace and Securi ty - and assigned to 
the Securi ty Council a g rea te r sphere of a c t i v i t y * l imi t ing the 
powers of the General Assembly to discussion and recommendation 
on any matter r e l a t i n g to the maintenance of peace and secur i ty 
12 
tha t was being dea l t with by the Securi ty Council . 
This meant wide scope for the deleberat ion of the General 
Assembly but a l imi ted/ spontaneous ro l e for the General Assembly 
i n matters of peace. I t means the Assembly infincing i t s e l f 
j u s t to those aspects of peace-keeping/ which involved long-range 
r a t h e r than immediate problems. 
1 1 . Post-War Foreign policy Preparat ion Department of Sta te 
pub l i ca t ion , 3580, pp. 596-608. 
12. See proposals for the establishment of a general in te rna-
t i ona l o rder . Department of S ta te Bul le t in , Vol. I I , no.276, 
8 October, 1944, pp. 368-69. 
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However, at the San Francisco Conference# systemate 
and vigorous atteinj>ts were made by the smaller powers for an 
enlarged role in the General Assembly and for a veto-free 
Security Council at least, on pacific settlement of interna-
ls 
tional dispute. under the leadership of H.V. Evatt of 
Australia, the smaller powers made a concerted efforts at San 
Francisco to enlarge the role of General Assembly in the 
maintenance of peace and security and make it comparable that 
of League Assembly. Paul, K. Walp observed that the small 
states decided to work together in order to convince the great 
14 
powers that the assembly should be given specific powers. 
The small states proposed many changes and additions 
to the Dumbarton Oaks proposal in order to confer on the General 
Assembly adequate powers to make it a centre of activity. The 
Maxican delegate said that "the Assembly should have all the 
15 
powers that ought tlo belong to it in a democratic system." 
13. 111/1 Documentary 4 86 (English) 
14. paul, K. Walp, Constitutional Development of the League of 
Nations. Laxing Prom 1931, pp. 68-69. 
15. UN Conference on International Organization, UN Docs., 
Vol. 9, p. 271. 
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The r e sp re sen ta t ive of P h i l l i p i n s added " . . . if the secur i ty 
Council by reason of non-concurrence of one permanent roember 
f a i l s to a r r i ve a t a decision . . . the matter in question be 
submitted to the General Assembly for f ina l decis ion. Decision 
of the General Assembly on matters submitted to i t by the 
Secur i ty Council should be made by an aff i rmative vote of three 
16 
fourths of a l l the members. 
But the g rea t powers did not accede to demands of smaller 
powers. The US rep resen ta t ive thus explained the view point of 
h i s country. The Secur i ty Council was to be a represen ta t ive 
body of the assembly, j u s t as the assembly was to be a represen-
t a t i v e body of various coun t r i e s , and pleaded, t h a t the assembly 
should not encroach on the Council, s ince i t was inconceivable 
t h a t any ac t ion of the Council would be contrary to the wishes 
17 
of the majority of the Assembly. 
All proposals to confer on the General Assembly a s t a tu s 
equal to t h a t of the Secur i ty Council in the performance of the 
t a sk of maintaining peace and secur i ty were, the re fore , r e j ec ted 
by the g r ea t powers. 
16. UN conference on In te rna t iona l Organizat ion, UN Docs, Vol. 9, p . 277. 
1 7 . UN Docs, Vt)l. 12, p . 316. 
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A u s t r a l l i a tab led a proposal which ran as follows: 
" the General Assembly should be author ised to consider any 
matter within the sphere of in t e rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s ' and " tha t 
the Assembly should not be bassed from making a recommendation 
18 
on the matter as the functions assigned to i t " . 
Though t h i s proposal was supported by roost of the 
smaller powers and endorsed by the B r i t i s h and US delegat ion, 
i t came to nothing on account of the apposi t ion of the Soviet 
union. 
A.A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union i n s i s t e d on keeping 
the scope of the Assembly's au thor i ty l imi ted , and agreed tha t 
the world "within the sphere of i n t e rna t iona l relation**, afforded 
the Assembly such a wide range of discussion and recommendation 
as to i n t e r f e r e with "the p r i n c i p l e of sovereignty of nations 
19 
which has been agreed to us fundamental to the organiza t ion . 
The Soviet Union therefore r e j ec t ed the Aus t ra l i an proposal . 
The r ep resen ta t ive of Aus t r a l l i a then proposed a modi-
f i c a t i o n of the proposal which runs as fol lows: "the General 
Assembly should be authorized to consider any matter which ef fec ts 
1 8 . UN DOCS, Vol. 9, p . 266. 
1 9 . I b i d , \A3l. 5 , p . 525 . 
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the maintenance of international peace and security". 
This changed revision was also not acceptable by the 
Soviet delegate. However/ after a prolonged discussion a 
compromise was reached. Thus at San Francisco the jurisdiction 
of the General Assembly in the field of peace and Security was 
enlarged by the inclusion of article 10 and 14 along with article 
11. After the inclusion of these articles the Assembly's powers 
in relation to international peace and security become, very 
broad. However, Article 10 runs as follows: 
"The General Assembly may discuss any question 
within the scope of the Charter or relating to 
the powers and functions of any organs provided 
for in the present Charter, and except as pro-
vided in Article 12, may make recommendations 
to the member of the United Nations or to the 
Security Council or to both any such question or 
matters". 
And Article 11 provides: 
1. The General Assembly may consider the general 
principles of cooperation in the maintenance of Interna-
tional peace and security, including the principles 
50 
governing disarmament and may make recommendations 
with regard to such principles to the members of the 
Security Council or to both. 
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions rela-
ting to the maintenance of International peace and 
Security before it by any matter of the United Nations 
or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not 
a member of the united Nations in accordance with 
Article 35/ paragraph 2 and except as provided in 
Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to 
such questions to the state or states concerned or to 
the Security Council or to both. Any such question, 
on which action is necessary, shall be referred to the 
Security Council by the General Assembly either before 
or after discussion* 
3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the 
security Council to situation which are likely to 
endanger International peace and Security. 
4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this 
Article shall not limit the general scope of Article JO, 
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Not only thanks to the e f for t s of the snialler povjers 
itianv other a r t i c l e s were added to the UN Charter such as 
^ 20 
Article 2(7), 44, 51, etc. 
Th\is the main concern of the San Francisco Conference 
was the "separation of powers" between the General Assembly 
and the Security Council of united Nations. This separation 
of powers "was in either contrast with the practice of the 
League of Nations. This separation of powers "^ was in either 
contrast with the practice of the League of Nations, for the 
League Covenant provided for concurrent jurisdiction to both 
the Assembly and the Council as regards the scope of' their acti-
vities. Professor H.F. Haviland, Jr. observes that in economic 
and social affairs the assembly was made supreme, and that 
in the exercise of force under the United Nations the Security 
21 
Council was made supreme. 
However, it may be pointed out that Security Council 
failed in its primary responsibilities in maintaining peace 
and security owing to the frequent use of veto by the Big 
20o BrownLie lan (Ed.) , op.cit.. p. 6v 
21. H. Field Haviland, Jr., The Political Role of the 
General Assembl^ y (New York. 1951), p. 7. 
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Five powers and was xinable to resolve the deadlock in the 
military staff committee over the "principles of equality" 
in the organization of an international force "to provide 
teeth" to the United Nations, Evatt, therefore/ suggested 
that the use of the right of veto should be restricted only 
to the Chapter VII and that it should have no application 
22 
to Chapter VI of the Charter. The Representative of Cuba 
submitted a proposal for "the calling of a general conference 
of the members of the United Nations in accordance with 
Article 109 of the Charter in order to modify Article 2 7 of the 
23 
Charter in order to eliminate the so called veto privilege". 
But the Soviet Union opposed the suggestion vehementaly. 
Gormyko said that the abolition of the veto would mean the end 
24 
of the united Nations. A.Jf. vyshinsky asserted that power 
of veto constituted the cornerstone of the United Nations. 
He further quoted from the document submitted by president 
Franklin D. Roosevelt at Yalta under the heading "Analysis of 
2 2. Official Records of the General Assembly (GAOR) 
Session 2 , First itta mtg. 112, p. 482. 
23. UN Year Book, 194 7, p. 131. 
24. GAOR Session 2, First itta mtg. 114, p. 501. 
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the American proposal "in which he had said "that the right 
of veto is in complete conformity with the special responsibi-
25 
lity of the great powers to maintain world peace. Further, 
he quoted from a speech made by the US Secretary of State in 
1944 to the effect that the government would not remain 
one day in the united Nations without retaining the veto power. 
In the light of these criticism, therefore, John Foster Dulles, 
the representative of United States, felt that no amendment of 
the Charter could be effected without the arrangement of the 
Five Permanent Members and that the Assembly would have to act 
26 
very cautiously. However, the general consensus was thus 
inclined to the view that no amendment was possible in 
Article 27. 
This deadlock in the Securi ty Council passed the way for 
two developments within the framework of the uni ted Nations. 
The f i r s t of these two developments was the establishment of 
r eg iona l organiza t ion under the provision of self-defence 
wi thin the UN Charter and the second was the uS proposal t o 
e s t a b l i s h an "Inter im committee" of the General Assembly. The 
d e l i b e r a t i v e l i f e of the Interim Committee ended when in 
25 . GAOR, Session 1, p len . mtg 69, p . 123 7. 
26. GAOR, Session 2, F i r s t c i l e e mtg. 113, p . 485. 
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1950 •the Uniting for peace Resolution secured a broader role 
27 
for the General Assembly. 
Right at the outset the united Nations became a casualty 
of the East-West conf l i c t . This i s brought out by the e lect ion 
of the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the 
controversy over the participation of the new regime of Poland 
in the a c t i v i t i e s of the organization. The Security Council 
f a i l ed to act even on the very f i r s t issue that came up before 
i t "the Iranian complaint against the USSR", the Soviet Union 
f e l t that the Iranian con^laint had been cooked up by the 
Western powers. As a retatiatory measure, i t complained to the 
Security Council against the presence of Brit ish troops in 
Greece and the problem of Indonesia. The Security Council was 
f a i l e d to solve these problems. Further* India also preferred t 
knock at the door of the General Assembly rather than the 
Security Covmcil on the issue of the treatment of Indians in 
the union of South Africa. Consequently/ i t is s ignif icant * 
to note that in the f i r s t half of 1946 the Security Council 
dealt with e ight po l i t i ca l i s sues , whereas the General Assembly 
discussed only two. But in the next twelve months the General 
2 7. UN Doc. A/c. 1/196. 
55 
Assembly considered as many as eighteen problems. Whereas 
the Security Council only five. Thus the General Assembly 
though only Secondary in the matters of international peace 
and security, afforded a better chance for the implementation 
of the idea of collective Security. Hence it fell to the 
General Assembly to consider the main problems of international 
peace and security and there are a few instances when the 
General Assembly performed acts similar to those permitted the 
Security Council under Article 39 and 40 before the passage of 
the "uniting For Peace Resolution". Some such questions are as 
28 
follows; 
Spanish Questions? 
The Cold war which can be sa id to have begun a f t e r the 
Conference in February 1946, widened the gulf between the Soviet 
Union and the West. At potsdan in July 1945, J . v . S t a l i n the 
then prime Minister of the Soviet Union, brought up the question 
of Sapin. He proposed t h a t the three governments - the government 
of B r i t a in , the Soviet Union, and the United S ta tes . . . should 
break of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with Franco's Spain because, in 
h i s views, " the Spain government" was a danger to the peace 
28 . Goodspeed, S .S . , The Nature and Function of In ternat lnnai 
Laji^ Oxford Universi ty Press , New York, 1959; pT 220. 
56 
29 
set t lenvent . This proposal vas r e j ec t ed by the American 
Pres ident and the B r i t i s h prime Minis ter . The reason was 
obvious, "The Blue Division" of Spain had helped the Gerrran 
forces on the Eastern front aga ins t the Soviet Union. At the 
same time Spain had played a very de l i ca t e garae agains t Axis 
encroachment through i t s policy of n e u t r a l i t y , and t h i s policy 
had observed the a l l i e d cause wel l . Even of Spain had openly 
en te red the war on t h e i r s i c e , the Al l i e s would not have 
gained so much. By not consenting to the occupation of Gilbrator 
by the axis fo rces . Spain had enabled the a l l i e s to keep the 
30 
Mediterranean open. Though seemingly Axis-oriented Spain had 
ac ted in a manner favourable t o a l l i e d v i c t o r y . Besides 
Franco's ha t red of communism was an open f a c t . Br i ta in and the 
United S t a t e s , there fore , did not wish to a l i ena t e Franco's 
Spain. Also, they could hardly ignore the geopol i t ica l 
importance of Spain, A h o s t i l e spain might well t i l t the 
balance aga ins t West in the East-West c o n f l i c t . The Security 
Council f a i l e d to taci0.e the i s s u e . 
Franco Regime was a d i r e c t t h r e a t to the World Peace 
"becaxjse of the conf l ic t ing stands taken by Br i ta in and Soviet 
29. Sandness, E. Roger, Spain and the uni ted Katinns. 
New York, 1966, p . 90. 
30« Ib id . 
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union". On November 4, 1946, the Security Council unanimously 
decided to remove the "situation in Spain" from its agenda and 
to place all records and documents relating to it at the 
disposal of the General Assembly. 
A General Assembly included the "situation in Spain** 
in its agenda as "Relations between Spain and the United Nations" 
The first committee and the General Assembly discussed the issue 
of international peace and security and reached the conclusion 
that the Fascist government of Spain headed by Franco v?as a 
government imposed by force upon the Spanish people with the 
aid of axis powers and that it not represent the Spanish people, 
they, therefore recommended that if within a reasonable time, 
there is not established a government which derives its autho-
rity from the consent of the government committed to respect 
freedom of speech, religion and assembly and to prompt holding 
of an election in which the Spanish people, free from force and 
intimidation and regardless of party, may express their will, 
the Security Council would consider adequate measures to be 
31 
taken in order to remedy the situation. 
31. General Assembly Resolution 39(1) 
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The General Assembly adopted t h i s far-reaching re so lu -
t i o n and ca l l ed upon a l l the members of the uni ted Nations 
immediately to r e c a l l t h e i r Ambassadors and Mimisters 
32 
p len ipo ten t i a ry accred i ted t h e r e . 
The represen ta t ive of Argentina* Bol ivia , Columbia the 
Soroinian Republic# Ecuador* Egypt, Ed Salvador, Peru and the 
Union of South Africa were of the opinion t h a t the reso lu t ion 
v i o l a t e d A r t i c l e 2(7) of the Char ter . Argentina sent i t s 
Ambassador to Spain and defended i t s ac t ion on the ground tha t 
the United Nations was not authorized to in terven in matters 
wi th in the domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n of any s t a t e . The Indian 
delegate c r i t i c i z e d t h i s a c t as undermining the p res t ige of the 
33 
united Nations. 
When the quest ion came up again for discussion in the 
second sess ion of the General Assembly, the proposal to reaffirm 
the General Assembly's e a r l i e r ac t ion was defeated. The General 
Assembly United i t s e l f to expressing confidence t h a t the Securi ty 
Council would "exerc ise i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s " , in the sane 
34 
meeting, i t a l so r e j ec t ed the po l i sh draf t r e so lu t i on demanding 
3 2 . General Assembly Resolution 39(1) . 
3 3 . UN Year Book, 194 7-48, p . 5 1 . 
34 . UN Documentary, A/860. 
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that all rnember-states should cease to export arms, ammunition/ 
and strategic# material to Spain and also refrain from 
entering into an agreement with the Franco regime. On the 
other hand/ it was argued that the demand for economic sactions 
went beyond the competence of the General Assembly and was 
exclusively a matter for the Security Council. 
The Western powers, under the pressure of the cold war, 
realized the strategic importance of Spain in any future war. 
A friendly Spain was essential to the effectiveness of the 
North Atlantic defence system as it held the key to an effec-
tive control of the Mediterranean area. The delegates of Peru 
and the Dominican Republic, therefore/ requested the General 
Assembly to consider General Assembly resolution 39(1). The 
Communist group of states opposed the idea. They said that 
they found no valid reason for a change in the basic position 
that the General Assembly had taken earlier. However, the 
General Assembly reversed its position in the hight of Article 
35 
2(7) by adopting another resolution on November 4, 1950. 
By this resolution it left its members free to maintain diplo-
matic and other relations with Spain. It also authorized the 
specialized Agencies of the organization to decide for themselves 
35. General Assembly Resolution 386(v). 
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whether Spain should be allowed to participate in their work. 
the sixth session of the General Assembly did not even discuss 
the Spanish question,. The Fascist regime in Spain thus escaped 
unscattered because of power politics in the United Nations. 
The Palestine Question; 
After the first World War Palestine was placed under the 
League of Nations mandate with Great Britain as the mandatory 
power. When the country was placed under the mandate/ the 
majority of the population consisted of Palestinian Arabs. Under 
the mandatory system* however/ large number of Jews migrated to 
Palestine from every corner of the World. Jews migrated on a 
* 
* 
mass sca le because under the Balfour Declarat ion, the Br i t i sh 
government had committed i t s e l f to the establishment of nat ional 
home for Jews in P a l e s t i n e . The massive Jews influx gave r i s e 
to tensions between the Arabs and the Jews. The Br i t i sh f a i l ed 
t o bring about a conpromise between the Arabs and the Jews. 
On April 2, 194^7 / they brought the problem of Pa les t ine before 
the General Assembly of the United Nations. The General Assembly 
held i t s f i r s t spec ia l sess ion to deal with the "Pa les t ine 
Question**. I t appointed a Special Committee (UNSCCP) to investiga-
t e , the problem, to examine i t s pros and cons, and to submit 
36 . General Assembly Resolut i ion 3 86(v) . 
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proposals for a so lu t ion of the d i spu te . The Arab countr ies 
wanted the immecliate "Termination of the mandate over Pales t ine 
and dec la ra t ion of i t s independence" to be included in the 
agenda of the General Assembly under the provis ion of Ar t ic le 
38 
18(2) . But t h e i r demand was not accepted by the UNSCOP. The 
UNSCOP submitted two repor t s on August 31 , 1947. one was a 
minori ty r epo r t submitted by the rep resen ta t ives of India, I ran, 
and Yugoslavia recommended a "b i -na t iona l federal s t a t e " . The 
other was the majority r epo r t containing a plan for " p a r t i t i o n 
39 
of Pa les t ine" in to Jews and Arab s t a t e s with economic union. 
The General Assembly crea ted an adhoc p o l i t i c a l committee 
t o consider the r epo r t of UNSCOP. On November 29, 194 7 in i t s 
second spec ia l sess ion , i t adopted recommendation of the Adhoc 
Committee for the p a r t i t i o n plan recommended in the majority 
40 
r e p o r t . I t put Jerusalem under a spec ia l in te rna t iona l regime 
41 
t o be administered by the uni ted Nations. ' 
3 7. UN Docuroentory A/364. 
3 8. Ar t i c l e 18, para 2 . 
3 9. UN Documentary A/364. 
40 . General Assembly Resolution 181(11) 
4 1 . I b i d . 
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The General Assembly a l so e s t ab l i shed a Pales t ine 
Commission to implement the Pa les t ine plan and requested the 
Secur i ty Council to a s s i s t the implementation of the plan, 
in doing so i t invoted Ar t i c l e 10 as well as Ar t i c l e 14. in 
t h e Preamble of the General Assembly r e so lu t ion 181(11), i t was 
the language of Ar t i c l e 14 t h a t was used. The author i ty of 
the General Assembly to carry out p a r t i t i o n was therefore , 
chal lenged by the Arab coun t r i e s . S.E.M. Par is Alkhoury of 
Syria s a i d : 
"What i s the capaci ty of the General Assembly 
regarding mandated t e r r i t o r i e s ? We turn to the 
Chapter XII of the Charter . All the Ar t i c l e s 
concerning mandated t e r r i t o r i e s are t h e r e . Let 
us look a t the Chapter XII of the Charter . In 
the United Nations e n t i t l e d in i t s General Assem-
b ly , or i t s committees, to make recommendations to 
the mandatory power, and to what extent and within 
what l i m i t s ? Recommendations would be made to 
the mandatory power e i t h e r to terminate the mandate 
63 
and recognize the independence of the mandated 
territory, or submitted a trusteeship agreement. 
There is no other way in which the General 
Assembly could make recommendations. It was 
argued that if the General Assembly recommended 
a partition of the country, it would be ultra-
vires and that it would not be Binding from the 
42 
legal point of view'*. 
The Palestine commission failed to implement the 
General Assembly resolution because the Security Council was 
not able to give it the armed forces it needed to execute the 
plan. It soon became clear that the plan was unfeasible. 
The Arab attitude was hostile and uncompromising to the 
partition idea, although the Jews expressed their willingness 
to assist in the implementation of the plan. Also the United 
Kingdom plainly informed the Palestine commissioned that it 
would not transfer any authority to it till the date of termi-
nation of the mandate, i.e. May 15, 1948. The Palestine 
Commission was not, therefore, able to enter Palestine, and it 
informed the Security Council that there was a strong likelihood 
42. GAOR, Session 1, plen, mtg. 70, p. 22. 
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of the col lapse of the Securi ty . . . on the terminat ion of the 
mandate uiiless adequate means are made ava i l ab le to the 
43 
commission for the exerc ise of i t s a u t h o r i t y . The Security 
Council found i t s e l f enable to t r a n s l a t e in to p rac t i ce t h i s 
p o l i t i c a l decis ion of the General Assembly. On April 1948, 
i t approved the UN reso lu t ion request ing the Security-General 
t o convene a spec ia l sess ion of the General Assembly to 
consider fur ther the quest ion of the future government of 
44 
P a l e s t i n e . 
Accordingly a second spec ia l sess ion of the General 
Assembly was c a l l e d on April 16/ 1948. The General Assembly 
a l s o f a i l e d to approve a t r u s t ee sh ip or any other so lu t ion of 
the problem. The Pa les t ine Commission was thereupon re l i eved 
of fur ther r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The General Assem-fely recommended 
t h a t a UN mediator be appointed in Pa les t ine by the Five Great 
powers. The Soviet Representative saids 
"Pa les t ine cons i s t s of two people, the Arabs and 
the Jews. Both have h i s t o r i c a l roo t s in Pa les t ine 
and each of which plays an important p a r t in the 
4 3 . UN Documentary, A/AC. 2 l / 9 . 
44 . I b i d . , S/705 
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economy and c u l t u r a l l i f e of the country. 
The so lu t ion of the problem l i e s in a 
s ing le Arab-Jewish s t a t e with equal r i g h t s . 
If i t i s not pos s ib l e , then the p a r t i t i o n of 
the Pa les t ine was a necessary condi t ion of 
peace in to two autonomous s t a t e s , one Jewish 
45 
and one Arab". 
But the Arabs and the Western powers were inc l ined to 
work the scheme j u s t a few hours before the decis ion of the 
Secur i ty Council in favour of the p a r t i t i o n of Pa l e s t i ne , The 
B r i t i s h government l a i d down i t s mandate in t h a t country. 
Before the United Nations could move in and implement i t s 
p a r r i t i o n plan, the Jewish agency proclaimed an iddependent 
s t a t e of I s r ae l within the boundaries recommended by the General 
Assembly. The US government immediately recognized the new 
s t a t e of I s r a e l . The armed forces of Egypt, I r aq , TrapsJordan 
and Syr ia , and the Lebanon crossed the f ron t i e r s of I s r a e l , and 
widespread f ight ing broke ou t . The Secur i ty Coxincil ca l l ed 
for an immediate c e a s e - f i r e . The United Nations Truce Supervision 
o rgan iza t ion (UNTSO) was crea ted a t t ha t time to si;^ervise the 
45. GA Resolution 186(S-11) 
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a r m i s t i c e . From 1949 Until 1956 an uneasy t ruce ex is ted with 
many complaints to the Securi ty Council concerning incidents 
and c l a s h e s . The refugee s i t u a t i o n was a l so acute and defied 
s o l u t i o n . However/ the Securi ty Council was able through i t s 
agency UNTSO* to arrange for a rmis t ice agreements between the 
Arab and I s r a e l . These arrangements worked t i l l the Suez 
46 
c r i s i s in 1956. 
The Greek Question; 
After the second world war, pro-Soviet governments were 
e s t a b l i s h e d in East European coun t r i e s . These were regarded 
as a p o l i t i c a l danger to the Western world in the Balkan 
r e g i o n . The communist par ty of Greece a l so s t a r t e d a gue r r i l a 
movement atyainst the mi l i t a ry d i c t a to r sh ip of i t s country, 
with the help of Albania, Balgaria and Yougoslavia. This was 
unacceptable to the Western powers. The r e s u l t was the p roc la -
47 
mation of the Truman Doctr ine. On December 1946, the Greek 
government made a complain aga ins t t h e i r communist neighbour to 
the Secur i ty Council, But i n s p i t e of a long and heated debate 
the Secur i ty Council was unable to solve the problem. Then the 
United S ta tes proposed t h a t the "Greek quest ion" should be 
4 6 . A.L. Bennet, o p . c i t . , p . 142. 
4 7. UN Documentary, S / l37 . 
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t r a n s f e r r e d t o the General Assembly under the heading " t h r e a t s 
t o t h e p o l i t i c a l independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of 
4 8 
Greece**. Desp i t e t h e o p p o s i t i o n of the S o v i e t b l o c , the 
Genera l Assembly e s t a b l i s h e d a United Nat ions s p e c i a l committee 
on t h e Balkans (UNSCOB) t o a s s i s t in b r i n g i n g about a peacefu l 
s e t t l e m e n t of t h e problem. UNSCOB r e p o r t e d in 1948, and was 
upheld by t h e t h i r d Assembly, t h a t t he con t inued suppo r t of 
g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y by Alban ia , B a l g a r i a and Yogoslavia c o n s t i -
t e d ' a t h r e a t t o t h e p o l i t i c a l independence and t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y of Greece and t o peace in t h e B a l k a n s ' . However, 
i n 1951 the s i t u a t i o n was c l a r i f i e d and l a r g e - s c a l e g u e r i l l a 
f i g h t i n g had c e a s e d , due l a r g e l y t o the d e f e c t i o n of Yogoslavia 
from t h e Sov i e t b l o c . The UNSCOB was d i s s o l v e d in 1951 and 
t h e fo l lowing year the peace Observa t ion Commission ( e s t a b l i s h e d 
by t h e ' u n i t i n g fo r peace'" r e s o l u t i o n ) c r e a t e d a sub-commission 
on t h e Balkans a t t h e r e q u e s t of t he General Assembly. I t 
c o n t i n u e d t o observe the f r o n t i e r s i t u a t i o n u n t i l i t s d i s s o -
49 
l u t i o n in 1954. 
4 8 . UN Documentary, A/344. 
4 9 . Goodspeed, S . S . , The Nature and Funct ion of I p t e r n a t i o n a l 
Organi^at ionj . Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , New York, 1959, 
p p . 205-206. 
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The General Assembly and its machinery of observation 
and conciliation performed adequately throughout its first 
real political undertaking inspite of Soviet obstructionism. 
The UNSCOB offered multilateral comfort and support to Greece 
and provided substantial on the spot frontier reports for 
50 
several years to the General Assembly. 
The General Assembly of the United Nations, as obserbed 
by a keen analyst of the United Nations system has become over 
the years the predominant political body of the world organiza-
tion. The frequent inability of the Security Council to discharge 
functions assigned to it by the Charter has brought a change 
in the relative powers of the Security Council and the General 
Assembly Member-States have increasingly extended the General 
Assembly's role in questions involving the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security and many of them 
have looked with ever widenning hope to this organ for solution 
of their problems. General Assembly resolution, moreover, while 
technically only recommendations have been viewed by some member 
« 
countries, with regard to certain matters and within certain 
51 
l imi t s , as legally binding decisions. 
50. Goodspeed, S.S., op.cit., p. 2o6. 
51. Palk and Mendlovitz (edt.) op.cit., p. 227. 
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It may be pointed out that the creation of the Unified 
command in Korea by the Security Council was possible solely 
52 
because of the fortuitous absence of the Soviet representative. 
Hence, it was realized by the General Assembly that to prevent 
matters relating to peace and security from being "frozen" on 
53 
the security Council Agenda. Which reduced to "impotence" 
the Organization as a whole# it should assume some of the 
responsibility of the Council. Consequently, the General Assembly 
adopted three closely connected resolutions, the first of which 
54 
is usually termed the 'Uniting for peace Resolution*. its 
intention was to create a nucleus of collective security outside 
55 
the Security Council, NO wonder, the Soviet Union opposed the 
resolution vehementally. The Resolution empowered the General 
Assembly thats 
"If the Security Council because of the lack of 
the unanimity of the Permanent members fail to 
exercise its primary responsibility for the 
52, Greig, D.W., op.cit.. p. 577, 
53, Starke, J.C,,Introduction to International Law. Butterworths, 
London, 1972, p. 603. 
54, Greign, D.W., op.cit.. p. 577, 
55, Reuter, Paul, International Institutions, George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., London, 1958, pp. 276-77". 
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maintenance of international peace and security 
in any act of aggression, the General Assembly will 
consider the matter immediately with a view to 
making appropriate recommendations to members for 
collective measures, including in the case of a 
breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use 
of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. If not in session 
at the time, the General Assembly may meet in an 
emergency special session within twenty-four hours 
56 
of the request therefore..." 
Furthermore, the resolution provided for the following 
six changes in the organization and procedure: 
1. The aubhority to transfer a peace and security issue 
to the General Assembly if the Security Council was 
blocked by veto. 
2. The capacity to call emergency session of the General 
Assembly if necessary for the purpose. 
56. paik, R.A., and Mendlovitz, S.H. (ed) , op.cit., p. 251, Also 
see Goodrich/ I.M., Edward and Simons, A.P.,Charter of the 
Unite(^ Nationst Commentary at Documents» Columbia university 
press. Yew York, London, 1959, p. 123; Setalvad, M.C., op.clt. 
p. 32; Nicholas H.C., United Nations as a political Institu-
tion, Oxford university Press, London, 1917, p. 117. 
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3 . A recomtnendation to member-states t h a t each member 
maintain within i t s na t ional armed forces elements 
t r a ined for se rv ice as a UN Unit, 
4• A peace observat ion Committee. 
5 . A panel of mi l i t a ry e x p e r t s . 
6 . A c o l l e c t i v e measures committee. 
Thus / the adoption of the 'uniting for peace Resolution* 
was the logical culmination of series of efforts to increase the 
political authority of the General Assembly for which the Korean 
57 
context provided the immediate occasion. 
The adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, 
Setalvad points out, "was virtually an amendment of the Charter, 
making an additional provision as it were to Chapter VII, 
providing for the contingency of the failure by the Security 
Council to exercise its primary responsibility by reason of 
58 
the lack of unanimity of the permanent members". 
57. Setalvad, M.C., op.cit.. pp. 33-4. 
58. Ibid., p. 32. 
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However* Andrew G. vyshinsky c r i t i c i z e d a l l the three 
r e s o l u t i o n s . Vyshinky sa id t h a t the Secretary-General then 
would be the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the 
59 
General Assembly . . . r id ing on a white horse . . . " and def in i te ly 
t he r e so lu t ions strengthened the pos i t i on of the General Assembly, 
In add i t ion to t h i s t r ans fe r -dev ice g rea t ly enlarged the 
funct ions and competence of the General Assembly. I t i s the 
. .i m-^ o r t a n t _ s h i f t of emergency power from veto-r idden 
60 
s e c u r i t y counci l to the ve to - l e s s General Assembly. Thus the 
General Assembly played an important ro l e in the matter of peace 
and s e c u r i t y as an a l t e r n a t i v e body of the Security Council* 
The v a l i d i t y of the famous r e s o l u t i o n and i t s impact on the 
organiza t ion w i l l be evaluated by reference t o some cases in 
which the uni t ing for peace Resolution was invoked: The 
f i r s t app l i ca t i on of the uni t ing for Peace Resolution followed 
soon a f t e r , when on February 1* 1951 the General Assembly 
passed a r e s o l u t i o n finding • 'that the Central People •s Govern-
a id 
roent of the peop le ' s ReP^l-i-c of China, by giving d i rec t /and 
a s s i s t a n c e to those who are already committing aggression in 
Korea and by engaging in h o s t a l i t i e s aga ins t the UN forces t h e r e . 
5 9 , Trygve L i e , i n the Cause of Peac^ . New York, the Macmillan 
Company, 1954, p . 3 74. 
6 0 . I b i d . , 347. 
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has i t s e l f engaged in h o s t a l i t i e s a g a i n s t the UN fo rces t h e r e , 
61 
has i t s e l f engaged i n a g g r e s s i o n in Korea. The General 
62 
Assembly adopted on Pebruiary 1, 1951, t he fo l lowing r e s o l u t i o n . 
"Noting t h a t t h e S e c u r i t y Counc i l , because of the l ack 
of t h e unanimity of t h e permanent members, has f a i l e d t o 
e x e r c i s e i t s pr imary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y fo r t he maintenance of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y in r e g a r d t o the Chinese 
communist i n t e r v e n t i o n in Korea, 
"Noting t h a t t h e C e n t r a l P e o p l e ' s Republ ic of China has 
n o t a c c e p t e d Uni ted Nations p r o p o s a l s t o b r ing about a c e s s a t i o n 
of h o s t a l i t i e s i n Korea wi th a view t o peacefu l s e t t l e m e n t * and 
t h a t i t s armed fo rce s con t inue t h e i r i n v a s i o n of Korea and t h e i r 
l a r g e - s c a l e a t t a c k upon United Nat ions f o r c e s t h e r e , 
" l Finds t h a t the C e n t r a l P e o p l e ' s Government of t he 
a i d 
p e o p l e ' s Republ ic of China, by g i v i n g d i r e c t / a n d 
a s s i s t a n c e t o t h o s e who were a l r e a d y committing 
a g g r e s s i o n in Korea and by engaging in h o s t a l i t i e s 
6 1 . S e t a l v a d , M . C , o p . c i t . . p . 37 . 
6 2 . Year Book of t h e United N a t i o a s , 1951, (Resolu t ion(489v) , 
Department of p u b l i c In fo rma t ion , u n i t e d N a t i o n s , 
New York, 1952, pp . 224-25 . 
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aga ins t uni ted Nations forces there has i t s e l f 
engaged in aggression in Korea; 
"2 Cal ls upon the Central People 's Government of the 
people ' s Republic of China to cause i t s forces and 
na t iona l s in Korea to cease h o s t a l i t i e s aga ins t the 
uni ted Nations forces and to withdraw in Korea; 
"3 Affirms the determination of the United Nations to 
continue ac t ion in Korea to meet the aggression; 
"4 Calls up6n a l l s t a t e s and a u t h o r i t i e s to continue 
to lend every a s s i s t ance to the United Nations 
ac t ion in Korea; 
"5 Calls upon a l l s t a t e s and a u t h o r i t i e s to r e f r a i n from 
giving any a s s i s t ance to the aggression in Korea*'. 
By passing t h i s r e s o l u t i o n , the General Assembly 
took a fur ther s tep forward. I t took upon i t s e l f the determi-
nat ion of the exis tence of an ac t of aggression which was under 
A r t i c l e 39, declared by the Charter t o be the fiinction of the 
63 
Secur i ty Council. For Ar t i c l e 39 provides; 
6 3 . Setalvad, M.C., o p . c i t . , p . 38. 
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"The S e c u r i t y Council s h a l l de termine the 
e x i s t e n c e of any t h r e a t t o t h e p e a c e , b r each 
of p e a c e / a c t of a g g r e s s i o n and s h a l l make 
recommendation, o r dec ide what measxires s h a l l 
be t a k e n i n accordance wi th A r t i c l e s 41 and 
42 t o m a i n t a i n o r r e s t o r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace 
64 
and securi ty .** 
However, an important point about the Korean war calls 
for comment. It was the first war in history to be fought in 
the name of the world organization and for the first time the 
concept of collective security, as envisaged in the UN Charter, 
was put to test. Western leaders hailed the event as *a 
historical progress towards the establishment of a viable 
system of collective security" demonstrating the fact that the 
United Nations is adoptable to the role of enforcement as well 
65 
as that of conciliation. 
A dispassionate study of the whole Korean episode, 
however, will make it clear that Korean conflict did nat so 
much mark a turning point towards collective security a showed 
64. BrownLie. I., op.cit., p. 12. 
65. Krishan parsed. The United Nations and Power Politics. 
Seal Publication Centre, Om Niwas, Rajamandi, Agra, 1956, 
p. 56. 
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hardening of the a t t i t u d e on the p a r t of the Western powers 
and the coinrotinist b l o c a l i k e . The two g i a n t s c l a s h e d t o have 
a t r i a l of b r u t e s t r e n g t h and s e p a r a t e d wi thou t g e t t i n g t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e s u p e r i o r i t y dec ided . The two could r e a l i z e the 
s t r e n g t h of each o t h e r and s i n c e n e i t h e r of them was s t r o n g 
enough t o subdue t h e o t h e r they agreed on an a r m i s t i c e n e i t h e r 
66 
s i d e a l lowed t o s p r e a d i t s domina t ion . 
The UN i n t e r v e n t i o n in Korea succeeded in r e p e l l i n g the 
Communists from South Korea bu t i t f a i l e d t o s e t t l e the d i spu te* 
on t h e o t h e r hand t h e c o n f l i c t and the way in which a r m i s t i c 
agreement b r i n g i n g the war t o the p o s i t i o n of a b e l l i g e r e n t and 
67 
lowered i t s p r e s t i g e as an e f f e c t i v e world o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
While t h e Korean o p e r a t i o n were s t i l l c o n t i n u e d , a c r i s i s 
a r o s e i n the Middle E a s t when I s r a e l invaded in t h e S i n a i 
P e n i s u l a of Egypt . This was fo l lowed by t h e Anglo-French a t t a c k 
on Egypt , so t h a t t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t and the problem of 
68 
t h e Suez cana l became a mixed and compl ica ted problem. Egypts 
v i t a l importance was due t o the Suez cana l connec t ing the Red 
s e a and Medi te r ranean s e a . Suez cana l had been owned and run 
by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l company wi th French and Ottoman i n t e r e s t in 
c o n t r o l . A c t u a l l y , the B r i t i s h have never owned the c a n a l , i t 
6 6 . Krishan p a r s a d , g p . c i t . , p . 59 . 
6 7 . I b i d . , p . 6 0 . 
6 8 . S e t a l v a d , M.C., o p . c i t . , p . 3 9 . 
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has continued to be owned and operated by the Suez Canal Company, 
an In t e rna t iona l j o i n t s tock concern with an Egyptian Charter 
and a lease which was va l id un t i l 1968. At the time/ the 
canal was l e g a l l y scheduled to be turned over , f ree to the 
Egyptian government. Most of the Stockholders are French and 
i t s d i r ec to r s a re p r i c i i p a l l y Br i t i sh and French. The,Adminis-
t r a t i v e head of f ice was located in P a r i s . But with 44 percent 
of the Stock, the B r i t i s h government has always been the l a r g e s t 
s ing le shareholder and, as a r e s u l t , has had a strong voice in 
the opera t ion of the canal and has received a major share of 
conqpany's proceeds . The s t a t u s of the canal was es tab l i shed by 
the Constantinople convention of 1988 which was signed by 
Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Br i t a in , I t a l y , the 
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Netherlands, the Ottoman Empire, Rxissia and Spain. 
On July 26, 1956 President Carnal Abdel Nasser of Egypt 
announced the na t i ona l i z a t i on of the canal and a plan to finance 
the dam from income derived from Egyptian opera t ion of the canal . 
Since more than half of the o i l needed for the economy of Western 
Europe proceed throxigh the Canal, r eac t ion to the se izure was 
immediate. So the incident of the Egyptian na t i ona l i za t i on of 
the Suez Canal was brought before the Securi ty Council on 
6 9 . Goodspeed, S . S . , o p . c i t . , pp . 194-95^*^^ AZ/soT^^  
A r ^ Ace No. ^^'^ 
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September 23, 1956 at the request of France and the United 
70 
Kingdom, The Security Council met immediately placed the 
item on the agenda, and proceeded to examine the situation in 
71 
the usual manner. But the Security Council was failed to 
exercise its responsibility to maintain international peace 
and security due to the "lack of the unanimity of the permanent 
members - that is because of a ''veto" and "the matter 
was transferred to an emergency meeting of the General Assembly 
72 
under the 'Uniting for Peace' Reso lut ion .* 
on November 1, 1956, the General Assembly began i t s 
f i r s t emergency s p e c i a l s e s s i o n with the subjec t matter l imi ted 
t o the Suez c r i s i s . On the fo l lowing day a r e s o l u t i o n was 
adopted c a l l i n g for a c e a s e - f i r e , a withdrawal of forces , 
and pronpt a c t i o n towards re-opening the cana l . The B r i t i s h 
and the French ind ica ted t h a t they would comply only i f a 
uni ted Nations force moved in to the area to insure the carrying 
out of d e t a i l s concerning the armit ice and the reppening of 
73 
the cana l . The General Assembly requested the Secretary-<3eneral 
t o abserve and report promptly on the e f f e c t of the r e s o l u t i o n . 
70 . Goodspeed, S . S . , o p . c i t . , pp .194-95 . 
7 1 . Seta lvad, M.C., o p . c i t . . p . 39 . 
7 2 . Falk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S.H ( e d ) , o p . c i t . . p . 262, 
See a l s o <5oodspeed, S . S . , o p . c i t . . p . 197. 
73 . Bennet, A . L . , o p . c i t . . p . 143. 
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The next emergency meeting of the General Assembly took place 
covering a plan for a. United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) . 
The General Assembly adopted the r e so lu t i on • 'es tabl ishing a 
un i ted Nations Command for the force, headed by General Burns, 
who was to r e c r u i t o f f i ce r s . . . who s h a l l be na t iona ls of 
coun t r i es having permanent members in Securi ty Council*. The 
U.K. French Parartroops had already begun to drop in the canal 
zone, and i t seemed a t one time t h a t Prance and the United 
Kingdom were not incl ined to accept the c e a s e - f i r e . However, 
Soviet t h r e a t s of in te rvent ion and pressure from various coun-
t r i e s including those of the commonwealth and, more than 
anything e l s e , the pressure from the uni ted Sta tes r e su l t ed 
in the annouhcement t h a t although UK-French troops had landed 
in Egypt, France and the uni ted Kingdom would comply with the 
c e a s e - f i r e r e s o l u t i o n . The General Assembly, however, continued 
i t s s t eps for the establ ishment of the UNEF. The basic function 
given to the UNEF was to supervise the cessa t ion of h o s t a l i t i e s 
in accordance with the General Assembly r e so lu t ion of November 2, 
74 
1956. Insp i t e of the bes t e f fo r t of the General Assembly 
through UNEF the c r i s i s of Suez canal has not been solved. The 
s i g n i f i c a n t quest ion df what would hapf-)en should UNEF be requested 
74. Setalvad, M.C., o p . c i t . , p . 42. 
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to leave Egyptian territory was unanswered. Egyptian reparation 
demands from Israel* Britain and France remained unsolved. An 
ominous note was injected into the unsettled situation with the 
sale of Soviet submarines to Egypt in 1957. Consequently, the 
75 
United Nations continue to face grave problems in this area. 
On October 23, 1956 a peaceful demonstration took place 
in Budapest. One of the principal demands was the removal of 
the Soviet troops stationed in Hungry. However, in order to 
quell the disturbances, the Soviet union moved into Hungry a 
large units of armed forces. The Soviet tanks joined with the 
police inflicting heavy casualties on Hungarian citizens. 
Hungarian authorities wanted to negotiate with the USSR for the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops. But the result was unsuccessful 
and the fighting continued. The United States, the United 
Kingdom and France requested the summoning of an urgent meeting 
of the security Council to discuss "the situation created by 
the foreign military forces in Hungary violently repressing 
76 
the rights of Hungarian people". Inspite of Soviet protest 
the mattec was adopted on the agenda of the Security Council. 
75. Goodspeed, S,S., op.cit., p. 266. 
06. Setalvad, M.C., ppcit., p. 44, See also Goodspeed, S.S. 
op.cit., p. 266, 
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The Secur i ty Council discussed the s i t u a t i o n f u l l y . However, 
on November 3 , 1956 the uni ted S ta t e s introduced , 
under t h i s d ra f t r eso lu t ion which would have ca l l ed upon the 
Sovie t Union to **desist forthwith from any kind of intervention" 
in Hungary, and to withdraw i t s armed forces withoxit delay". 
I t a l so affirmed the r i g h t of Hungarian people to a government 
responsive to i t s independence and well-being dedicated to i t s 
independence and wel l -being. The Soviet union, however, 
c a s t a negat ive vote while other Counci l ' s member voted in i t s 
favour. So the Securi ty Council could not take decision on 
Hungarian s i t u a t i o n " . The Secur i ty Council then by a procedure 
of vote which did not requi re the unanimity of the permanent 
members, decided to c a l l a spec ia l sess ion of the General 
Assembly to "make appropr ia te recommendations concerning the 
s i t u a t i o n in Hungary' s ince the Security Council had been 
unable to exerc ise i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the maintenance of 
77 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y . The Soviet union of course, • 
p r o t e s t e d both the o r ig ina l i n sc r ip t i on of the Hungarian item 
on the agenda of the Securi ty Council and i t s subsequent t ransfer 
t o the General Assembly. However, the General Assembly met in 
an emergency sess ion and passed the US Resolutidn. The Secretary 
77, Palk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S.H., o p . c i t . , p . 236, a lso see 
Setalvad, M.C., o p . c i t . , p . 44 and Goodspeed, S,S>, o p . c i t . , 
p . 267. 
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General was requested to observe the sitviation directly "through 
representatives appointed by him to report thereon to the 
General Assembly and as soon as possible suggest methods to 
bring an end to the foreign intervention in Hungary ,..* 
On November 9, 1956 the General Assembly again called i;qpon the 
Soviet union to withdraw its forces from Hungary and recommen-
ded that free elections should be held in Hungary under United 
Nation auspices» and built their own form of government which they 
78 
want to establish. 
Further« the emergency special session of the General 
Assembly transferred the Hungarian situation to the agenda of 
the Assemblies regular session. During both the emergency and 
regular session the Soviet Union opposed the united Nations 
intervention in Hungary on the ground that it is domestic matter 
which under the Charter the General Assembly could not enter 
into. From time to time the General Assembly appoint observer 
committees and passed certain resolution for the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Hungary. But inspite of such resolution the 
General Assembly was unsuccessful and the Soviet troops still 
remained in Hungary. The General Assembly thereafter established 
a five member committee (Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and 
Uruguary) to investigate the Soviet-crush Hungarian revolt. At 
78, Goodspeed, S.S., op.cit., p. 267. 
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one of i t s s e s s i o n the General Assembly endorsed the report 
of the Committee. Among other th ings the General Assembly 
r e s o l u t i o n noted that the events which took place in October 
and NovenAser 1956, c o n s t i t u t e d a spontaneous nat ional upris ing; 
t h a t the present Hungarian regime had been imposed upon the 
Hungarian People by the armed i n t e r v e n t i o n of the USSR, that 
the human r i g h t s and freedoms guaranteed by the treaty of „ 
peace with Hungary, and that the S o v i e t union had carr ied out 
mass deportat ions of Hungarian c i t i z e n s to the USSR. In 
a d d i t i o n , the r e s o l u t i o n c a l l e d \ipon the USSR and the Hungarian 
a u t h o r i t i e s to d e s i s t from r e p r e s s i v e measures aga ins t the 
Hungarian population , to r e s p e c t tha t country's l i b e r t y and 
independence, and ensure the return of the deportees . The 
repor t i t s e l f had indicated c l e a r l y t h a t there was no evidence 
t o stjpport the Sov ie t charge t h a t the upris ing was fomented and 
hepled by react ionary c i r c l e s in Hungary and 'Western iropartia-
79 
l i s t s ' . 
However, the action of the General Assembly proved 
fruitless in the matter of Hungarian crisis. Inspite of all its 
efforts because the action complained against one of the permanent 
member and none of the Permanent members were prepared to 
79. Goodspeed/ S.S., op.cit., p. 268. 
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t ake the r i s k of f ight ing a war with the Soviet Union over 
80 
Hungary. 
In July 1960 due to the break down of in t e rna l law and 
order only a few days l a t t e r a f t e r the CSongo became independent 
brov;ght a telegram from the Congolese President and the prime 
Minis ter request ing the SecretaryHSeneral of the united Nations 
" to an urgent d ispatch of mi l i t a ry a s s i s t a n c e " . The Secre tary-
General repor ted the matter to the Securi ty Council. The 
Securi ty Council adopted a r e s o l u t i o n author is ing the Secre ta ry-
General " to take necessary s teps* in consul ta t ions with the 
government of the Congo/ to provide the government with such 
mi l i t a ry a s s i s t ance as may be necessary, u n t i l / through the 
e f f o r t s of the Congolese government with the technical ass i s tance 
of the United Nations, the nat ional secur i ty force may be ab le , 
81 
in the opinion of the Government/ to meet fu l ly t h e i r t a s k s ' . 
Within the Republic of the Congo, there were three r i v a l 
p o l i t i c a l groups - the P res iden t i a l group/ prime Min i s t e r ' s 
group and army led by the chief of the s t a f f . In these circums-
tances / the Security-General was confronted with the problem of 
80. Setalvad/ M.C., op.cit., p. 47. 
81, Greig, D.W., Introduction t;.o International LaWf 
Butterworths, London, 1970, p. 566. 
85 
how to Implement h is mandate and t o vhom to give the ass is tance 
82 
s t i p u l a t e d in the decision of the Securi ty Council. As D^g 
Hammerskjold himself said* **the Congo c r i s i s . . . put the 
Secre^-ariat under the heavies t s t r a i n which i t has ever had to 
fsir" , So, however, Hammerskjold himself requested on 13th July 
meetljg ©f the Securi ty Council, for the f i r s t time for the 
recot.^ji^atiQj^ of the c rea t ion of ONUC (from the French t i t l e , 
,'-fg^e de I ' organizat ion des Nations unies au Congo') and 
Hamn.j-gkjojLd himself said- l a t e r , t h a t " the only addi t ional 
guic^nce was provided by a s e t of p r inc ip l e s . . . which had been 
evo.yg(3 during the experience of the uni ted Nations Emergency 
for gH (ujqgp) an(3 which he had to ld the Secur i ty Council would 
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®9a.n adopt . On July 22, 1900, the Securi ty Council approved 
^^^ UN Congo operat ion (ONUC) , along the l i ne s of the UNEF. 
On \ugust 9, I960, the Securi ty Council approved another reso lu-
*^ *^)n confirming the author i ty given to the Secretary-General 
** .11 not be a par ty to or in any way intervene in or be used 
^^\ influence the outcome of any in t e rna l c o n f l i c t , cons t i tu t iona l 
°^ Otherwise", and ca l l ed \ipon a l l members to accept ' and carry 
^^ : the decis ions of the Secur i ty Council, and afford mutual 
82. Falk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S.H. (ed.) o p . c i t . , p . 319. 
83. Nicholas, H.G., The United Nations as a P o l i t i c a l instJS-
t u t i o n . Oxford University p r e s s . New York, 1971, p . 179. 
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a s s i s t a n c e in c a r r y i n g ou t t he measures decided upon by i t . 
However, as the S e c u r i t y Counci l d id not e x p l i c i t l y say t h a t 
i t was a c t i n g under Chapter VII and was tak ing enforcement 
measures under i t # t h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l assumed t h a t h i s 
own powers were l i m i t e d t o the moral and l ^ga l weight a t t a c h e d 
84 
t o t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s r e s o l u i t i o n . 
Consequent ly / t h e s i t u a t i o n of the Congo was f u r t h e r 
d e t e r i o r a t e d and t h e S e c u r i t y Council l ap sed i n t o i n a c t i v i t y . 
An emergency s p e c i a l s e s s i o n of the General Assembly was 
c a l l e d under t h e " U n i t i n g fo r peace" R e s o l u t i o n on September 17, 
1960. The General Assembly suppor t ed the o p e r a t i v e r e s o l u t i o n 
of the S e c u r i t y Counci l and c a l l e d upon the S e c r e t a r y General 
t o t a k e v igorous a c t i o n in t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of the maintenance 
of law and o r d e r th roughou t the Congo and t o sa feguard i t s 
u n i t y , i t s t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , and i t s p o l i t i c a l independence 
85 
i n the i n t e r e s t s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y . 
F u r t h e r , it A p r i l 1961, the C e n t r a l government in the 
Congo announced i t s w i l l i n g n e s s t o coope ra t e wi th the United 
Nat ions on the b a s i s of t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ' s r e s o l u t i o n . 
84 . S e t a l v a d , M.C., o p . c i t . , p p . 5 1 - 2 . 
8 5 . I b i d . , p . 5 3 . 
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Meanwhile tVte General Assembly a l so approved three reso lu t ions 
r 
dealing with the ac tua l conduct of the opera t ion in the 
Secre tary-Genera l ' s conduct of the ope ra t ions . The Soviet 
union became increas ingly jealous of his handling of the 
Congo c r i s i s and declared b lunt ly t h a t the Soviet union, however, 
and i t s a l l i e s no longer t r u s t e d Hammerskjold and on his to 
r e s i g n . La te r , Khruschev pleaded for the dismissal of the 
Secretary General DaCi Hammerskjold. The Soviet Union, however, 
wanted more than the removal of Hammerskjold and proposed a 
c o l l e c t i v e executive body of the United Nations (Troika) 
comprising three equal Secretary General - one represent ing 
the East one the West and one represent ing the non-aligned 
86 
c o u n t r i e s . But the General Assembly passed a r e so lu t ion tha t 
expressed a t ang ib le evidence of i t s bas ic confidence in the 
Secretary Genera l ' s Congo p o l i c i e s by appropr ia t ing 100 mil l ion 
87 
d o l l a r s to finance the Congo opera t ion . p a r t i a l l y because of 
f inanc ia l problems and p a r t i a l l y because of i t s p r inc ipa l mandate 
had been achieved, the ONUC was withdrawn from the Congo by 
July 30, 1964. Ernest W. Lefever concluding in tiis study of the 
Congo opera t ion , quoted by A.L* Bennet summarizes his overa l l 
86 . R . i . Mi l le r , DaCi Hammerskjold and Cr i s i s Diplomacy. 
Oceania Publ ic Publ ica t ions , I n c , 1961, pp. 297-98. 
87 . H.G. Nicholas, o p . c i t . , p . 185. 
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assessment of I t s shortcomings and success as fol lows: 
"The Congo peace keeping e f f o r t s was a novel, 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l , and a l e s s - than e f f i c i e n t e n t e r p r i s e . I t 
sometimes fumbled. I t made many small mistakes . I t was 
a s s a i l e d on a l l s i d e s . I t p rec ipa ta t ed a f inanc ia l c r i s i s for 
the uni ted Nations. But in the f ina l a n a l y s i s , the UN force 
roust be judged by i t s cont r ibu t ion to in t e rna t iona l s t a b i l i t y , 
r egard less of what other i n t e r e s t in might have served. So 
Judged, the mission succeeded. I t cont r ibuted to peace and 
s e c u r i t y in Central Africa and in the Wider World. 
As the l a r g e s t and most complex i n t e rna t i ona l l y 
au thor ized and administered operat ion in h i s t o r y , the Congo 
peacekeeping e f fo r t s i s r i c h in lessons and warnings for 
88 
t h e f u t u r e . 
Hence, in the Congo operation both the Security Council 
and the General Assembly took part in the decisions that were 
taken from time to time, and the General Assembly tried to act 
whenever the Security Council was inactive or failed to take 
88, Bennet, A.L., op.cit., p. 148, 
89 
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no te of t h e r a p i d l y moving s i t u a t i o n . 
A look a t t he peace-keep ing o p e r a t i o n s by t h e 'Un i t ing 
fo r Peace ' r e s o l u t i o n w i l l r e v e a l t h a t what the S e c u r i t y Council 
had not been a b l e t o ach ieve because of the l a c k of t h e unanimity 
of t h e Permanent members and t h e consequent use of ' v e t o ' . The 
Genera l Assembly cou ld e a s i l y do and on s e v e r a l occas ions se rved 
t h e world from d i s a s t e r " . Some Assembly r e s o l u t i o n s have 
a f f e c t e d the means a t the d i s p o s a l of s t a t e s i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s 
by c r e a t i n g new peace -keep ing t echn iques to i s o l a t e c l a s h e s 
between smaller nations or within a smaller nations from the 
largest East-West struggle. The communist retreat from South 
Korea in 1951; French and British evacuation of Egypt in 
1956, the US withdrawal from Lebanon in 1958, the Soviet retreat 
from the Congo after the fall of Lumumba were surely furthered 
90 
by these techniques. However, these operations had themselves 
been a source of crisis and the entire united Nations system 
was threatened as it did not serve the Big powers interests. 
89. Setalvad, M.C., op.cit., p. 55. 
90. Lande, G.R. 'The Changing effectiveness of the General 
Assembly Resolutions' in Falk, R.A., and Mendlovitz, S.H. 
(ed) , op.cit., p. 228. 
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The nineteenth sess ion of the General Assembly was v i r -
t u a l l y paralyzed by what i s commonly r e fe r red to as the financing 
91 92 
c r i s i s . The financing c r i s i s , (the Expenses case) provided 
the opponents an opportunity to warn t h a t the United Nations 
is a "sinking ship unworthy of fur ther t r u s t of mankind" and 
the fr iends of the uni ted Nations worried t h a t i t might not 
s u r v i v e . In f ac t / the c r i s i s which had pa ra l i s ed the organiza-
t i o n , was the product of many fac tors but the most s a l i e n t was 
the p e r s i s t e n t re fusa l of the Soviet Union and France to pay 
t h e i r shares of major peace-keeping operat ions ca r r i ed on the 
Suez and the Congo. The c r i s i s was not r e a l l y about maney. The 
amount involved were very minor. I t was p o l i t i c a l . I t was 
the c r i s i s t h a t has paralyzed the organizat ion as a consequence 
of p o l i t i c a l defaul t by Prance and the Soviet union without 
e i t h e r content ion of f inancia l hardship by the defaul t ing 
s t a t e s , or ac tua l i n a b i l i t y . Thereupon, the General Assembly 
under A r t i c l e 17(2) requested the In t e rna t iona l Court of Jus t i ce 
to advise whether the expenses of the two forces cons t i t u t e 
9 1 . Falk, R.A., and Mendlotitz, S.H., o p . c i t . , p . 693. 
92 . Year Book of the United Nations, 1962. off ice of the 
Publ ica t ion Information, uni ted Nations, New York, 1964, 
pp . 473, 477. 
T 91 
• t h e expenses of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i n the meaning of the 
93 
C h a r t e r . A r t i c l e 17(2) of t he Cha r t e r p r o v i d e s : 
"The expenses of t h e 0 r g a n i 2 a t i o n s h a l l be borne by 
94 
t h e Members a s appo r t i oned by t h e General Assembly". 
The o p i n i o n of t h e Court was d e l i v e r e d on Ju ly 2o, 1962. 
By a v o t e of 9 t o 5 t h e Court ag reed t h a t the f inanc ing of 
UNEF and ONUC " c o n s t i t u t e d ' expenses of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n ' W i t h i n 
t h e meaning of A r t i c l e 1 7 ( 2 ) " , t he r eby confirming the a u t h o -
9S 
r i t y of t h e General Assembly t o make t h e c o n t r o v e r s i a l assesment . 
The o p i n i o n of t h e ma jo r i ty i s of importance because i t c o n s t i -
t u t e s , t he "express j u d i c i a l approva l of the p r a c t i c a l t r a n s f e r 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t he maintenance of peace and s e c u r i t y 
96 
from t h e S e c u r i t y Council t o t h e General Assembly". i t has 
a l s o been obse rved : This op in ion of t h e Coiirt i s of c r u c i a l 
impor tance for more than one r e a s o n . I t involved not only the • 
o r g a n i z a t i o n b u t a l s o t h e f utvire of the o r g a n i z a t i o n in the 
main tenance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y . That the Court* 
9 3 . Year Book of t h e u n i t e d N a t i o n s , 1962, CD.c i t .« pp .437-477 . 
9 4 . BrownLie I , Basic pocuments i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, Oxford 
and the Clarend9n p r e s s , 196 7, p . 8. 
9 5 . F^ lk , R.A. and Mendlovi tz , S .H. , o p . c i t . , p . 697. 
9 6 . J . P . Hoggs, "Peace Keeping Costs and Char ter o b l i g a t i o n " , 
Columbia Law Review (New York) , v o l . 62 , p p . 1237-8, quoted 
by S e t a l v a d , M.C., o p . c i t . . p . 60 . 
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the principal judicial organ of the United Nations Organiza-
tions, has discharged its responsibility effectively is clear 
beyond any doubt. Until recently* fear was expressed in some 
quarters whether the court's opinion would get a favourable 
reception in the General Assembly of the United Nations. These 
doubts are dispelled now. The General Assembly has accepted 
97 
the advisory opinion of the International Court of justice**. 
However/ the Soviet union and France referred to pay even after 
the advisory opinion. Thereupon, the USA and its allies 
threatened to invoke Article 19 of the Charter which provides: 
"A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears 
in the payment of its financial contribution to the 
organization shall have no vote in the General Assem-
bly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds 
the amount of its contribution due from it for the 
preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, 
neverthless, permit such a member to vote if it is 
satisfied that the failure to pay is due to the condi-
98 
tions beyond the control of the members**. 
97. G.B. Raju, Editorial Comment, Indian Journal of International 
Law, vol. 2, pi 490, quoted by Setalvad, M.C., op.cit.. 
pp. 60-1, 
98. Brownlie, I., op.cit.^ p. 8. 
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The sov ie t union threatened to leave the organizat ion 
i f i t was deprived of i t s vote in the General Assembly. Even-
txjallY in AxjQUSt 1965, the USA and i t s a l l i e s gave way and 
agreed not to invoKe Ar t i c l e 19; in r e t u r n , the sov ie t union 
promised to mate a voluntary cont r ibu t ion towards the expenses 
99 
of the two fo rces . 
The s h i f t of emphasis from the secu r i t y Council to the 
General Assembly has aroused concern and "even in the absence 
of an organized sijperior Power to compel obedience, a government 
in the General Assembly forum wi l l not e a s i l y ignore the conduct 
and a t t i t u d e s of the majority of the UN members. I t must 
consider with case the poss ib le r eac t ion of o ther s t a t e s to a 
defiance of an Assembly r e s o l u t i o n . I t must weigh not only the 
immediate r eac t ion of t he na t ions , which would be most affected 
by such a breach, but a l so the e f f e c t on world publ ic opinion. 
The s h i f t of emphasis from Securi ty Council t o the General 
Assembly has n a t u r a l l y changed the balance of Power and influence. 
The Big Five do not enjoy in the General Assembly the same 
9 9 . Ahmad i s h t i a q . The General Assembly of the united Nations; 
A Study of Changing St ruc ture of Power, Indian Journal of 
P n l i t i c g , Vbl. XII , Nbs. 1-2, April-Acgust, 1978, p . 6 1 . 
100. Falk , R.A. and Mendlovitz, S.H. (ed.) o p . c i t . , p . 299, 
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p r i v i l e g e pos i t i on vhich they have in the Securi ty Council. 
This l o g i c a l l y weakens t h e i r g r ip over the Organization. 
Furthermore/ as the r e s u l t of the expansion of the membership 
of the General Assembly# i t has grown from a body of f i f t y one 
to one of one hundred of f i f t y -n ine (159) , the majority of 
which is non-Western< underdeveloped/, and who have gained 
t h e i r independence r ecen t l y . Roughly t h r ee - f i f t h s of the 
t o t a l membership belongs to the Afro-Asian 
101 
r e g i o n s . Many-of them are mini s t a t e s which are products of 
decoloniza t ion p rocess . They view f u l l roercbership in the 
o rgan iza t ion as the finjal stamp of approval on t h e i r independence. 
In addition* the Third World majority fee ls t h a t fur ther mini 
t o 
s t a t e membership would add / the i r preponderance in the United 
102 
Nat ions, as t h e i r voting behaviovir revea ls an anti-Western 
a t t i t u d e . I t may be of i n t e r e s t to describe b r i e f ly the change 
in voting behaviour in the General Assembly., s ince i t s establish" 
ment. In f a c t , the United S ta tes coiwnand an "automatic majority* 
or an "automatic two-third majority" in the General Assembly 
during the years before 1955 and thus exercised nearly couplete 
101 . Goodrich, L.M.,The United Nations in a Changing World. 
Columbia Universi ty Press , New York, 1974, p / 6 3 . — 
102. Gunter, M.M.. 'The United Nations Mini S t a t e Problems'. 
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cont ro l over the Assembly's dec is ion . In the following yea r s , 
from 1955 to 1960, the newly admitted members behaviour lessened 
America's control but the United S ta tes pos i t i on was s t i l l 
s t r o n g . F ina l ly , the considerable increase in membership since 
1960, i t i s s a id , has ended America's dominance. Undoubtedly, 
so fa r as the voting r e s u l t of the General Assembly are concerned, 
the p o s i t i o n of the USA is weakened a f t e r 1960 but in comparison 
to the USSR, on the combined categor ies of cold-war, peace-
keeping, arms cont ro l and disarmament i s sues , the United Sta tes 
continued to be general ly successful and the Soviet Union to be 
103 
unsuccessful . Thus, the s t rengthening of the General Assembly's 
pos i t i on and anti-Western a t t i t u d e of the Third-World - (which 
includes microstates) has been a source of i r r i t a n t of Western 
nat ions • 
The strengthened pos i t i on of the General Assembly with 
i t s increased membership almost a l l of them being underdeveloped 
(ifncluding mini s t a t e s ) has made the Super power r e l u c t a n t 
to en t ru s t r e a l power to a body where they do not have a ve to . 
To avoid a confrontat ion with the majority within the General 
Assembly, the idea of weighted voting has been suggested to 
103. Rowe, Edward, T . , Changing 
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arrest or reverse the voting behaviour in the General Assembly. 
The scheines for weighted voting are especially relevant to the 
workability of the Uniting for Peace Resolution and other Peace-
105 
keeping approaches. 
The important changes in the priorities of the united 
Nations, too, have significant consequences for the role of its 
organs, particularly the General Assembly. The organization 
has come to give higher priority to economic and social 
development, (it has been decided to appoint a Director-General 
for development and, international Economic ^operation, a high 
level official, with a rank just lower than the Secretary-
General, to provide leadership in the field of development and 
international economic cooperation. The Director-General will 
be appointed by the Secretary General^, decolonalization 
and the eliminetion of racial discrimination than to the 
maintenance of international peace and security and the matters 
to which the highest priority is given, is primarily the 
106 
responsibility of the General Assembly. 
104. eland Inis L. Jr., Sword into Plowsharesf The firoblerns 
and Progress of International Oi-aanization. Random House/ 
New York, 1963, p. l36. 
105. Palk, R.A. and Mendlotitz, S.H., op.cit., p. 299, 
14)6. Ahmad, Ishtiaq, The General Assembly of the United Nations: 
A Study of Changing Structure of Power, op.cit., p. 62, 
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After a l l , tbe General Assembly occupies a key pos i t ion 
in the network of the United Nations. I t was given important 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s wi thin the UN s t r u c t u r e , notably with respec t 
t o Economic and Social Council, The Trusteeship Council and 
the Specia l ized agencies . I t e l e c t s the nom^ermanent members 
of the Securi ty Council, the Economic and Social Council and 
the non-designated, members of the Trusteeship Counci l .^^I t 
considers and approves the budget of the uni ted Nations. The 
-power of purse** i s Universally recognized as the one of the 
most e f f ec t ive means by which an assembly can exercise control 
108 ^ ,^ 
over an execut ive . The General Assembly is e s s e n t i a l l y a 
d e l i b e r a t i v e , svpervisory, and reviewing body. I t has become 
a world plateform for m u l t i l a t e r a l diplomacy, p o l i t i c a l l y , 
the Assembly's predominance i s assumed by the f ac t t h a t i t i s 
only the p r i n c i p a l organ in which a l l member s t a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e 
on an equal b a s i s . As the only permanent p o l i t i c a l body in 
which a l l the s t a t e s are represented the General Assembly helps 
assume the performance of a l l t h e i r functions in in te rna t iona l 
107. Maclver, R.H./ The Nations and the United Nations, 
Manhattan Publishing Company, New York, 1959, p . 78. 
108. Andrew Boyd, o p . c i t . , p . 46. 
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system. Of a l l the United Nations bodies the General Assembly 
above a l l s tands for a conception of the World as a t rue 
• Comity of Nations• r a t h e r than a mere conglomeration of 
110 
regional blocs or hegemonial spheres. It is not ignorable one. 
109. M.J. Peterson* The General Assembly in World Politics * 
Allen and Unwin, London* Sydney* 1986* pp. 2-3-4. 
110. Evan Luard (ed.)/ The Evaluation of International 
organization, Fredericka prager. New York, Washington* 
1966, p. 56. 
CHAPTER - III 
RISE OF THE THIRD WORLD • THREATS TO BIGS HEGEMONY 
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Chapter-I l l 
Rise of the Third World I Threats to Bigs Heaewonv 
By the end of World War Second a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s t 
movement had/ to some ex ten t , gained momentum and desire 
t o independence had reached stupendous propor t ions , and 
the old colonial ism, based on t e r r i t o r i a l dominance, had 
near ly ended. The veloci ty of the a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s t move-
ment was so strong tha t when the UN Charter was wr i t t en in 
1945, the p r inc ip l e of Right of a l l peoples t o choose t he i r 
forms of government according to f ree ly expressed wishes 
1 
of the people concerned was acceptab le . 
So, the united Nations has declared in i t s Charter 
and in i t s delegate bodies, i t s i n t e r e s t in the movement to 
self-government. This i n t e r e s t i s exercised along two 
dimensions - t h a t of t ru s t eesh ip and t h a t of decolonization-
Of these two, decolonization has made up the bulk of the 
movement s ince the number of the t r u s t t e r r i t o r i e s and 
t h e i r populat ion represented only the t i p of the colonial 
1 . Bennet, A.L., In te rna t iona l organiza€<Lflins pr inc ip les and 
I s sues , prent ice Hall , I n c . , Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey,. 
1977, p . 262, 
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2 
iceberg . Since the establ ishment of the United Nations 
owing to decolonization process under the two systems 
(Triisteeship in Chapter XII and XIII and Non-self governing 
3 
t e r r i t o r i e s in Chapter XI, the membership of the united 
Nations has increased due to decolonizat ion process . I t 
4 
i s now 159 though in the beginning the membership was 51 . 
Most of them belong to the T^ird World. The term 'Third 
World was coined in 1952 by Alfred Sauvy a t the height of the 
cold war and applied to the developing countr ies tha t remained 
outs ide the two Power blocs but belonged to the non-communist 
world. Angelopoulos himself uses the phrase in a spec i f ic 
sense / namely/ to describe the groi:^ of developing countries 
in the ear ly 1970s. However, i t may be t h a t in the 1970s the 
phrase Tires Monde was used more in the sense of ' t h i r d Force' 
r a t h e r than ' t h i r d World', indica t ing 'ru^n-alignment' ra ther 
than underdevelopment. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note in th i s 
r e spec t t h a t William Safire in h is the New Language of 
P o l i t i c s (1972) does not include the ' t h i r d world' but in the 
2 . Bennet, A.L. , o p . c i t . , p . 262* 
3 . Goodspe^d, S .S . , The Nature and Function of Internationa^ 
Organization> New York, Oxford University Press , 1959, 
p . 507. 
4. M.J. Peterson, The General Assembly in World Politics. 
Allen and Unwin, London, Sydney, 1986/ p. 292. 
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discuss ion of ' t h i r d Force* poin ts ou t , s t r i c t l y speaking, 
t h e phrase in English^ should be " t h i r d World" following the 
French t i r e s Mr>nde but ' • third Force" is used nore frequently ' 
He argues t h a t t i r e s Monde was o r i g i n a l l y popularized in 
France during the period of 194 7-49 to describe the p o l i t i c a l 
5 
p a r t i e s t h a t took t h e i r s tand between Gau l l i s t and o the r s . 
With the lessening of the tens ion of the cold war and 
the c rea t ion of many new independent s t a t e s throughout 1960s 
t he Phrase t i r e s Monde seems to have taken on a new meaning 
which however r e t a ined something of the o r i g i n a l : 
(a) The confrontat ion was now seen as between the ' r i c h 
n a t i o n s ' and the 'poor na t i ons ' the r i c h nations a lso 
l^eing r e fe r red to as ' i n d u s t r i a l i z e d or developed; 
(b) the East-West confrontat ion was supplemented by a 
'North-South' confrontat ion, the majority of the 
tires-monde bring in the Southern hemisphere; 
(c) the o r i g i n a l confrontat ion of the East and the West was 
r e t a ined in the adoption of ' F i r s t World' to denote the 
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d market-economy countr ies /^the c a p i t a l i s t 
5 . Les l ie Wolf P h i i l i p e s , Why Third World? in Third World 
Quarterly January 1979,. Vol. 1, No. 1, Croom HELM Limited 
2-10, S t . Jhons Road, London, SWll, p . 105. 
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count r i es or the Western world» to indica te the 
c e n t r a l l y d i rec ted countr ies of the COMECON 
countr ies) the publ ic sec tor and the ro l e o£ the 
s t a t e in the overa l l economic system i s a much 
more important fac tors in " t h i r d w r l d " economics 
6 
r a t h e r than in t r a d i t i o n a l Western economics.•»"* 
The Third World/ which cons i s t s very l a rge ly of former 
colonies of European or American empires, con f l i c t between 
them has of ten involved or engaged the i n t e r e s t s of the former 
metropol i tan g rea t power or powers. During the post world 
war I I per iod , the ' F i r s t World* (Western, i ndus t r i a l i s ed , non-
communist s t a t e s ) and the 'Second World' (Communist States) 
developed t h e i r own confrontat ion and competition for influence 
and power and such confrontation and conpe t i t ion were a lso 
quickly t r a n s l a t e d to the Third World in i t s weakness/ with or 
7 
without i n v i t a t i o n . 
6 . Less i i e Wolf P h i l l i p e s , o p . c i t . , p . 108. 
7» T.B. Mi l l a r , Conflict and I^^tejcyention in Conflict and 
In t e rven t ion in the Third World (edited) by Mohammad 
Ayoob, Vikas Publishing House, Pv t . / New Delhi, 1980, 
p . 6 . 
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The Third World was not born as a free and ful ly 
autonomous e n t i t y . The process of colonian and imperial 
r u l e was in the nature of a big melting pdat in to which the 
Third World s o c i e t i e s were sucked and moulded. They emerged 
ou t of t h i s melting pot with hybrid s t ruc tu re s and d i s to r t ed 
p e r s o n a l i t i e s . But t h i s was not a l l the colonia l metropolis , 
while granting independence to a p a r t i c u l a r Third World 
country or reg ion . The pas t - co lon ia l behaviour of a Third 
World country or region, the re fo re , cannot be understood except 
in the context of t h i s melting pot processs* The continuing 
involvement of the g rea t powers in the Third World stemmed out 
8 
of t h i s process as a massive and, perhaps, inev i tab le legacy. 
The term and i t s various c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which add up 
t o make a country a p a r t of the Third World is one t h a t 
encompasses in i t s t o t a l i t y the feel ing of depr ivat ion , both 
in terms of the recen t pas t as well as the cur ren t s i t u a t i o n , 
among a la rge sec t ion of the World's populat ion v i s -av i s 
the p r iv i l eged few (in r e l a t i v e numerical terms) . Although 
the re are concrete ind ica tors - economic, mi l i t a ry and 
8. S.D. Muni, "South Asia" in "Confl ict and In tervent ion in 
the Third World", ed i t ed by Mohammad Ayoob, vikas 
publishing House^ Pv t . , L td . , New Delhi, 1980, p . 38. 
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technological - which bear out of t h i s t he s i s of deprivation 
and co lon ia l and neo-colonial exploi ta t ion • What binds the 
Third world t o g e t l ^ r - in an emotional and psychological 
sense - i s the percept ion of having been a t the ' receiving end* 
for the l a s t 3oO to 400 yea r s , i . e . a t the ' receiving end*, 
economically* m i l i t a r i l y , p o l i t i c a l l y and the corresponding 
des i r e to change t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s and to regain a degree 
of autonomy within the bas i ca l ly h i e r a rch ica l in ternat ional 
system t h a t gives a c e r t a i n amount of uni ty to the Third 
World - despi te i t s diverse nature and i t s own in te rna l problems— 
p a r t i c u l a r l y v i s - a - v i s the dominant powers within the interna-
t i o n a l system. And i t i s t h i s in te rp lay of the Third World's 
ques t for autonomy on the one hand with the g r ea t povers ' 
de s i r e to cont ro l and manage the in t e rna t iona l system on the 
o ther t h a t provides the major con t rad ic t ion within the 
9 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system as i t i s organised today. 
However, there i s g rea t inequal i ty in power, again in 
a l l i t s manifes ta t ions , including the economic, mi l i t a ry and 
p o l i t i c a l , between the g rea t powers of North (and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the Sviper powers) on the one hand and the countr ies of the 
9 . Ayoob, Mohammed, (ed.) Confl ict and Intervent ion in the 
Third world, Vikas Publishing Hbuse, P v t . , L td . , New Delhi, 
1980, p . 241. 
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Third on the o the r . This inequal i ty i s , in f a c t , q u a n t i t a t i -
vely so g r ea t t h a t i t tends to take on a q u a l i t a t i v e dimension 
as we l l . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t rue of the Third World's 
r e l a t i o n s h i p not only with the two superpowers, the US and the 
USSR, but a l so in i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p with the economic g i a n t s . 
West Germany and Japan as well as the countr ies of the EEC 
c o l l e c t i v e l y . I t i s t h i s inequal i ty which renders the Third 
World - or la rge p a r t s of the grea t powers - m i l i t a r i l y , 
economically and p o l i t i c a l l y - and thus renders the Third 
World's app i ra t ion for autonomy from these managers of the 
10 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system so d i f f i c u l t to achieve . 
Bennet wrote t h a t "Although se l f determination and 
s e l f - r u l e are a t t r a c t i v e goals for p o l i t i c a l l y dominated 
peop les , independence is no panacea, and the problems follow-
ing p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a t i o n may seem grea te r than those previously 
surmounted". Most of the Third World countr ies are economically 
underdeveloped and must face the dilemmas of gradual ly 
overcoming poverty, d i sease , hunger and l i t e r a c y . Both outside 
a id and in te rna l savings are required to bui ld a se l f -genera t ing 
economy. Without; populat ion cont ro l gains in t o t a l production 
may be p a r t i a l l y or completely wiped out on a per capi ta b a s i s . 
10. AJ:oob, Mohammed (ed) , Confl ict and in te rvent ion in the 
Third World, Vikas Publishing House, Pv t . , L td . . New Delhi, 
1980, p . 239. 
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Mini-s ta tes lack the economic base to bui ld a viable economic 
s t r u c t u r e independent of heavy r e l i ance on o t h e r s . Frus t ra -
t i o n s and impatience with slow progress are almost ce r t a in to 
accompany the s t ruggle for development. The in te rna t iona l 
community may seem deaf to the appeals of the poor nations for 
spec ia l concessions to help them escape from poverty. The 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t of the r i c h a re not l i k e l y to identify strongly 
with the welfare of impoverished peoples nor to be 
outweighted by humanitarian compassion. 
Once the unifying force of the common goal of indepen-
dence has been removed/ the p o l i t i c a l v i t a l i t y of the new 
s t a t e must a l so be s trengthened. The development of p o l i t i c a l 
consciousness of nat ion building must be undertaken. The 
s t rugg le for self-government i s a revolut ion t h a t has nearly 
run i t s course . But out of t h a t s t ruggle has emerged the new 
^orth-South confrontat ion of which the world is increasingly 
conscioios. Whether the nat ions of the globe with the a id of 
i n t e rna t i ona l machinery and cooperative e f fo r t s can successfully 
r e so lve , t he new challenges remains to be proven. At t h i s s tage 
i t seems c e r t a i n t h a t the new problems are no l e s s formidable 
11 
than the old**. 
1 1 . Bennet/ A.L«/ op .c i t .> p . 286, 
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After the p e s t Second World War, the h i e r a r ch i ca l nature 
of the i n t e rna t i ona l e<D nomic order put the two Super powers 
a t the apex of t h i s order and the Third World countr ies despite 
the euphoria follwing formal decolonisat ion in the 1950s and 
1960s/ have by and large remained/ although with c e r t a i n 
r e l a t i v e l y s ign i f i can t except ions , are a t the bottom of the 
12 
i n t e rna t i ona l pecking order . So the Third World countr ies 
faced the hardships and f ru s t r a t i ons of economic, soc ia l and 
13 
p o l i t i c a l d isequi l ibr ium. 
Due to disequi l ibr ium the regional conf l i c t s arose in 
the Third World countr ies and the g rea t powers in tervent ion 
became re levan t and important. The ro l e of the g rea t powers 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the Super Powers, in the in t e rna t iona l system has 
been pr imar i ly one of c o n f l i c t management and, qu i te of ten, 
of conf l i c t - exace rba t ion , r a t h e r than helping in the reso lu t ion 
14 
of regional c o n f l i c t s . As S i s i s Gi^ta argued t h a t : 
12 . Ayoob, Mohammed, o p . c i t . . pp. 239-40. 
13 . Bennet, A.L., p p . c i t . ^ p . 286. 
14. Ayoob, Mohammed, o p . c i t . , p . 250. 
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"Although the relation between Super powers have 
been stabilized, there has been a perceptible rise 
in the level of permisability of chaos, conflict 
and violence in those regions of the world which 
are peripheral for the purposes of the Central 
balance. The evident fact that conflicts and clashes 
among the states of these regions provide the great 
powers with a high degree of leverage on them and a 
great opportunity to increase their influence over 
the parties in such a conflict must be appearing to 
them as a matter of some advantage, though as status 
quo states they cannot but be interested in maintai-
ning a minimum degree of stability even in the remote 
15 
regions of the world.** 
Further, not only the roots of these regional conflicts 
in the Third World today traceable in substantial measure to the 
acts of ommission and commission performed by the Europen colonial 
powers - the great powers and conflict managers of earlier days— 
but that during and after the period of the former decolonisation 
they have been exacerbated by the policies, strategies and 
15. Sisir Gupta, Great power Relations, World Order and Third 
World', Foreign affairs Reports, Vol. 27, nos. 7-8 
(July-|^ugust, 1978), p. 135. 
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a c t i v i t i e s of those who cur ren t ly hold greats and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
super , power s t a t u s . Not only have these antagonisms been 
allowed to f e s t e r because low-level per iphera l tension su i t ed 
the i n t e r e s t s of the super powers once the cen t ra l balance had 
become s t a b i l i s e d , but , in f a c t , many of them were ac t ive ly 
encouraged, p a r t i c i c u l a r l y by means of arms t r a n s f e r , by those 
who aspi red to manage the pos t World War i n t e rna t iona l system, 
in add i t ion a new phase of gunboat diplomacy on the p a r t of 
the g r ea t powers now threa tens to erode if not completely 
destroy the inc ip i en t p o l i t i c a l autonomy of the Third World 
c o u n t r i e s . I t is i ron ic t h a t while negot ia t ions about a Hew 
In t e rna t i ona l Economic Order are in progress , the in te rna t iona l 
p o l i t i c a l order seems to be moving in a r e t rog re s s ive d i red t ion 
which, if i t i s not reversed, wil l led to increasing control of 
the Third World's p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s - conf l i c tua l or o ther -
wise - by the managers of the i n t e rna t iona l system and thus 
s t i f l e a l l demands for p o l i t i c a l j u s t i c e in the Third World -
a t the leve l of ind iv idua l , soc i a l s t ra tum, c l a s s , nation or 
r eg ion . This in essence, would perpetuate global inequal i ty 
in the guise of preserving World Order - an order imposed and 
con t ro l l ed by the big few (and p a r t i c u l a r l y by the big two) 
16 
for t h e i r own bene f i t . 
16. Ayoob, Mohammed, o p . c i t . , p . 252. 
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The xirge for economic emancipation and democratization 
of i n t e rna t i ona l economic r e l a t i o n s a l so l i e s a t the hear t of 
the demand for the es tabl ishment of a New In te rna t iona l Economic 
o rde r . (NIEO). The c a l l for an NIEO was not j u s t a c a l l for 
an "income r e d i s t r i b u t i o n from the r i c h to the poor". I t was 
according to the UN reso lu t ion on the subject (1 May 1974) , a 
c a l l for a r e s t ruc tu r i ng of in t e rna t iona l economic r e l a t i ons 
on the bas is of s 
"equity» sovereign equa l i t y , interdependence/ 
common i n t e r e s t s / and co-operat ion among a l l 
s t a t e s i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r economic and soc ia l 
system . . . (the NIEO) sha l l co r rec t i nequa l i t i e s 
and redress i n j u s t i c e / make i t poss ib le to e l i -
minate the widening gap between the developed and 
the developing coun t r i e s , and ensxire s t e a d i l y 
acce le ra t ing economic and soc ia l development and 
peace and j u s t i c e for the present and future 
17 
genra t ions" . 
17. K.B. Lai and S.D. Muni, Non-alignment and the In terna t ional 
Economic Order in Non-alignaent in Contemporary In ternat ional 
Relations (Ed) by Misra/ K.P., and Narayanan, K.R., Vikas 
Publishing House, P v t . , L td . , 1981, pp. 136-37. 
I l l 
Natural ly to transferrn i t into a j u s t economic order 
became the goal of the s t ruggle of the Third World aga ins t 
colonial ism neo-colonial exploi ta t ion» and the s t ruc tu re s of 
18 
economic dominance. 
However, the Third World countr ies have held many 
conferences •*to discuss and agree upon the most e f f ec t ive 
measures*' to remove the hindrances in way to economic and soc ia l 
19 
development. Such a conference met in Cairo in July 1962, With 
the Cairo Conference of July 1962, the Third World launched 
concerted e f fo r t s in the United Nations which led eventual ly to 
the es tabl ishment of the uni ted Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD .^ The UNCTAD held i t s i t s f i r s t meeting in 
Geneva from 23 March to 16 June 1964. The UNCTAD and the 
group of 77 have s ince become the p r inc ipa l forum and instrument 
20 
r e spec t i ve ly of the Third World's s t rugg le for a NIEO. 
18 . K.B. Lai and S.D. Muni, o p . c i t . , p . 138, 
19. Declarat ion of the Head of the S ta te or government of 
Non-aligned coun t r i e s , Belgrade, 1961, Paragraph 22, 
20. Cairo Declarat ion of Developing Countr ies , 1962, 
Paragraph 7. 
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There is a tendency on the p a r t of some Western 
scholars to describe the mi l i t a ry of the Third World as a 
product of ac t ion taken by the organizat ion of Petroleum— 
Exporting countr ies (OPEC) in 1973 as regards o i l p r ices and 
the a l leged objec t ive ibf p o l i t i c a l power of the leaders of 
the Third World. I t is t rue t h a t the OPEC ac t ion improved 
the bargaining s t r eng th of the Third World and put t e e th into i t 
i t s s t rugg le for an NIEO. The s i x t h and seventh spec ia l 
ses s ion of the General Assembly showed how the developed coun-
t r i e s themselves were persuaded to negot ia te with the t h i r d 
world on a l l the aspects of an NIEO. However, the hike in 
petroleum pr ices h i t the o i l importing developing countr ies 
too hard. So much so t h a t spec ia l e f f o r t s were made to preserve 
the s o l i d a r i t y and unity of purpose of the countr ies of the 
Third W&rld by neu t ra l i z ing the adverse s ide -e f f ec t s of the 
hike in petroleum pr ices on the developmental prospects of the 
21 
most se r ious ly affected c o u n t r i e s . 
Further* in the aftermath of the OPEC ac t ion , the non-
a l igned count r ies pledged t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y with the OPEC " in 
the face of the campaign of t h r e a t s , blackmail and r e p r i s a l s " . 
2 1 . Mishra, K.P. and Narayanan, K.R,, o p . c i t . , pp. 138-39 
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22 
tnainlY from the West. They a lso ha i led the OPEC ac t ion for 
23 
*"changing the direction of the financial resources. 
However/ the OPEC action would ubdoubtedly have lost 
much of its force and effectiveness. The overall approach of 
the Third World may be seen as following either or both of the 
two conflicting stands, viz antarky and delinking on the one 
24 
hand and integration and real interdependence on the other. 
Furthermore, "the special session of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations in 198o should review the implementation 
of the NIEO and take effective measures to promote its establish-
ment". Hence, the struggle of the Third World is too pessimis-
tic and counterproductive and has resolved equally serious 
economic crisis in the past and opened up new frontiers of 
25 
progress and perfection. 
There are possibilities of action on the part of the 
Third World at various levels. For one thing, the sovereign 
of the third World have accepted in principle the need to 
rationalize the economic structures of their societies. They 
2 2. Final Declaration, Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau, 
Havana March 1975, paragraph 135. 
23. Lima Programme for Mutual Assistance and Solidarity, 
Ministerial Conference, Lima, August 19 75, Paragraph 135, 
24. Mishra, K.p. and Narayanan, K.R., op.cit., p. 
25. Ibid., p. 152. 
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must demons t ra te p o l i t i c a l w i l l and d i s p l a y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
c a p a b i l i t i e s adqua t e ly to c a r r y o u t t h i s much-needed r a t i o n a -
26 
l i z a t i o n . 
Secondly , a t t he l e v e l of t h e T h i r d World as a group, 
t h e concep t of c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - r e l i a n c e i s l a r g e l y t h e o r i t i c a l . 
S u s t a i n e d e f f o r t s a r e needed t o e x p l o i t the avenues of 
c o o p e r a t i o n i d e n t i f i e d and t o ha rness the p o t e n t i a l s of growth 
and development . 
T h i r d l y , in n e g o t i a t i n g with the developed c o u n t r i e s on 
t h e s u b j e c t of a NIEO, t h e Th i rd World needs t o b u i l d up an 
adequa t e fund of knowledge and i n fo rma t ion , as a l s o t o develope 
t h e face of a t t e m p t s t o d i v i d e and work up i n t e r m e d i a t e s o l u -
t i o n s t o r e a c h agreed g o a l s . 
And l a s t l y , s i n c e r e and d i s p a s s i o n a t e . a t t e m p t s should be 
made by b o t h t h e North and t h e s o u t h t o harmonize , as much as 
p o s s i b l e , t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s of a, NIEO. One way t o do t h i s i s 
t o r e d e f i n e t h e g o a l s of development. An a t t empt was made t o 
c o n c e p t u a l i z e b a s i c needs'*, bu t i t appeared as though i t fias 
meant on ly for the Th i rd World. There may be p o s s i b i l i t y of 
2 6 . H.w. s i n g e r , "The New I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic Orders An 
Overview", Jou rna l of Mgdern Af r ican S tud i e s (London) , 
Vol . 16, No. 4 , p p . 539-48 . 
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redef ining the concept of "bas ic needs" as j u s t needs" t h a t 
a re equal ly appl icable to the North and the South. If i t is 
conceded t h a t there are na tura l and ecological l im i t s to deve-
lopment/ then the task of finding a median between subject 
27 
poverty and unres t ra ined affluence becomes inescapable. 
Consequently, the demand of the New In te rna t iona l 
Economic order by the Third World i s the more equi tab le d i s t r i -
bu t ia iof wealth between the r i c h and the poor nations to which 
the r i c h are not prepared. They a s s e r t in a l l conferences for 
t h e i r r i g h t s of equal share in the economic resources whether 
ava i l ab l e on land or a t sea . But uhfortunately they have nei ther 
money nor technology and for t h i s they are dependent upon the 
Super Powers. The Law of the Sea Conference demonstrated the 
d iv i s ions t h a t could appear on p a r t i c u l a r i s sues . The long-
coas t and broad margin s t a t e s in Africa and Latin America got 
t h e i r regions to endorse the 2oo-miles zone concept despi te the 
f ac t the more numerous land-locked and sho r t - coas t s t a t e s would 
ge t l i t t l e . An a l l i a n c e of Western and Third World land-based 
mineral producing s t a t e s secured agreement to production 
c e i l i n g s on deep seabed mining tha t assured g rea t ly reduced 
27 . Mishra, K . F . and Narayanan, K.R. (ed) , o p . c i t . , p . 153 
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revenues and hence greatly reduced sums for distribution to 
28 
Third World members of the proposed seabed authority. 
In addition, there is more indirect impact of regionalism 
on world economic policies which is expressed in the work of 
the United Nations and its associated agencies. This impact can 
best be described as 'regional pressure group activity. Moreover/ 
the result of its work has unambiguously been helpful to economic 
welfare in the Third World, as compared to earlier ways of 
approaching world trade and financial questions. It is beyond 
dispute that the grudging recognition on the part of the 
industrialised states that massive redistributive pllicies are 
in order would not have developed in the absence of this regio-
nal pressure group activity. However, to creating new institu-
tions capable of generating pressure for new policies and 
programmes aiming at redistribution, the Third World blocs have 
also succeeded in forcing changes in global Trade and financial 
29 
institution. 
The era into which the world is moving appears to be 
characterised by these features. Military blocs are losing 
28. Peterson, M.J., The General Assembly in world Politics, 
Allen and Unwin Eondon, Sydney, 1986, p. 296. 
29, J.T. Kenneth (ed.) , The Evolving United _Nations; A Pros-
pect for Peace? European Publications, London, 1971, 
pp. 132-33. 
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cohesion. The two Mil i tary bloa. leaclers can no longer 
on the obedience of t h e i r a l l i e s and w i l l therefore r e so r t 
to niore d i r e c t contacts and to more u n i l a t e r a l behaviour. 
Econonic blocs wi l l gain in cohesion. Western Europ will 
move towards uni ty on matters of defence and foreign pol icy. 
The global s ta lemate wi l l r espec t to nuclear weapons wi l l 
contini;ie whether or not there is a comprehensive arms control 
agreement. The p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuclear capab i l i ty wi l l a l so 
cont inue/ though the q u a l i t a t i v e differences between nuclear 
latecomers and the two superpowers wi l l not disappear . More 
e f f o r t wi l l go into re d i s t r i b u t i v e po l i c i e s designed to make 
the Third world catch up economically and s o c i a l l y , A 
consciousness towards safeguarding world ecological and environ-
mental values wi l l grow. The two super powers wil l show 
l e s s wi l l ingness towards mi l i t a ry and ideological s e l f -
a s s e r t i o n and other groupings wi l l show more. Nationalism 
in the West w i l l wane but i t wi l l in tens i fy in Third 
World. With the completion of the decolonizat ion process 
there w i l l be less global consensus on bas ic p o l i t i c a l and 
human r i g h t s and va lues . The World w i l l be divided into many 
untidy and overlapping blocs lacking c l e a r l y defined leaders 
and mi l i t a ry /d ip lomat i c power wi l l be d i s t r i b u t e d in a way in 
which some groups w i l l have dipropor t ionate shares in some 
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domains, and other groups in other dotnains. In sho r t , the 
30 
ensemble wi l l be a mult i -bloc asymmetric system. However* 
most of the Third World nations have refused to jo in e i t h e r 
of the bloc (the US bloc and the Soviet bloc) and have decided 
to be nonaligned - an another source of i r r i t a n t to the former 
co lon ia l powers. 
The United Nations which had been gathering a s t o r e of 
exper ience , a power of analys is and a slowly increasing t r e a -
sury of r e a l wisdom in the f i r s t f ive years of i t s labours . 
Much cons t i tuen t work was being put behind them tha t was to 
prepare the way for important developments of future h i s t o r y . 
But a f t e r the emergence of the Third World there was a sudden 
change in the order of events , and the world was given a v i s ib l e 
31 
and unwelcome example of in s t an t h i s t o r y . The two control l ing 
c o a l i t i o n s have ex i s t ed in the United Nations. From l a t e 1947 
u n t i l 1955 the uni ted Nations was con t ro l led by a c o a l i t i o n 
composed of Western European, Lat in American and Commonwealth 
s t a t e s led by the United S t a t e s . This c o a l i t i o n was p a r t i c u l a r l y 
uni ted on any issue t h a t involved or could be presented as 
involving, cold war competition with the Soviet Union. I t a l so 
30. J . T . Kenneth ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , p . 136. 
3 1 . Meigs, CorNfelia, The Great E^signi Men and Events in the 
United Nations from 1945 t o l 9 6 3 . L i t t l e Brown and Company 
Boston Toranto, 1964, p . 153. 
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usua l ly stayed together on issues of human r i g h t s , soc i a l 
concerns and in t e rna l UN adminis t ra t ion . However, there were 
sharp disagreements on co lonia l and economic quest ion which 
could be prepared over only with d i f f i c u l t y . Though th i s 
c o a l i t i o n worked well* i t was not a cohesive group. I t might 
b e s t be compared to a mult ipar ty c o a l i t i o n in a nat ional 
l e g i s l a t u r e , where power is kept by concessions concerning 
t h a t none of the p a r t i e s defects to the opposi t ion . None wi l l 
ge t everything i t wants, but each has to be given enough to be 
kept s a t i s f i e d . In in t e rna t iona l terms, the US-led majority 
was a very mixed group. Led by a super power, i t included 
severa l temporarily weakened but s t i l l r a t he r powerful s t a t e s , 
a number of s t a t e s lafge enough to be a t l e a s t regional t ha t 
would always be weak. The inculs ion of the strong s t a t e s meant 
the c o a l i t i o n had ample material resources for put t ing ideas 
in to a c t i o n , but the d iv i s ion between weak and strong was a 
source of tension as the weaker members wanted more a t t e n t i o n 
pa id to norms pro tec t ing weak s t a t e s while the strong wanted 
32 
to pursue c o n f l i c t with other s t rong powers. 
At f i r s t the cold war was s u f f i c i e n t l y intense to keep 
the c o a l i t i o n together ; the decolonization brought to the 
United Nations a number of new African and Asian s t a t e s l ess 
32 . Peterson, M.J. , o p . c i t . , pp. 11-12. 
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i n t e r e s t e d in cold war and wore i n t e r e s t ed in decolonizat ion 
and economic development. As the UN membership slowly rose , 
the US-led c o a l i t i o n began eroding. The influx of African 
and Asian members in the ear ly 1960s, simply overwhelmed a 
weakened US-led majority in two ways: F i r s t , i t increased the 
p r e - ex i s t i ng tensions between co lonia l and an t i co lon i a l s t a t e s 
and between i n d u s t r i a l and developing s t a t e s . Second, the 
new members were l ess t i e d to the United S ta tes and often 
frankly an t i -wes te rn close observers of the numbers r e a l i z ed 
even in the mid 1950s tha t the US-led c o a l i t i o n was having 
t roub le r a i s i n g two-thirds major i t i e s ; a f t e r 1960 i t was c lear 
t o a l l the US-led c o a l i t i o n could not even muster a simple 
major i ty . The l a t e 1950s and ea r ly 1960s were thus a time of 
exp lo ra t i on . Alone, the Africans and Asians almost cons t i tu ted 
a majority and the United Nations has been con t ro l l ed by a 
s t a b l e c o a l i t i o n of African, Asian and Latin American s t a t e s 
known as c o l l e c t i v e l y as the Third World. In 1964 t h i s coa l i t i on 
cons is ted e n t i r e l y of weak s t a t e s . The Third World c o a l i t i o n 
i s i n t e r e s t ed in using the uni ted Nations to crea te norms and 
r u l e s p ro tec t ing the weak from the strong and to advance group 
demands for changes In in t e rna t iona l regimes perceived as working 
to Third World in disadvantage. I t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y in te res ted 
in ending colonial ism, a t tacking a l l other forms of imperialism. 
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promoting development and c rea t ing new ru les for in te rna t iona l 
a c t i v i t y ensuring the Third World as a whole a g rea t e r share 
of mater ia l benef i t s and dec is ion-ma king power. Even today the 
Third World majority does not always have the mater ia l resources 
encourages compromise on mater ial ques t ions , but a l so g rea t e r 
r e s o r t to symbolic p o l i t i c s on matters t h a t a r e , or can be 
33 
presented a s , mainly moral i s sues . 
Yet differences among members in level of economic 
development, bas ic s t r u c t u r e of the economy regional s i t u a t i o n s , 
ind iv idual i n t e r e s t s and o r i en t a t ions in super power conf l i c t s 
a r e c rea t ing some strong in te rna l t ens ions . So f a r , the Third 
World majority has been able to manage these tensions by using 
two devices : F i r s t / proposals a re kept a t a broad leve l of 
gene ra l i t y and tend to cons i s t of loading everyone demands 
toge the r . Second, the c o a l i t i o n devotes much a t t e n t i o n to issues 
on which a l l can agree , such as the e r ad i ca t i on of r a c i s t regimes 
in Southern Afr ica/ the promotion of Pales tenian claims of 
s ta tehood, the advancement of economic development and the 
promotion of Third World influence in i n t e rna t iona l dec i s ion-
making. 
3 3 , Peterson, M.J. , o p . c i t . / pp . 12-13. 
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The main c o n t r a s t s between t h e two c o n t r o l l i n g c o a l i t i o n s 
l i e in t h e i r a cce s s t o m a t e r i a l power and t h e i r g o a l s . The 
US-led c o a l i t i o n had access t o ample m a t e r i a l power and used 
t h e u n i t e d Nat ion as one of many fo for a f f i rming 
and r e f i n i n g t h e goal of an open and u n i v e r s a l i s t i c system 
a l l o w i n g scope fo r i n d i v i d u a l and o t h e r n o n - s t a t e a c t o r s t h a t 
had been s t a t e d dur ing the second World War. The Third World 
c o a l i t i o n has a c c e s s t o r a t h e r l i m i t e d m a t e r i a l pdwer but 
wishes t o c h a l l e n g e many of t h e e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l norms 
and r e g i m e s . For i t , t h e Uni ted Nat ion i s one of the major 
f o r a a v a i l a b l e fo r any purpose and one of the few p l aces where 
t h o s e wi th t h e power t o make changes can be fo rced t o pay 
a t t e n t i o n t o t h e whole range of t h e Th i rd World demands. Fur ther / 
i t f i nds i n t h e UN's modest r e s o u r c e s a s i g n i f i c a n t a d d i t i o n to 
i t s own. The Th i rd World C o a l i t i o n thus uses the United Nation 
more i n t e n s e l y t h a n d id the US-led c o a l i t i o n , bu t i t s r e l a t i v e 
l a c k of power has exposed more c l e a r l y the l i m i t s on the United 
34 
Nat ions c o n t r o l over outcomes in World P o l i t i c s . 
The goals_Qf d i f f e r e n t c o a l i t i o n s , t h e i r r e l a t i v e power 
o u t s i d e t h e Uni ted Nat ions and t h e i r mechanisms for main ta in ing 
coherence a l l in f l i ience t h e way in which t h e u n i t e d Nations 
3 4 . P e t e r s o n , M . J . , o p . c i t . , p . 14 . 
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decisions are used. A coali t ion of strong s ta tes with status 
quo or reformist goals need not rely very heavily on symbolic 
p o l i t i c s . To the extent that i t does, symbols are used to 
keep coal i t ion members together, to encourage active roles in 
implementation and to pre-empt cri t icism by opponents. This 
does not mean that such a coali t ion will content i t se l f with 
mild appeals. Though i t s goals are modest, i t s rhetoric may 
be immodest when £t feels deeply threatened. The US-led 
coal i t ion provides an excellent example of such a coal i t ion. 
I t s modest goals allowed i t to use the united Nations relat ively 
sparingly. This is not to say that the US-led coali t ion had no 
vision of the World other than protecting the s ta tus quo. In 
cer ta in areas a l l or most of i t s members sought to change 
t rad i t iona l ' fea tures of international re la t ions . US policy-
makers shared the goal of creating an international system that 
would encourage democracy and free enterprise in a community 
of independent buf mutually cooperative s t a t e s , ^k^st members 
agreed that ending colonialism was necessary to a jus t interna-
t ional order/ but saw this as a gradual process in which the 
peoples of individual colonies would f i r s t be reached for 
independence. Additionally they expected that the smaller colo-
nies would usually apt for local self-government within a conti-
nued re la t ion to the metro-pale rather than independence. This 
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ending of colonial ism would mean global acceptance of s e l f -
determinat ion/ a major normative change as compared to the 
35 
n ine teen th century,. The concept of se l f -de te rmina t ion , for 
example/ has been used pr imar i ly as an instrument of p o l i t i c a l 
p ressure for the emancipation of colonies from Western r u l e . 
The Declarat ion on the Granting of Independence to colonia l 
36 
count r ies and peoples affirms t h a t " a l l peoples have the r i g h t 
to se l f -de te rmina t ion" , but is c l ea r ly di redted aga ins t the 
remnants of Western colonialism* and has been invoked in t h i s 
sense in subsequent Assembly r e s o l u t i o n s . "Self-determination" 
has a l so been invoked in the drive of the l e s s developed nation 
for reaff i rmat ion of t h e i r sovereignty in the economic sphere. 
In 195b# l a rge ly by the votes of these nations and over the 
oppos i t ion of mahy European s t a t e s , the Assembly's Third 
Committee adopted, for i r c lus ion as p a r t of Ar t i c l e 1 in both 
d ra f t covenants on Human Rights , the following provis ion: 
"All peoples have the r i g h t of se l f -de te rmina t ion . 
EST v i r tue of t h i s r i g h t they f ree ly determine t h e i r 
p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s and freely pursue t h e i r economic 
35. Peterson, M.J., op.cit., pp. 187-88. 
36. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 Dgc. 1960, 
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soc ia l and c u l t u r a l oevelopment. The peoples may/ 
for t h e i r own ends, f reely dispose of t h e i r natu-
r a l wealth and resources without prejudice to any 
ob l iga t ions a r i s ing out of in t e rna t iona l economic 
co-operation* based upa>n the p r i n c i p l e of mutual 
bene f i t , and in t e rna t iona l law. In no case may a 
37 
people be deprived of i t s own means of subs i s tence . " 
However, the US-led c o a l i t i o n sought to change the 
t r a d i t i o n a l presvj^ption t h a t , massacre a s ide , the way in which 
governments' t r e a t e d t h e i r own people was a domestic a f f a i r . 
This general notion t h a t peace and democracy depend on respec t 
for human r i g h t s received grea t impetus from the Axis, whose 
conduct appeared to prove once and for a l l the proposi t ion 
t h a t there was a strong l i nk betv;een suppression of the people a t 
home and aggression abroad. Both the UN Charter and the 
38 
Assembly decisions were used to promote new norms in t h i s a rea . 
The US-led c o a l i t i o n did employ some s t r i d e n t r h e t o r i c 
on occasion. Most was inspi red by cold war c o n f l i c t with the 
Soviet b loc , which offered a d i f fe ren t and uncongenial v is ion of 
3 7. GAOR: 10 Sess, 1955, Annexes, Agenda item 28-1 (A/30 77, para 717) 
3 8. Peterson, M.J. , o p . c i t . , p . 188. 
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the World. Whether t h i s v is ion is seen as an a t t a c k on democ-
racy on continued c a p i t a l i s t domination. I t represented cha l -
lenge to the bas ic tene ts of i n t e rna t iona l order held by the 
US-led c o a l i t i o n . This meant t ha t Soviet e f fo r t s to advance 
t h e i r v i s ion had to be combated with symbolic as well as mate-
r i a l means. Assembly r h e t o r i c provided p a r t of the symbolic 
39 
co n t r i bu t i on . 
A c o a l i t i o n of weak s t a t e s with far- reaching goals must 
r e l y very heavily on symbolic p o l i t i c s . To the extent t ha t 
i t s goals cannot be obtained with i t s own resources , such a 
c o a l i t i o n must persuade others to use t h e i r r e sou rce s . Symbo-
l i c p o l i t i c s are used/ then, to persuade others t h a t they ought 
to share the goals and help a t t a i n them. Such e f fo r t s can take 
any or a l l of three forms: showing how norms professed by the 
o the rs mandate accepting the weak c o a l i t i o n ' s goa l s , appealing 
to the o the rd ' s e l f - i n t e r e s t , or i n s t i l l i n g gu i l ty f ee l ings . 
The Third World c o a l i t i o n has used a l l three approaches to 
varying degrees. Western governments and individuals who 
profess any form of social ism or Marxism tend to be very sympa-
t h e t i c to Third world leaders professing s imi la r ideas . On 
occasion Third World ana lys ts and governments have echoed the 
39 . Peterson, M.J, , o p . c i t . , pp. 188-89, 
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views of Western ana lys t s who see in te rna t iona l economics as a 
posi t ive-sum game in which a l l can benef i t from cooperative 
a c t i v i t y and c e r t a i n changes in the r u l e s . Such arguments have 
not been prominent in Third World group r h e t o r i c . Westerners 
a r e not now a t t r a c t e d by argument t ha t the Third Wurrld's 
cu r ren t lack of development is West 's f a u l t . Worse, such 
arguments tend to backf i re , fear t ha t making any concession wi l l 
be seen as acceptance of the gu i l t y ve rd ic t has slowed down 
40 
some Western governments responses . 
Further/ the d i f fe ren t r a t e of economic progress among 
Third World s t a t e s suggest t ha t some of the blame for current 
Third World governments - a point advanced by the Japanese for 
41 
sometime and more recen t ly by Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. 
Whatever t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s in making decisions because of ou t -
s ide pressure / a growing number of Ih i rd World governments are 
beginning to admit t h a t they have the main r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for 
42 
deal ing with t h e i r own problems. 
A r a t i o n a l - a c t o r suggests t h a t Third World governments 
should drop the g u i l t arguments and focus ins tead on common 
40 . Peterson/ M.J. , o p . c i t . / pp . 189-90. 
4 1 . New York Times, l3 July 1983, p . A7 
4 2 . Peterson, M.J. , o p . c i t . . p . 190, 
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norms and i n t e r e s t s . However, a nvmber of f a c t o r s main ta in the 
prominance of g u i l t r h e t o r i c . F i r s t / the s lowness of Western 
r e sponse l e a d s t o extreme f r u s t r a t i o n and encourages i t s 
c o n t i n u e d u s e . Second, both t h e Nonaligned and grovqj of 77 were 
v u i l t on an a n t i c o l o n i a l ideology t h a t cannot be abandoned too 
q u i c k l y . Th i rd , t h e normal tendency of the o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o 
modify t h e i r i d e o l o g i e s s lowly i s powerfu l ly r e i n f o r c e d ' by the 
n e c e s s i t i e s of c o a l i t i o n maintenance and t h e i n t e r n a l workings 
of those g r o u p i n g s . The u s - l e d c o a l i t i o n however he ld t o g e t h e r 
f a r l onge r on c o l d war i s s u e s than on any o t h e r because of t h i s 
phenomenon; t h e Th i rd World c o a l i t i o n now uses c a l l s for a New 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic o r d e r and campaign a g a i n s t I s r a e l and 
South Af r i ca in the same way. F i n a l l y , the i n h e r i t e d a n t i c o -
l o n i a l ideo logy , p l u s the f a c t t h a t Western c o u n t r i e s happen to 
be on t h e o t h e r s i d e of t h e i s s u e s of the g r e a t e s t concern t o 
t h e Thi rd World, a l lows t h e more r a d i c a l members of both the 
Groiqj of 77 and the Non-al igned t o cappaign fo r con t inued a t t a c k s 
on the West, u n t i l l a t e l y , the r a d i c a l s were more o r g a n i z e d 
t h a n the moderates and a b l e t o push bo th t h e Group of 77 and Non-
a l i g n e d in a more a n t i - w e s t e r n d i r e c t i o n than s e t by the e x i s t i n g 
43 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i d e o l o g y . 
4 3 . P e t e r s o n , M . J . , o p . c i t . » p* 191. 
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The Third World c o a l i t i o n used the uni ted Nations to 
l eg i t imize i t s own views, but a l so used f a i r l y s t r i d e n t rhetor ic 
because i t wanted to overturn or g rea t ly rev i se the previously 
ex i s t ing in t e rna t iona l o rce r . An a l l i ance between the Soviet 
b loc . Third World Marxis t -Leninis t s t a t e s and other r ad ica l 
elements of the Non-aligned would, if they ever became' s u f f i -
c i e n t l y , the United Nation would be used to provide the doctr inal 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for act ions the majority was tackl ing to revamp 
44 
the world* 
Though there would s t i l l Le some competition for influence 
between the two coa l i t i ons - the US-led c o a l i t i o n and the Third 
World, t h i s would be l ess intense than in the cur ren t ideology-
fueled competition between the Super powers. The uni ted Nations 
then work as an i n s t i t u t i o n for mediating con f l i c t and 
encouraging cooperation much l i ke the San Francisco conference 
hoped. If, however, the strong wanted g rea te r changes, the 
weak would have considerable d i f f i c u l t y pro tec t ing themselves. 
The General Assembly would be used to l eg i t imize weak s t a t e 
views, but would be p i t i f u l sh ie ld aga ins t a concerted programme 
of revolu t ion or revis ionism sponsored by a c o a l i t i o n of 
44 . Peterson, M.J., o p . c i t . , p . 191. 
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strong s t a t e s . The Third World c o a l i t i o n r e a l i z e s t h i s 
i n t u i t i v e l y ; hence some members fears of "super power 
condominium" when the United S ta tes and the Soviet union moved 
in to a per iod of r e l a t i v e l y good r e l a t i o n s and began cooperating 
on a wider var ie ty of issues in the mid-1970s. The Third World 
c o a l i t i o n views i t s s i t u a t i o n very d i f f e r e n t l y . Lacking very 
many other advantages in World P o l i t i c s , i t has tended to place 
a very high value on con t ro l l ing the General Assembly and» if 
pos s ib l e / the Wider UN system. This requi res s t i c k i n g toge ther . 
The dynamics of c o a l i t i o n maintenance have led leaders of 
the Third World c o a l i t i o n to adopt a very d i f fe ren t pa t t e rn of 
l inkage in the General Assembly, which cons i s t s of aggregating 
many individual a b s t r a c t proposi t ions in to a l a rge r overa l l 
package. This process not only produces grand packages, such as 
the New In te rna t iona l Economic order or the New World Communi-
ca t ions and information order but i n f l a t e s t h e i r individual 
components as wel l . Development of the concept of "permanent 
Sovereignty over na tu ra l resources" provides a good example. 
The notion of the "permanent Sovereignty" was first advanced 
45 in the late 1950s. The efforts to promote the idea of 
45. Peterson, M.J., op.cit., p. 193. 
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"permanent sovereignty was continued. Hence the General Assembly 
decided a t i t s seventeenth sess ion to study c e r t a i n p r inc ip l e s 
of i n t e rna t iona l law concerning fr iendly r e l a t i o n s and coopera-
t i o n among s t a t e s , i t - included the p r inc ip l e of sovereign 
46 
e o u a l i t y . The spec ia l committee e s t ab l i shed a t the Assembly's 
47 
e igh teen th sess ion to prepare a r epor t kas able to reach 
agreement on the following "points of consensus**; 
1. All s t a t e enjoy, sovereign equa l i t y , AS subjects of 
i n t e rna t iona l law they have equal r i g h t s and d u t i e s , 
2, In p a r t i c u l a r , sovereign equa l i ty includes the following 
elementsi 
(a) Sta tes are j u r i d i c a l l y equa l . 
(b) Each s t a t e enjoys the r i g h t s inherent in fu l l 
sovere ignty . 
(c) Each s t a t e has the duty to respec t the pe rsona l i ty 
of o ther s t a t e s . 
(d) The t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and the p o l i t i c a l indepen-
dence of the s t a t e s are i nv io l ab l e . 
4 6 . GA Res . 1815 (XVII) , Dfecember 2 1 , 1962. 
4 7 . GA Res . 1966 (XVII I ) , December 16, 1963 
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(e) Each s t a t e has the r i g h t f r e e l y to choose and 
develop i t s p o l i t i c a l s o c i a l , economic, and 
c u l t u r a l s y s t e m s . 
(f) EaCh s t a t e has the duty t o comply f u l l y and in good 
f a i t h wi th i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s and t o l i v e 
48 
in peace wi th o t h e r s t a t e s . 
Among the p o i n t s on which t h e r e was l a c k of agreement was 
whether a s t a t e has t h e r i g h t t o d i spose f r e e l y of i t s n a t u r a l 
w e a l t h r e s o u r c e s . Some main ta ined t h a t an a b s o l u t e r i g h t e x i s t s . 
O t h e r s f e l t t h a t any s t a t e m e n t t o t h a t e f f e c t shou ld be ba lanced 
by a r e f e r e n c e t o the General Assembly 's r e s o l u t i o n of December 
14, 1962, which r e c o g n i z e d the i n t e r n a t i o n a l law s t a n d a r d as 
49 
govern ing compensat ion for e x p r o p r i a t i o n of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y . 
However, in t h e Cha r t e r of Economic Rights and Dut ies of 
S t a t e s R e s o l u t i o n 2381 ( x x i x ) , adopted in 1974, t h e concept had 
been broadened t o inc lude o t h e r forms of wea l t h , and the idea 
of h o s t - s t a t e c o n t r o l over f o r e i g n inves tment s t r e n g t h e n e d . 
4 8 . G.A. Res. 2103 ( x x ) , Dec. 20, 1965. 
49. Goodrich, L.M., Hambro, E. and Simons, A.p.. Charter 
of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 
Columbia University press, 1969, p. 40. 
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A r t i c l e 2(1) of the Chapter I I s a id t h a t every s t a t e has and 
s h a l l f ree ly exerc ise fu l l permanent sovereignty, including 
possession/ use, and d i sposa l , over a l l i t s wealth, na tura l 
resources and economic a c t i v i t i e s " . The r e s t of A r t i c l e 2 then 
s e t out a wide-ranging de f in i t ion of the mechanisms for exe rc i -
50 
s ing t h i s ' ' fu l l permanent sovereignty" . 
The united Nations, however, as s t a t e d in the Charter 
51 
i t s e l f i s based on ""the sovereign equa l i ty of a l l i t s members'* 
and as s t a t e d in i t s preamble, i s e s t ab l i shed to reaffirm f a i t h 
in fundamental human r i g h t s , in the digni ty and worth of human 
person, in the equal r i g h t s of men and women and nations large 
52 
and s m a l l . . . " The des i red goal of the organizat ion i s therefore 
t o achieve universal membership. Consequently, frequent references 
in the debates of the General Assembly and Security Council, in 
favour of universa l membership, have been made. A number of 
r e so lu t ions in favour ^of un ive r sa l i t y too , have been adopted. 
I t is evident from the debates t h a t i t was never intended to 
make the United Nations a club of like-minded* s t a t e s ; neiither 
was i t intended to prevent membership of s t a t e s having d i f fe ren t 
50 . Peterson, M.J«, o p . c i t . , p . 194. 
51. BrownLie, Ian, Basic Documents in International Law, Oxford 
at Clarendon Press, 1963-, p. 3, 
52« Ibid., p. 2. 
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(and undesirable) ideologies and different economic and political 
53 
systems. 
Under t h e Char te r t he membership of t h e u n i t e d Nations 
i s based on the p r i n c i p l e of ' ' un iversa l i ty** not ' ' s e l e c t i v i t y ' * . 
Members a r e r e q u i r e d t o be " l i ke -minded" • a t l e a s t to the e x t e n t 
t h a t a l l must s u p p o r t t h e purposes and p r i n c i p l e s of t he Char ter 
54 
and f u l f i l t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s t h e r e u n d e r . According t o A r t i c l e 
4(A) ""Membership in the United Nat ions i s open t o a l l o the r peace -
l o v i n g s t a t e s which a c c e p t t h e o b l i g a t i o n s con ta ined in t h e 
p r e s e n t C h a r t e r and in the judgement of the o r g a n i z a t i o n , a r e 
55 
a b l e and w i l l i n g t o c a r r y ou t t h e s e o b l i g a t i o n s " . 
A s t a t e , which f u l f i l l s t h e c r i t e r i a s t a t e d above, i s 
f r e e t o s e e k , and would be and has been g e n e r a l l y admi t ted t o 
t h e Uni ted Nat ions membership has been r e j e c t e d on the ground X 
t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t c o u n t r y , though independent , i s too smal l or 
56 
poor t o s i ippor t t h e burdens of t h e membership. N a t u r a l l y , 
t h e r e i s an enormous i n c r e a s e i n the membership of the u n i t e d 
N a t i o n s . Fur thermore / as the r e s u l t of t he expenaion of the 
5 3 . Ahmad, I .# The Problem of Membership of M i c r o s t a t e s i n the 
u n i t e d N a t i o n s , Ind ian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c s , Voi. X I I I , 
Nos. 1-2, Apr i l -Augus t 1979, p . 126. 
5 4 . Goodr ich , L.M,, Hambro, E. and Simons, A . P . ( e d . ) , o p . c l t . , 
p . 77 
5 5 . I b i d . , p . 85; BrownLie , ! . , o p . c i t . , p . 4 , 
5 6 . Smith , S.A. De . , Exceedi tq Small i n Pawce t t , JES Higgins 
Rosalyn ( e d . ) , I n t e r n a t i o n a l b r q a n i z a t i o n Law in Mnvement, 
Oxford Unvy, P r e s s , London, New York, 1974, p . 6 5 . 
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membership of the uni ted Nations, i t has grown from a body of 
f i f ty -one members to one hundred f i f t y nine (159); the majority 
of which is non-WeStern, underdeveloped# and who have gained 
t h e i r independence r e c e n t l y . Roughly th ree f i f t h s of the t o t a l 
57 
membership belongs to the Afro-Asian reg ions . Many of them are 
mini s t a t e s which are the product of the decolonizat ion process . 
They view fu l l membership in the organizat ion as the f ina l 
stamp of approval on t h e i r independence. In add i t ion , the Third 
World majority fee l s t h a t fur ther minis ta te membership would 
58 
add to t h e i r preponderance in the United Nations. 
However, the increasing number of min is ta tes in the 
un i ted Nations has become a matter of concern to roany.L.M. 
Goodrich has pointed out the concern as follows^ 
"Pears have been expressed t h a t the admission of 
minis ta tes to the uni ted Nations wi l l s t r a i n the 
physical and f inanc ia l resources of the organiza-
t i o n , overload the already heavy agenda of i t s 
p r i n c i p a l organs, and fur ther reduce the c r e d i b i -
l i t y and influence of the General Assembly r e so lu -
tions'* . 
57. Goodrich, L.M., The United Nations in a Changing World^ 
Columbia Universi ty P ress , New York, 1974, p . 63 . 
58 . Gvinter, M.M., 'The United Nations Ministate probleiws', 
American Journal of In t e rna t iona l Law. Jan . 1977, 
vo l . 71, No. ! • p . 116. 
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He f u r t h e r p o i n t s o u t t h a t : 
" t h e bturdens of t h e membership a r e o f t e n beyond 
what t h e s e smal l nevr s t a t e s can c a r r y . This 
a p p l i e s bo th t o t h e f i n a n c i a l c o s t s and t h e need of 
making a v a i l a b l e fo r UN s e r v i c e and p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
in v a r i o u s Uni ted Nat ions meet ings p e r s o n n e l t h a t 
59 
i s needed for domest ic p u r p o s e s " , 
Those s t :^por t ing t h e m i n i s t a t e s r i g h t t o membership in 
t h e Uni ted Nat ions a rgue t h a t t h e s e a r e e x a g g e r a t e d . They 
b e l i e v e t h a t the i n t e r e s t of populas and weal thy s t a t e s a r e 
p r o t e c t e d by the b a s i c f a c t t h a t t he General Assembly can make 
recommendations on ly r a t h e r t han make d e c i s i o n s t h a t a r e l e g a l l y 
b i n d i n g on governments . Furthermore* the i n f l u e n c e of theve 
s t a t e s i n General Assembly dec is ion-making i s no t measured by 
the vo te s t h a t p r o c e s s , p roponents emphasize t h a t m i n i s t a t e s 
r e q u i r e s e r v i c e s which t h e United Nations i s b e s t equipped to 
60 
p r o v i d e . The m i n i s t a t e s on the o t h e r hand/ view t h e i r admiss ion 
t o t h e Uni ted Nat ions a s "a necessa ry c e t t i f i c a t e of s o v e r e i g n t y " 
5 9 . Goodr ich , LM. o p . c i t . ^ p p . 4 9 - 5 0 . 
6 0 , I b i d . » p . 50 . 
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and "most economical o r conven ien t form of m u l t i p l e d i p l o m a t i c 
61 
r e s p r e s e n t a t i o n . Through the u n i t e d N a t i o n s , t he m i n i s t a t e s 
c o u l d s e c u r e a wide range of e s s e n t i a l t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e * 
I n a d d i t i o n , t h e u n i t e d Nat ions can g ive the s t a t e m e n t of smal l 
c o u n t r i e s the p o l i t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e they need t o conduct t h e i r 
62 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s e f f e c t i v e l y . Hence/ a p p o s i t i o n t o 
t h e i r membership would be " e a s i l y equa ted t o neo impe r i a l ism ^  
63 
an onus no one wanted t o b e a r " . 
However, t he m i n i s t a t e problem e x i s t s and would con t inue 
t o e x i s t s i n the yea r ahead as w i th t h e i r i n c r e a s i n g number, 
t h e y wovild be and a r e in a p o s i t i o n t o change t h e ba lance of 
power in t h e Uni ted N a t i o n s , warns a keen a n a l y s t of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . In h i s a r t i c l e , e n t i t l e d " M i c r o s t a t e s in world 
a f f a i r s " , p u b l i s h e d on May 9 , 1971, by American E n t e r p r i s e 
I n s t i t u t e f o r P u b l i c Rgsea rch , Elmer p i i s c k e , P ro fe s so r of 
GoveriOTent and p o l i t i c s , a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Maryland, p o i n t s o u t 
t h a t t he r a p i d J>rol i f e r a t i o n of the t i n y c o u n t r i e s in the world 
community a r e being c o n s i d e r e d as a sou rce of e r o s i o n of t h e i r 
6 1 . Boyce, P . J . , " M i c r o s t a t e s and The i r Role i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Affa i rs '* / A u s t r a l i a n Fore ign A f f a i r s Record, Vol. 4 8 , 
No. 1/ J a n , 1944, p . 2 3 . 
6 2 . Goodr ich , L.M., o p . c i t . , p . 50 . 
6 3 . Gun te r , M.M., "What Happened t o the Uni ted Nat ions M i n i s t a t e 
problem?" , American J o u r n a l of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law. Vol. 71 , 
No. 1, j a n , 19 77, p . 116. 
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influence in the i n t e rna t iona l cotnmxintty. "Like i t or not*, 
Pl ischke a s s e r t s , **microstates p r o l i f e r a t i o n is eroding the 
equalibriura in the community of na t ions ; co r rec t ive ac t ions 
a r e ava i lab le and sooner or l a t e r hard decisions wi l l have to 
be made*. The only p r a c t i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e " , he suggests i s " to 
r e t a r d and manage the future p r o l i f e r a t i o n of s t a t e s and del imit 
micros ta te p a r t i c i p a t i o n in forms and a f f a i r s " . Unchecked 
increase of the roinistates", pl ischke maintains " i s l i k e l y to 
e f f e c t the ex is t ing in t e rna t iona l system" and express doubts a t 
t o "whether the change can be endured by the World community". 
According to him, in the years ahead, 50 to 100 or even more 
s t a t e s may gain independence and i f unchecked, w i l l jo in the 
uni ted Nations; two out of every f ive then would be roicrostates. 
He has t r e a t e d those s t a t e s as microsta tes whose populat ion is 
fewer than 300,000 people . Many eminent scholars of i n t e r n a t i o -
nal organiza t ion and persons assoc ia ted with the United Nations 
have questioned se r ious ly the Wisdom of admitting min i s t a t e s , 
64 
t o f u l l membership. But l ega l ly t h e i r object ions to the 
admission of min i s ta tes is not t enab le . 
However, many new s t a t e s are being admitted as f a l l 
members in the United Nations ( e . g . Seychelles) and they are 
64 . Ahmad, I s h t i a q , o p . c i t . , pp . 127-28. 
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behaving in as respons ib le manner as t h e i r 'big brethern*? 
The American apprehension about t h e i r conduct or ro le in the 
United Nations seems to be based on vrrong presumptions. Any 
endeavour to reopen the i s sue would not be in the bes t i n t e r e s t 
o£ the in t ernat iona l community. Moreover# seeking amendment 
of the Charter means opening a pandora's box and some of i t 
may even l e d to the quest ioning of the b a s i c pos tu la tes of the 
Charter such as 'b ig power' hegemony in the Security Council, 
the veto e t c . and even i f consensus i s arr ived a t about the 
"special**« a s s o c i a t e membership for the m i n i s t a t e s , the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community would be faced with another problem, 
perhaps, very unf la t ter ing and unpleasant one, namely, the 
f i n a n c i a l impl icat ions a r i s i n g out of the tow~tier membership* 
a l l the more so i f a large nuinber of member-nations decided to 
have the b e n e f i t s without t h e i r share of f i n a n c i a l burden. 
Would the organ iza t ion then contdnue to be a world organizat ion 
both in the name and s p i r i t or be converted more or l e s s into a • 
65 
Rich Nations Club? Moreover, the United Nations can help these 
new and emerging s t a t e s to f ind t h e i r p lace in the world. 
Secretary-General Hammerskjold o f t en re ferred to the important 
r o l e of the United Nations during t h i s per iod o f t r a n s i t i o n . 
6 5 . Ahmad, I s h t i a q , o p . c i t . , p . 132. 
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"The united Nations is now, or w i l l be t h e i r organizat ion 
The United Nations can give them a framework for t h e i r young 
na t iona l l i f e which gives a deeper sense and g rea te r weight to 
66 
independence*. 
However, the increasing number of Membership in the united 
Nations almost a l l of them being underdeveloped (including the 
minis ta tes) has made the Big Five r e l u c t a n t to e n t r u s t the r e a l 
power to a body wtere they do not have a ve to . This increase 
has upset the voting behaviour in the United Nations - the change 
as not iced was anti-American. This changed in the voting beha-
viour caused anxiety in American and Western c i r c l e . Vlhich 
consequently a f fec t s the decision-making in the United Nations 
General Assembly. Which worries the Western powers and makes the 
Third World happy, in f a c t , the uni ted S ta tes commanded an 
^automatic majority* or an "automatic two-third majority" in 
the General Assembly dir ing the years before 1955 and thus 
exerc i sed nearby complete control over the General Assembly's 
dec i s ion . In the following years , from 1955 to 1960, the newly 
admitted members behaviour lessened America's control but the 
66 . Bailey, D. Sydney, The General Assembly of the United 
Nat ions . (Revised edi t ion) , p a l l Mall p r e s s , London, 
Dunmon. 1960, p . 239. 
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uni ted Sta tes pos i t i on was s t i l l s t rong . F ina l l y , the cons i -
derable increase in the membership s ince 1960# i t i s said» has 
ended America's dominance. Undoubtedly, so far as the voting 
r e s u l t s of the General Assembly are concerned, the pos i t i on of 
the USA i s weakened a f t e r I960 but in comparison to the USSR, on 
combined ca tegor ies of cold war, peace-keeping, arms control and 
disarmament i s sue s , the United S ta tes continued to be general ly 
67 
successful and the Soviet union to be unsuccessful . Even the 
ant i -Western a t t i t u d e of the Third World ^ (which includes 
microsta tes) has been a source of i r r i t a n t for v/estern na t ions , 
PurtVermore, of a l l the organs of the United Nations, the 
General Assembly has received the g r e a t e s t impact from the 
increase in the number of sovereign s t a t e s which would have made 
68 
the General Assembly something of a r e a l world forum. The balance 
of the organiza t ion has , of course , d r a s t i c a l l y s h i f t e d . Whereas 
the majority of the o r ig ina l members were European and American 
the majority now are African and Asian. This has brought in i t s 
t r a i n a s h i f t in the concerns and in the charac ter of the 
6 7. Rowe, Edward, T . , 'Changing pa t t e rns in the Voting success 
of Member S ta tes in the United Nations General Assembly, 1945 
t o 1966, In t e rna t iona l Organizat ion, Vol. 23 , 1969, pp.232-52, 
68 . Bai ly, D. Sydney, o p . c i t . , p . 239. 
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Organizat ion . 
The US-led c o a l i t i o n s p l i t on the i s sue in 1950. The 
S o v i e t b loc was then able to make common cause with African, 
Asian and Lat in American members and with t h e i r help s t e e r greater 
a t t e n t i o n t o group and econoaiic r i g h t s in the mid-1950s. Thus 
even before the I h i r d World c o a l i t i o n had coa le sced Assembly 
d i s c u s s i o n s were emphasizing group and economic r i g h t s over 
70 
ind iv idua l and p o l i t i c a l ones . 
The dynamics of c o a l i t i o n formation and maintenance 
a f f e c t the symbolic content of dec i s ions and so inf luence 
a d d r e s s e s ' response to them. The US-led c o a l i t i o n held together 
by disaggregat ing i s s u e s . I t s leading members' tendency to 
p r e f e r d i saggregat ion was re in forced by the f a c t that only by 
keeping things separate could the l o n g - r o l l i n g that he ld the 
c o a l i t i o n together cont inue . Except on co ld war i s s u e s , where 
an a l l - o u t i d e o l o g i c a l c o n t e s t with the Sov ie t b loc mandated 
s t r i d e n t r h e t o r i c , the symbolic appeals were u n i v e r s a l i s t i c but. 
measured. Nothing encouraged supporters or opponents to f e e l 
urgency except when warfare had broken out and UN mechanisms 
were being used to control or s top i t . However, the Third World 
6 9 . padelford, N . J . , Goodrich, L.M., ( e d ) , Fredrick A, prager 
Inc . Pub l i shers , Washington, New York, London, 1965, p.16 
70 . Peterson, M.J., o p . c i t . , p . 198. 
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c o a l i t i o n had a very d i f fe ren t s t y l e both i t s leading members' 
ph i losophica l preferences and the c o a l i t i o n ' s i n t e rna l dynamics 
encourage l inking issiaes. Not only do individioal i s sue s , but 
i t a l so l inked to the grand overchanging concepts of a n t i colo-
nial ism and a New In te rna t iona l Economic Order. The appeals 
remain universal i s t i e * but i t was opposed by the uni ted Sta tes 
and the other Western coun te r i e s . The Soviet bloc* too, has 
found elements to ' oppose in Third World demands. Whereas the 
Soviet bloc si:pports general c a l l s for a new in t e rna t iona l econo-
mic order but i s happiest about those p a r t s emphasixir^ the 
r o l e of s t a t e guidance in the economy and l e a s t happy about 
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those p a r t s e n t a i l i n g new demands on the UN's regu la r budget. 
Unless the re i s a strong confrontat ion between the super 
powers and the Third World governments. But the Third World 
governments are genera l ly happy with the amount of time a l loca ted 
to various issues in the General Assembly. Col lec t ive ly they 
con t ro l the agenda, and ind iv idua l ly they can "tune out* by 
adopting the groufi pos i t i on or f a i l i n g to amend meetings. The 
i n d u s t r i a l coun t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y of the west, f ee l the ef fec ts 
of r e a l l o c a t i o n more s ince the dynamics of Assembly a c t i v i t y pu l l 
them in the pos i t i on of responding on most i s s u e s . The norms 
7 1 . Peterson, H . J . , o p . c i t . , pp. 206-207. 
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Of the Third World s o l i d a r i t y i s s u f f i c i e n t l y s t rong , however/ 
t h a t the l e s s e n t h u s i a s t i c as wel l as those who might oppose can 
be put under severe pressure with accusat ions of be traya l . For 
i n s t a n c e , Antigua and Barbuda has invoked i t in e f f o r t s to 
secure wide agreement to bring Antarctrica to the General 
Assembly as a North-South i s s u e . I t has t r i e d to deal with the 
inconvenient f a c t tha t s evera l Third World s t a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e 
in the very regime i t wants to rep lace by such things a s : 
**What i s sad about t h i s connivance between the 
Eastern and Western i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nat ions i s tha t 
a handful of Third World countr ies are a c t i v e p a r t i -
c ipants with them in e f f o r t s to exelude other Third 
72 
World nat ions" . 
H i s t o r i c a l l y the General Assembly has known two s t a b l e 
c o n t r o l l i n g c o a l i t i o n s : the US-led c o a l i t i o n of 194 7-55 and t t e 
Third world that has c o n t r o l l e d the General Assembly s ince 1964, 
The two c o a l i t i o n s have had d i f f e r e n t g o a l s . Members of the 
US-led c o a l i t i o n had created the UN and the wider pos t war 
in ternat iona l order . Consequently, the u s - l e d c o a l i t i o n used the 
72 , Peterson, M.J. , o p . c i t , , pp. 2 2 o - 2 l , 
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Genaeral A3senibly# l i k e the r e s t of the UN« to leg i t imize and 
s t reng then the postwar order* to continue c e r t a i n reform 
e f f o r t s begun in the Charter - such as e labora t ion of the notion 
of human r i g h t s - and to defend i t aga ins t the a l t e r n a t i v e 
v i s ion promoted by the Soviet b loc . Most members of the Third 
World c o a l i t i o n a t t a i n e d independence a f t e r pos t war order was 
c r ea t ed . Even in areas where t h e i r subs tan t ive complaints are 
mild/ t h i s fac t leads many to des i re change simply because they 
do not l i k e l iv ing in a system they had no r o l e in c rea t ing . 
However, the members range from midly r e v i s i o n i s t frankly 
revo lu t ionary in t h e i r prefer red v is ions of the in te rna t iona l 
o rde r . They agree on severa l broad proposi t ions* such as the 
Deed to end a l l remanants of colonial ism in in t e rna t iona l 
r e l a t i o n s . Even so* the Third World c o a l i t i o n s t i l l xises the 
General Assembly and the r e s t of the UN system to challenge many 
aspects of the cu r ren t i n t e rna t iona l o rde r . Both the US-led 
and the Third World coa l i t i ons have faced problems of maintaining 
coherence. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to say t h a t one ' s problems were more 
severe than the o t h e r ' s , though circumstances have allowed the 
Third World c o a l i t i o n a longer per iod of dominance. Both c o a l i -
t ions have faced the problem of having to maintain a r e l a t i v e l y 
l a rge s i z e - two-thirds of the UN membership - in order to have 
the f u l l e s t con t ro l over a c t i v i t i e s and dec i s ions . Each 
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Each coa l i t ion has faced different problems in maintaining control. 
over two-thirds of vetes/ and has used different methods to do 
s o . These in turn have affected Assembly proceedings and deci-
73 
sions in varying ways. 
I n i t i a l l y the Third World coa l i t i on had a far easier time 
maintaining i t s e l f . All members were re la t ive ly weak in global 
terms# though some were regional powers. All members were also 
developing s t a t e s . Most had experienced colonial rule and/or 
rac ia l discrimination. Many also faced serious shallenges to 
building an e f f ec t ive s tate apparatus and i n s t i l l i n g a posit ive 
sense of national identity among their populations. The Afro-
Asian members also desired to remain outside superpower 
c o n f l i c t s . However* while the coa l i t ion would often change 
pos i t ion when i t began disagreement among Third World states 
because the coordination mechanisms were used to ensure that 
potent ia l ly div is ive questions did not appear on the Assembly's 
e f f e c t i v e agenda. The next few years are l ike ly to see 
the t h i r d w o r l d coa l i t ion limp along and 
the issues that Unite the Third World are those where the 
contrast with Western posi t ion i s greatest . Once the discussion 
73. Peterson, M.J., opcit.. pp. 254T55. 
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g e t s beyond g e n e r a l i t i e s to s p e c i f i c s , i n t r a - T h i r d World 
d i v i s i o n s s u r f a c e . This can be s e e n in such ma t t e r s as 
comprehensive North-South n e g o t i a t i o n s , the law of the s e a , 
o r UN r e s t r u c t u r i n g , where i n t r a - T h i r d World d i f f e r e n c e s a r e 
a t l e a s t as r e s p o n s i b l e fo r the r e s u l t s (or l a c k of r e s u l t s ) 
a s West-South c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . By 1985 t h i s t r e n d had proceeded 
f o r enough t h a t c o a l i t i o n fo rmat ion in the Assembly was a nore 
f l u i d p roces s t han i t had been f i v e y e a r s b e f o r e , though not 
s o f l u i d as t o d u p l i c a t e the s i t u a t i o n between 1955 and 1964, 
The Th i rd World c o a l i t i o n took over t h e p r e c e d e n t s for 
Assembly importance c r e a t e d by t h e US-led c o a l i t i o n , but 
a t t e m p t e d t o use t h e Assembly for ambi t ions g o a l s i t l acked t h e 
c a p a b i l i t y t o a t t a i n . Most groi;^) p r o g r e s s came from p l ay ing the 
Un i t ed S t a t e s off a g a i n s t t he S o v i e t Union wherever the 
s u p e r powers saw i n f l u e n c e i n the Thi rd World as impor tan t t o 
t h e i r g e n e r a l c a n p e t i t i o n , a p p e a l i n g t o s y m p a t h e t i c segments of 
74 
Western op in ion a b l e t o away t h e i r governments ' p o l i c i e s . 
Whatever the f u t u r e of t h e Th i rd World c o a l i t i o n , t hen 
t h e General Assembly w i l l con t inue t o have c o n s i d e r a b l e in f luence 
o v e r the agenda of World p o l i t i c s . I t w i l l con t inue to be used 
f o r p roduc ing a s e t of d e c i s i o n s t h a t commit UN bodies t o 
7 4 . P e t e r s o n , M. J . , o p . c i t * , p p . 256 t o 260. 
148 
par t icu lar ac t iv i t i e s and attempt to move member s ta tes in 
directions preferred by a majority. Though i t will continue 
to make many decisions, the impact of these decisions on the 
actual outcomes of po l i t i ca l interactions in the international 
system will remain weaK. Again, whatever the future of the 
Third World coal i t ion, the treatment of different types of issue 
will not change too much. Most decisions will s t i l l deal with 
internal UN questions. Side-taking will remain easier than 
confl ic t management in a body of almost 159 members as long as 
those members remain seriously divided by ideology and different 
degrees of happiness or unhappiness with the international status 
quo. Assembly debates will continue to be more useful for 
focussing on global issues and general points rather than on 
local questions or detai ls of specific in teract ions . The 
Assembly will also continue to reinforce the position of s ta tes 
as central actors in World po l i t i c s though i t s global conferen-
ces will provide new opportunities for lobbying by non-govern-
mental organizations. However, some aspects of Assembly po l i t i cs 
wi l l change as coali t ions evolve. Both the content of decisions 
and the strength of attempts to use the Assembly as a revis ionis t 
force in world po l i t i c s will change if the Third World coalitions 
continues to fragment. I t may even turn out in retrospect that 
the neo-conservative-isolationist al l iance now directing united 
States policy towards hos ta l i ty and confrontation in the United 
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Nations i s a lagged response* more relevant to the Third World 
rhetoric and a c t i v i t i e s of the inid-1970s than to -.those of the 
1980s. Yet that a l l iance may help perpetuate the very habits i t 
deplores by providing the fragmenting Third World with rallying 
points that help i t maintain cohesion with longer. 
I^wever, with the demdLse of European imperialism and the 
r i s e of Asian and African peoples to fu l l statehood/ the World 
has become p o l i t i c a l l y , cul tural ly and ideological ly increasingly 
fragmented. To some extent the process of fragaentation has been 
paral le led by forces which have made for integration. There has, 
therefore, been a process of integration as well as of fragmen-
ta t ion . Integration psychologically and technologically fragmen-
tations p o l i t i c a l l y , cul tural ly and ideological ly . Further, 
Professor Goodwin points out that the world in which the organi-
zation has ex is ted has been marked by both fragmentation and 
integration; these world pressures being ref lected in the changing 
relations between the United Nations principal organs, i t i s 
against th i s background that he looks at power and responsiblity 
within the united Nations and investigates such problems as the 
impact of i t s expanded membership voting patterns and the cost 
75. Peterson, M.J., o p . c i t . , 263-64. 
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76 
of viniversality. Naturally it is a source of irritant to the 
Big powers. Because the Third World states now became more 
prominent framework of the United Nations. The Third World 
States now demanding the revision of entire international Law. 
The present International Law* in the opinion of the Third World 
nations, is framed by the Western colonialist to suit their 
need. However/ it should be admitted without reservation, that 
the importance of the United Nations role in the years ahead 
and its effectiveness in dealing with the questions brought 
before it will be largely determined by the leadership and 
support of the superpowers which guides and will continue to 
guide the destiny of the world. The peaceful utilization of 
atomic energy, the proper use of the sea and the s^ a-ljed, protec-
tion of environment against pollutions, preservation of limited 
natural resources for present and future generation need 
77 
leadership and support by super powers. Hence, any attempt to 
compel the major powers to agree with what they disagree will 
certainly not be in the interest of international community. For 
a happy and healthy international society* the B4.g Fives to be 
conceded a leading role in international relations. 
76, J.J. Kenneth (ed)./ The Evolving United Nations; A Prospect 
for Peace. Europa Publication London, 1971, pp. 1 to 35. 
77. Goodrich, L.M.,^p.cit., :p. 271. 
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Ch^pt^^r - l y 
Amendment of the Charters problems and prospects 
"Twice in our l i f e t ime", the scourage of war has brought 
1 
unto ld sorrow to mankind and/ a f t e r each war, mankind pledged to 
e s t a b l i s h condit ions which would ensure a b e t t e r world-order—a 
world in which violence could be reduced s i g n i f i c a n t l y ; peace and 
s e c u r i t y could be ensxired; and condit ions for economic' welfare, 
s o c i a l j u s t i c e and respec t for human r i g h t s and fundamental 
freedoms could be c rea ted . Thus, the League of Nations came into 
ex i s tence a f t e r the f i r s t World War, which unfortunately, f a i l ed 
and then came the United Nations — a revised version of the 
2 
League — undoubtedly improved in many respec t and represent ing 
a fresh approach to the world problems with the purpose " to 
maintain i n t e rna t i ona l peace and s e c u r i t y ; to develope fr iendly 
r e l a t i o n s among na t ions" , and to cooperate i n t e rna t i ona l l y in 
solving " i n t e r n a t i o n a l problem of economic, s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l or 
! • Brown Lie , I , , Basic Documents in In te rna t iona l y^ aw, 
Oxford the Clarendon Press , 1967, p . 2. 
2 . Claud, I n i s . ^ r . . Swords Into Plowshares The Problem anri 
Progress of i n t e rna t i ona l Organizat ion. Ranr^nmH;:;;^ 
New York, 1963, p . 66. " " ^ ' ^•'= 
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humanitarian charac ter / and in promoting respec t for human 
3 
r i g h t s and fundamental freedoms for a l l . 
The Charter of the United Nations was es tab l i shed as a 
consequence of the uni ted Nations Conference on In te rna t iona l 
o rganiza t ion held a t San Francisco and was brought into force on 
4 
26 June 1945. I t i s a truism t h a t the tex t of the Charter gives 
a qu i t e misleading p i c tu r e of the United Nations as i t i s today. 
Those provis ions of the Charter which were claimed by i t s 
authors to provide the new organiza t ion with t e e t h tha t the League 
of Nations did not have, e i t h e r have never been used <fir have in 
p r a c t i c e been of l i t t l e importance. New emphasis and new 
methods have been developed through the l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of Charter p rov i s ions . There have not always been acceptable to 
a l l members; however# the process of adoption and development 
5 
con t inues . 
The goal of the organiza t ion has been " to save succeeding 
generat ions from the scourage of war* but Hammerskjold noted t h a t 
i t s a b i l i t y to r e a l i z e t h i s goal of peace was dependent upon i t s 
3 . BrownLie, I . , o p . c i t . , p . 3 . 
4« I b i d . . p . 1. 
5 . Padelford, N.J . and Goodrich, L.M. ( e d ) . . The United Nations 
in-Balance; Accomplishment and Prospect . Fredericka, Praeger, 
New York, Washington, 1965, p . 65. 
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i t s ab i l i ty to proijiote five principles or objectives which are 
contained in purposes and principles of the Charter. Hammerskjold 
defined these objectives as the prevention of armed conflict 
through negotiation, the prohibition of the use of force"save in 
the common in teres t" , equal economic opportunity, po l i t i ca l 
6 
equal i ty , and the rule of Law or ju s t i ce . 
Dag HammersJ^jold made i t quite clear that these pr inc i -
ples are interdependent principles of a to ta l approach to the 
relat ionship of human beings - whether between individuals in 
a s ta te or between people grouped into s t a t e s . He viewed 
the attempt on the par t of the international community to 
es tabl i sh i t s re lat ions along the lines of these principles as 
an extension of a movement which had been taking place for 
centuries to rea l ize the principles of western c iv i l iza t ion in 
the World. Pol i t ica l ly they were the standards of l iberal 
democracy which had been gaining ascendancy within many s tates 
over the past several centuries. He yiewed their adoption by 
the United Nations as "the f i r s t step towards the establishment 
of an international democracy of peoples, bringing a l l nations— 
irrespective of history, size or wealth — together on an equal 
m^m-yim^^'^^'m^li^m 
6. Zacher, M., Dag Hammerskjold. United Nations^ Columbia 
University press New York and London, 1970, p. 22. 
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an equal basis of pastness in the vast venture of creating a 
7 
true world community. 
To a large extent, the rules reflect standards accepted 
as binding for life within states. Thus, they appear, in the 
main, as a projection into the international arena and interna-
tional community of purposes and principles already accepted as 
being of national validity. In this sense the Charter takes 
a first step in the direction of organized international 
8 
community. 
Andrew W. Cordier , the former executive Ass i s t an t to 
t he Secretary-General remarked t h a t Hammerskjold ""had almost 
a r e l i g i o u s re spec t for the Charter" and by a statement of his 
own tha t the uni ted Nations represented "a secu la r 'Church' of 
9 
ideals and p r i n c i p l e s in i n t e rna t iona l a f f a i r s . 
Hammerskjold's other three goals of equal economic 
oppor tuni ty , p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y , and the ru le of law are d i rec ted 
a t removing the underlying causes of i n t e rna t iona l c o n f l i c t and 
7. Zacher, M., o o . c i t . . pp . 22-3 . 
8* I b i d . . p . 23. 
5« Ibi^d. 
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a t building a nore peaceful vx>rld order. Their real izat ion is 
sought in te ra l ia in order to help eliminate the concurrence of 
international disputes and violence and hence the need for 
employing means of easing tensionsjiJ. s e t t l i ng disputes and 
controll ing the use of force. The operational meaning of these 
three principles are quite clear in that there respective 
purposes are; 
(1) to promote greater equality in economic standards 
among the peoples of the v^rld; 
(2) to seciire a voice for a l l nations in international 
decisionoaking in addition to protecting the po l i -
t i c a l independence of a l l nations; and 
(3) to expand the number of questions of international concern 
which are covered by international agreements and to 
promote the settlement of disputes and the creation 
of cooperative endeavoures in accordance with legal 
procedure and substantive law. 
Furthermore/ the responsibi l i t ies which the Charter 
requires of the member s ta tes are bases of power of the organi-
zation in tha t , as obligations, they can be invoked by the 
members or one of the principal organ to include certain members 
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to conform to a c e r t a i n time of ac t i on . The roost basic respon-
s i b i l i t y incvunbent xjpon the members was t h a t they a c t in 
accordance with the p r inc ip l e s and purposes of the Charter . The 
o the r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was t h a t the members comply with those 
decis ions of the united Nations organ which were meant to be 
binding in the Charter and t h a t they give ser ious considerat ion 
10 
to those decisions which were only recommendations. 
A respons ibk l i ty t h a t s t a t e s assumed in adhering to the 
Charter was to submit conf l i c t s and tensions to the organizat ion 
for solut ion* sometimes even when these were a l t e r n a t i v e methods 
for solving them. From the above points Hammerskjold thought 
t h a t s t a t e s had an ob l iga t ion use i t as much as poss ib le in 
order to s t rengthen the uni ted Nations e f fec t iveness . 
Hammerskjold once wrote; 
" to f a i l to use the uni ted Nations machinery on these 
occasions when the Charter p l a in ly means t h a t i t should 
be used/ to improvise other arrangements without over-
r i d ing p r a c t i c a l and p o l i t i c a l reasons — t h i s may tend 
to weaken the pos i t i on of the organiza t ion and reduce 
i t s influence and e f fec t iveness , even when the ul t imate 
10. Zacher, M./ o p . c i t . / p . 26 
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11 
purpose is a United Nations purpose**. 
Haratnerskjold a l so sa id t h a t there was an ' ' i n t e r e s t of the member 
Governments in s t rengthening the i n s t i t u t i o n s which they have 
12 
endovjed with a pricoary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for viorld peace n 
However, the members wotdd led to a gradual atrophy of 
and loss of respect for the united Nations as an instrument for 
cooperation and peace- and the confrontation had developed 
between the East and the West — particularly between the Soviet 
Union, United States and the United Kingdom — and this was 
hardly conducive to the fall implementation and carrying out of 
14 
the Charter provision for keeping the peace. The two power 
blocs of conflicting ideologies trying for world domination 
terribly shook the very corner stone of the united Nations. 
Every international problem that arose was judged by the two 
power blocs in the process of world strategy and they took 
their guard in the arena of united Nations accordingly. The 
real issue dwindled into insignificance and the united Nations 
11. Zacher, M., gp.cit., pp. 26-7. 
12. Ibid., p. 27. 
13» Ibid., 
14, Padelford, N.J. and Goodrich, L.M., op.cit., p. 68. 
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I t s e l f became the pawn of the world s t r a t e g y and f a i l e d to deal 
15 
with the s i t u a t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y . 
Ffowever/ the united Nations is the beginning of a world 
community and i t s Charter the beginning of world law. I t i s , 
in f a c t , "our only hope", c e r t a i n l y our only p resen t hope for 
achieving the grand objec t ives of peace, economic well-being and 
s o c i a l advancement. At the same t ime, the community is r iven 
with d issens ion, the law fragmentary, and the underlying in te rna -
l s 
t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n fraught with c o n f l i c t . 
Consequently/ the United Nations has broad purposes and 
p r i n c i p l e s which have been nentioned in the Char ter . The f i r s t 
two a r t i c l e s of the Charter s t a t e the p r i n c i p l e s and aims to which 
17 
the uni ted Nations and i t s members are dedicated. The primary 
ob jec t ive of the uni ted Nations i s to maintain In te rna t iona l 
peace and Sedurity which was b u i l t up around the concept of 
c o l l e c t i v e s ecu r i t y - t h a t s ecu r i t y of one nat ion i s the concern 
of a l l / t h a t the nat ions breaking the law wi l l be r e s i s t e d 
15 . Parsad, Krishan, The united Nations and Power p o l i t i c s . 
Seal pub l ica t ion Center, Om Niwas, Agra, 1956, pp. 129-30. 
16. F e l l e r , A.H., United Nations and World Community, L i t t l e 
Brown &Oo., Bostan, 1953, p . 144, 
17. Goodspeed, S .S . , The Nature and Function of In te rna t iona l 
Orqanizationf Oxford un ive r s i t y . New York, 1959, p . 111. 
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collectively by the armed forces of all member states, such 
military operations being conducted by the Security Council 
18 
through i t s m i l i t a r y s t a f f committee (Art. 41 to 49) . 
At a l l times the .o rgan iza t ion is to develop fr iendly 
r e l a t i o n s among nat ions based on r e spec t for p r i n c i p l e of equal 
r i g h t s and se l f -de terminat ion of people, paragraph 3 of Ar t ic le 
1 s p e l l s ou t add i t iona l aims of the United Nations. Economic 
equa l i t y and soc i a l progress are not only condi t ions favourable 
t o a durable peace but are themselves worthy objec t ives of an 
i n t e rna t i ona l o rgan iza t ion . Thus the members of the uni ted 
Nations are pledged to cooperate not o n l y ' i n solving in te rna t iona l 
problems of an economic, s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l or humanitarian charac te r ' 
but a lso in promoting and encouraging respec t for human r i gh t s 
and fundamental freedoms for a l l without d i s t i n c t i o n s as to 
r a c e , sex , language, or r e l i g i o n ' . To be a cent re for harmoni-
zing the ac t ions of nat ion^ in the at ta inment of the common 
19 
ends . 
18. prakash Krishna, op .c i - t . , p . 131, 
19« Goodspeed, S.S. / o p . c i t . , pp. 111-12; Bennet, A.L. , In te rna-
t i o n a l Organizat ion; Pr inc ip les and lssi^S| , p ren t ice Hall , 
Inc , Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey , 1977, pp. 46 to 48; 
Brown Lie , I . , o p . c i t . , p . 
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Iimnediately following the primary statement of purposes, 
the Char ter , in Ar t i c l e 2, e s t ab l i shes the basic ru le s of conduct 
o r p r i n c i p l e s upon which the uni ted Nations i s founded and, i t is 
hoped v;pon which i t w i l l opera te . The f i r s t and probably the 
most fundamental p r i n c i p l e i s the sovereign equa l i ty of a l l 
members. However, i t i s a cornerstone upon which the uni ted 
20 
Nations is cons t ruc ted . After the pos tu l a t e of the sovereign 
equa l i t y of a l l members i s express , each i s reminded of the 
importance of honouring i t s ob l iga t ions assumed through membership 
i n the uni ted Nations. A fundamental s t i p u l a t i o n i s the use of 
p a c i f i c se t t lement for a l l disputes of an in t e rna t iona l character . 
Once a dangerous con f l i c t developes, each member must u t i l i z e 
peaceful means to resolve i t , even if the problem concerns a 
noimember of the o rgan iza t ion . In the case of non-members, the 
uni ted Nations ' s h a l l ensure t h a t they a c t in accordance with 
those p r inc ip l e s so fa r as may be necessary for the maintenance 
of in t e rna t iona l peace and s e c u r i t y . AltYiough the t h r e a t or use 
of force is not e l iminated by the Charter , due to the poss ible use 
of c o l l e c t i v e measures and se l f -defence , a l l members are obliged 
to forego such ac t ion t h a t is ' i n cons i s t en t with the pruposes of 
21 
the uni ted Nations*. The l i s t of p r i n c i p l e s in Ar t i c l e 2 of 
20. Bennet, A.L., o p . c i t . . pp. 48-9. 
2 1 , Goodspeed, S . S . , o p . c i t . , pp . 111-12, 
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t h e C h a r t e r concludes wi th a s e v e r e l i m i t a t i o n upon United 
Nat ions a u t h o r i t y . This l i m i t a t i o n i s t he "domes t ic j u r i s d i c -
t i o n " c l a u s e which f o r b i d s t h e United Nat ions " t o i n t e r v e n e in 
m a t t e r s which a r e e s s e n t i a l l y w i t h i n t h e domest ic j u r i s d i c t i o n 
of any s t a t e . Whether i t i s a member of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n or n o t " . 
But an e x c e p t i o n t o the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e domest ic j u r i s d i c t i o n 
p r i n c i p l e i s g r a n t e d in t h e l a s t c l a u s e of A r t i c l e 2 i n which 
t h e S e c u r i t y Counci l i s a u t h o r i z e d t o t ake enforcement a c t i o n 
under Chapter VII of the Cha r t e r wi thou t r e s t r i c t i o n by t h e 
domest ic j u r i s d i c t i o n r u l e . Chapter VII dea l s wi th the most 
d r a s t i c roeasiires t h a t t h e S e c u r i t y Counci l may apply wi th r e s p e c t 
22 
t o t h r e a t to peace / b reaches of p e a c e , or a c t of a g g r e s s i o n . 
In a d d i t i o n to t h i s l i s t of a r t i c l e 2, s e v e r a l o t h e r 
g e n e r a l r u l e s a r e s c a t t e r e d th roughou t the Cha r t e r p a r t i c u l a r l y 
t h o s e wi th r e s p e c t to the p r e s e r v a t i o n of p e a c e . Although the 
p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e and s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n a r e s p e c i f i c a l l y 
23 
r e f e r r e d t o as o b j e c t i v e s , they a r e not covered in any a r t i c l e . 
Consequent ly , however, for t he f u l f i l m e n t of t h e s e 
purposes and p r i n c i p l e s , t h e u n i t y of the Grea t Powers i s e s s e n t i a l 
22. A.L. Bennet, op.cit., p. 50. 
23. Jfei^, p. 48.7 also see Goodspeed, S.S., op.cit.^ p. 112, 
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as i t i s t h e Key t o the s u c c e s s of a u n i v e r s a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n composed of s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s j o i n e d t o g e t h e r by 
24 
v o l u n t a r y d e c i s i o n . 
But t h e Uni ted Nations was unable t o e x e r c i s e t he se 
pu rposes and p r i n c i p l e s e f f e c t i v e l y due to the c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t -
ween E a s t and West and o t h e r problems such as ve to problem, 
i n c r e a s i n g number of membership* qxiest ion of Domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n , 
l a c k of compulsory j u r i s d i c t i o n i n ICJ and i n c r e a s e i n t h e u n i t e d 
Nat ions Peace f o r c e . Hence, t h e r e i s a need for the amendment df 
t h e c h a r t e r i n such a way as t o s a t i s f y a l l . Goodspeed wrote in 
h i s book t h a t "many people who have watched the o r g a n i z a t i o n 
muddle along on a s e r i o u s problems a r e convinced t h a t t h e only 
way o u t of a p p a r e n t inpass i s t o acbp t amendments t h a t would, i n 
t h e i r v iew, s t r e n g t h e n the Cha r t e r p r o v i s i o n s and b r ing them 
i n t o w i th e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s , in t h e wor ld . I t i s a rgued t h a t 
t h e development of n u c l e a r weapons a l t e r e d the t r a d i t i o n a l 
concep t s of peace and s e c u r i t y v^on which t h e u n i t e d Nations was ' 
b u i l t . Most of them t h i n k i n g a long t h e s e l i n e s involves the 
r e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e u n i t e d Nat ions i n t o some form of world 
25 
government . 
2 4 . Goodspeed, S . S . , o p . c i t . , p . 113 . 
2 5 . I b i d t » p . 6 1 1 . 
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Goodspeed a l so wrote t h a t the other suggestions for 
r e v i s i o n include those t h a t would l imi t i t s present au thor i ty in 
economic and soc ia l questions and in the f i e l d of c o l l e c t i v e 
s e c u r i t y or d r a s t i c a l l y change the nature of the organisa t ion by 
e l iminat ing c e r t a i n of i t s members and joining the remainder 
in to a huge m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . Then there are proposals which 
seek to Improve the functioning of the Charter on c e r t a i n matters 
by expanding mechanisms for the maintenance of peace and overhau-
l ing some of i t s ex i s t ing machinery. But a f t e r a l l i t i s suggested 
t h a t the Charter of the United Nations should be amended. Clark 
and Sohn a l so proposed a comprehensive plan for the amendment of 
the Char ter . 
Hence/ any wr i t t en document/ however/ carefu l ly drafted 
i s bound to requ i re a change in the course of the time and in the 
l i g h t of i t s working exper ience. Thus^ the UN Charter/ too cannot 
escape amendment and procedure of rev i s ion l a i d down in the Charter 
i t s e l f . At San Francisco Conference two methods of amending the 
26 
Charter were argued upon. One i s Ar t i c l e 108 and the o ther in 
A r t i c l e 109. 
26. Bennet/ A.L./ o p . c i t . . p . 79. 
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HoveveiT/ the ' most important spec i f i c fea tures of the 
proposal for the amendment of the Charter are as fol lows: 
After the outbreak of the Cold War the world finds i t s e l f 
divided not into two blocs but into t h r ee : the uncommitted world— 
the p a r t of the world which has stood out boldly and stubbornly 
for i t s independence i n sp i t e of p o l i t i c a l , economic and mi l i t a ry 
p ressures - i s a t l e a s t as la rge as e i t h e r of the two power blocs. 
However, i t is the most s i g n i f i c a n t development in the United 
Nations is the emergence of what might be ca l l ed a "Third World". 
Almost a l l of them are n e u t r a l . They do not jo in any of the 
bloc - the East and the West. Hence a g r ea t danger e x i s t s in a 
b ipo la r world, with a l l countr ies l inked \xp on opposing sides in 
the East West c o n f l i c t . Such a sitvoation involves two g igan t i c 
b l o c s , mutually h o s t i l e to each other and with l i t t l e room for 
the operat ion of conc i l i a t i ng inf luences . If, however, these are 
members of the United Nations which would throw t h e i r weight 
aga ins t any aggressor , a b e t t e r chance may be achieved. 
The United Nations however, as s t a t e s in the Charter 
27 
i t s e l f i s based on " the sovereign equa l i ty of a l l i t s members" 
and as s t a t e d in the preamble, is e s t ab l i shed to reaffirm f a i t h 
27. BrownLie, I . , o p . c i t , , p . 3 . 
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in fundamental human r i g h t s , in the digni ty and vor th of human 
person, in the equal r i g h t s of men and women and of nations 
2$ 
l a rge and s m a l l . . . " . The desired goal of the organizat ion is 
therefore to achieve universa l membership. Consequently, frequent 
references in the debates of the General Assembly and the Securi ty 
Council, in favour of universal membership has been made. A 
number of r eso lu t ions in favour of un ive r sa l i t y too# have been 
adopted. I t i s evident from the debates t h a t i t was never 
intended to make the United Nations a club of like-minded' s t a t e s ; 
n e i t h e r was i t intended to prevent membership of s t a t e s having 
d i f f e r e n t (and undesirable) ideologies and d i f fe ren t economic 
29 
and p o l i t i c a l systems. 
**universality* not " s e l e c t i v i t y " was to guide the p r inc ip l e 
of admission in to the United Nations. The p r i nc ip l e of " l i k e -
mindedness** is appl icab le "only to the ex ten t t h a t a l l must 
support the purposes' and p r inc ip l e s of the' Charter and f u l f i l 
29 
t h e i r ob l iga t ions thereunder . According to A r t i c l e 4(1) 
"Membership of the organizat ion i s open to a l l peace-loving s t q t e s , 
which accept the ob l iga t ions contained in the Charter and in the 
28 . Brown^iie, I . , o p . c i t . , p . 2. 
29. Ahmad* I . , "The Problem of Membership of Microstates in the 
uni ted Nations", Indian Journal of Pn l i t i c s^ Vol. XI I I , 
Nos. 1-2, April-August, 1979, p . 126. 
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judgement of the organization/ are able and willing to carry out 
30 
these obligations. 
A state which fulfills the criteria stated above, is free 
to seek, and would be and has been generally admitted to the 
United Nations. Consequently, no application for the United 
Nations membership, has been rejected on the ground that the 
applicant country, though independent, is too small or poor to 
31 
support the burdens of the membership. Naturally, there is an 
encormous increase in the membership of the United Nations. It 
has grown from a body of 51 members to one fifty nine; the 
majority of which are the product of decolonization process; 
many of them are microstates and underdeveloped. Owing to their 
colonial past, their attitudes in most of the cases but defini-
tely not in all the cases, are anti-Western. However, the United 
Nations is about to achieve total tmiversality in the near future 
if the criteria for the membership remained unchanged. It is 
expected that in the near future the remaining colonial territo-
ries mostly small and insular will gain independence and apply 
32 
for admission ...**. 
30. Goodrich, Mambro and Simon, A.p. (ed) , Charter of the Uj^ ited 
Nations: Commentary Documents. Columbia University press. 
New York, London, 1969, p. 76> BrownLie, I., op.cit.^ p. 4. 
31. Smith, S.A. De; Exceeding Small in Fawatt, JES and Higgins 
Rosalyn (ed) . International Organization ;Law in Movement^ 
Oxfcird University Press, London, New York, 1976, p. 65. 
32. Goodrich, L.M., op.cit., p. 49. 
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A sugges t ion t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n be made between the r i g h t 
of independence and the quest ion of f u l l membership of minis tates 
in the United Nations a l s o could not mater ia l i ze becaxjse of cons-
t i t u t i c « i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . A committee of Experts (The Ministate 
Committee) to study the problem was e s t a b l i s h e d . Two substan-
t i v e proposals* one by the uni ted States! for the establ ishment of 
a category of a s s o c i a t e membership/ enjoying a l l r i gh t s except 
to vote and hold o f f i c e and bearing the o b l i g a t i o n of a member 
e x c e p t the o b l i g a t i o n to pay f i n a n c i a l assessments« and the other 
© r i t i e h proposa l , advocating for voluntary renunciat ion of cer ta ip 
r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s \3p0n admission as f u l l member (renunciation) 
of the r i g h t t o vote and to hold o f f i c e and understanding that 
the assessment of the f i n a n c i a l contr ibut ion would be a t minimal 
l e v e l ) / when re ferred to the UN Legal Counsel were r e j e c t e d on 
the ground that the US proposal needs amendment pf the Charter 
as A r t i c l e 4 of the Charter, which def ines condi t ions for admit-
t i n g new members to the UN, mal^s no reference to a s s o c i a t e 
membership and the B r i t i s h proposal , the Counsil contended, 
though does not need amendment of the Charter, i s a g a i n s t the 
s p i r i t of the a r t i c l e 18 which a s s e r t s that "Each member of the 
General Assembly s h ^ l l have one vote". Furthermore, e q u a l i t y i s 
the p r i n c i p l e of the UN and a member renouncing i t s r i g h t to vote 
168 
34 
v o l u n t a r i l y may remain " sove re ign" b u t h a r d l y retnaina "equa l " 
t h e problems remain unso lved . However, t he membership of the 
Uni t ed Nat ions shou ld be fo r a l l i n t e n s e and purposes u n i v e r s a l . 
P o l i t i c s shou ld no t e n t e r i n t o t h e q u e s t i o n of the new members — 
whether they a r e under -deve loped o r m i n i a t a t e s . Consequent ly/ 
t h e C h a r t e r i s t o be amentted in such a way as t o remove h indrance 
i n the way of admiss ion of t h e p e a c e - l o v i n g n a t i o n . 
A r a d i c a l r e v i s i o n i s proposed i n the major organs of 
t h e u n i t e d Nat ions - t he S e c u r i t y Counci l and the General Assembly. 
The Uni ted Nat ions however was b u i l t xip a round t h e concept 
of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y - t h a t s e c u r i t y of one n a t i o n i s t h e 
conce rn of a l l # t h a t t h e n a t i o n s b r e a k i n g t h e law w i l l be r e s i s t e d 
c o l l e c t i v e l y by t h e armed f o r c e s of a l l member s t a t e s ; such 
m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s be ing conducted by t h e S e c u r i t y Counci l 
35 
t h r o u g h i t s m i l i t a r y s t a f f committee ( A r t i c l e 41 t o 49) . The 
impor t an t f u n c t i o n which t h e S e c u r i t y Counci l has been a s s i g n e d 
t o d i s c h a r g e " g i v e s t h e impress ion t h a t i t i s t h e c e n t r a l organ 
36 
of t h e Uni ted N a t i o n s " . However* t h e f r e q u e n t i n a b i l i t y of t h e 
S e c u r i t y Counci l t o dec ide m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
3 4 . Gunte r , M.M., 'The Uni ted Nat ions M i n i s t a t e s p r o b l e m s ' , 
American j o u r n a l of I ^ t e rp^ t i t pna l Law. Vol. 7 1 , No. 1 . 
January 1977, p p . 111-122. 
3 5 . P r a s a d , Kr i shna , o p . c i t . . p . i 3 l . 
3 6 . S e t a l v a d , M.C., The Role of t h e Ui^iited Nations i n the j i a in tenance of Peac^ . As ia P u b l i s h i n g House, Bombay, 1976, 
p . 16 . 
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peace and secur i ty owing to excessive use of veto the importance 
of tVte Securi ty Council had been lowered in the eyes of the 
na t i ons . The veto power which gives the p r iv i l eged pos i t ion 
of the permanent members in the Securi ty Council/ has come to 
sharp c r i t i c i s m . The ' v e t o ' implies t ha t no decis ion by the 
United Nations aga ins t the wishes of anyone of the Big Five, 
37 
can be taken even if the power is an aggressor . 
Throughout the h i s to ry of the United Nations, the p r e s -
38 
tige of the Security Council has flactuated greatly, in fact, 
due to excessive use of veto important matters are often "frozen" 
39 
in the Security Council agenda. For example the Communist 
coup in Czechoslovakia (February 1948) the Soviet Blockade of 
Berlin (September 1948) and many other issues which were brought 
before the Security Council but they were vetoed by the Big 
Five particularly by Soviet Russia, only once the Security 
Council was able to take action when North Korea attacked on the 
Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950. It may be pointed out that 
the "creation of the unified command in Korea by the Security 
Council was possible solely because of the fortuitous absence 
3 7. Prasad, Krishna, op.cit., p. 148. 
38. Bennet/ A.L., op.cit., p. 58. 
39. Starke, J.C, Introduction to Ipternatiopa] T,aw.Rn^ o^rgwr^ T-^ •Kc, 
London, 197o, p. 577. 
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40 
o£ the Soviet representative. Hence, it was realized by the 
General Assembly that to prevent matters relating to peace and 
• • 
Secxirity from being "frozen* on the Secur i ty Council Agenda which 
i t 
reduced to impotence the organiza t ion as a whole/should 
assume some of the responsibil^ity of the Council, Consquently, 
the General Assembly adopted th ree c lose ly connected reso lu -
t i o n s / the f i r s t of which i s usual ly termed the 'un i t ing for 
peace r e s o l u t i o n , under the uni t ing for peace resolu t ion the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of maintaining peace ans Secur i ty has been 
41 
t r a n s f e r r e d from the Securi ty Council to the General Assembly. 
The frequent exerc ise of the "veto* by the Soviet union 
was. t e chn i ca l l y cons i s t en t with Charter provis ions but was 
claimed by the West to be an "abuse" s ince according to the 
Pour-power statement a t San-Pranscico# i t was not to be 
"assumed—that the permanent members, any more than the non-
permanent members, would use t h e i r ' v e t o ' power wi l ful ly to 
•- " 4 2 - • 
obs t ruc t the operat ion of the Council . 
Consequently, there has been general resentment agains t 
the use of veto on questions of peace and secur i ty and t h i s led 
40 . Greig, D.W.-, In te rna t iona l l.aw, Butterwnri-h« London, 1970, 
p . 577. 
4 1 . S ta rke , J . C . , o p . c i j : . . p , 603, 
42 . Padelford, N . J . , Goodrich, L.M., op.ci t^ . . p . 68. 
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to demand for its abolition or limitation. It would however, 
be logical to except the veto to be limited when the Security 
Council is seeking to bring about the peaceful settlement of 
43 
disputes. But the abolition of veto would add,little to the 
power of the UN because it would still be virtually impossible 
for the United Nations to take enfordement action against on 
nuclear -power (all the Big Five are nuclear power). 
There is a proposal presented by Clark and Sohn for the 
abolition of the Security Council and to substitute for its an 
44 
executive council, Composed of seventeen representatives 
elected by the General Assembly Itself from its own membership. 
In this way no nation would be entitled to appoint any member of 
the new council and the council would consist solely of persons 
45 
well known to the Assembly and enjoying its confidence. This 
new and highly important organ would not only be chosen by the 
Assembly/ but would also be responsible to and removable by the 
46 
Assembly; and the Council would serve for the four year terms. 
That the General Assembly would have the "primary,responsibility" 
for the maintenance of peace, so that the new executive council 
would not have the basic responsibility in thjs respect possessed 
43. Goodspeed, S,S., op.clt., p. 612. 
44. Clark and Sohn, op.cit.. p. xxii. 
45. Ibid.. p. 71. 
46. Ibi^.. p. xxii 
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by the Securi ty Council and the Executive Council would function 
in a l l important f i e l d as "the agent of the General Assembly", 
sub jec t to a t a l l times to the Assembly's supervis ion and 
d i r e c t i o n . But despi te of t h i s d i f f e ren t s t a t u s , the proposed 
execut ive council vrould be an organ of g r e a t au thor i ty and 
47 
importance. 
The Plan of Clark and Sohn a l so provides t h a t while no 
member Nation would be e n t i t l e d to "Permanent" represen ta t ion 
on the Council, spec ia l provis ion would be made for the represen-
t a t i o n of t t e l a rge r na t ions , whereby the four l a r g e s t nations 
(China, Ind ia , the USA and the USSR) would each be e n t i t l e d a t 
a l l tiroes to have one of i t s r ep resen ta t ives on the Council; and 
four of the e ight next l a r g e s t nat ions (Braz i l , France, West 
Germany, Indonesia, I t a l y , Japan, Pakis tan, and the united 
Kingdom) would in r o t a t i o n a l so be e n t i t l e d to r ep resen ta t ion , 
with the provis ion tha t two of these four s h a l l always be from 
nat ions in Europe and the other two from nations ou ts ide Europe 
The remaining nine members would be chosen by the Assembly from 
the r ep re sen ta t i ves ' o f a l l the other member nations and the 
non-self governing t e r r i t o r i e s , under a formula designed to provide 
4 7. Clark and Sohn, o p . c i t . , p . 71, 
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f a i r r ep re sen ta t ion , for a l l the main regions of the world 
and to ensure t h a t every member na t ion , without, except ion, 
s h a l l in due course have a r ep resen ta t ive on t h i s a l l important 
48 
couhc i l . 
In con t r a s t to the voting procedure of the present 
Secur i ty Council, whereby anyone of the Five nat ions e n t i t l e d 
to "permanent** membership has a veto power in a l l non-procedural 
m a t t e r s . But no provis ion is made corresponding to the '*veto** 
pd)wer of anyone of the •*Big Five" contained in the Clark and 
Sohn proposal , i t i s c lea r t ha t in the new executive counci l , 
no decis ion , g rea t or small , should be blocked by any s ing le 
v o t e . On the other hand, i t is suggested t h a t a l l decisions 
of the Council s h a l l be by a subs t an t i a l majority of i t s members, 
and i t i s of the utmost consequence t h a t every important dec i -
s ion s h a l l command a c l ea r majority of members from both the main 
groups of na t ions , i . e . from the group comprising the l a r g e s t 
and medium-sized nat ions and a l so from the more numerous group 
of smaller na t ions . I t is bel ieved t h a t the proposed r e q u i r e -
ment of a minimum majority of twelve of the seventeen council 
members for any d e c i s i o n , together with the requirement t h a t On 
" important mat ters" t h i s majority s h a l l include a majority of 
4 8. Clark and Sohn, o p . c i t . , p . x x i i i 
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c o u n c i l members from the n a t i o n s e n t i t l e d t o f i f t e e n o r more 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the General Assembly and a l s o a major i ty of 
49 
t h e members from the s m a l l e r n a t i o n s / meets t h e s e t e s t s . 
The proposed Execu t ive Counci l would c o n s t i t u t e the 
e x e c u t i v e arm of the s t r e n g t h e n e d United N a t i o n s , holding 
much t h e same r e l a t i o n t o the General Assembly. Sub jec t t o i t s 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o the Assembly, t h e new c o u n c i l would have 
b road powers t o s u p e r v i s e and d i r e c t t he disarmament p rocess 
and o t h e r aspects of the whole system foe t he maintenance of 
50 
p e a c e • 
Moreover, a radical revision is proposed as to the powers, 
composition and method of voting of the General Assembly. The 
plan calls for imposing the final responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace upon the General Assembly itself, and gives 
the assembly adequate powers to this end. These powers would 
however, be strictly limited to matters directory related to 
51 
the maintenance of peace. 
A more basic change is the grant to the General Assembly 
of new power to legislate within certain limits and new povrer 
to deal directly not only with disputes and situations but also 
49. Clark and Sohn, op.cit.. p. 80 to 82. 
50. Ibid., p. xxiii. 
51. Ibid., p. xix. 
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w i t h t h r e a t s t o the peace« breaches of peace and a c t s of 
a g g r e s s i o n . Hence, t h e proposed p l a n of C la rk and Sohn embodies 
two fundamental changes : (1) The t r a n s f e r of the pr imary r e spon -
s i b i l i t y for t h e maintenance of peace from the S e c u r i t y Council 
t o the Genera l Assembly; and (2) t h e g r a n t t o the Assembly of 
c e r t a i n powers to make b ind ing laws as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from mere 
recommendat ions. These new l e g i s l a t i v e powers a r e s t r i c t l y 
l i m i t e d / and y e t would, i t i s b e l i e v e d , prove s u f f i c i e n t to 
e n a b l e t h e u n i t e d Nat ions t o f u l f i l i t s b a s i c purpose of p r even -
t i n g war, - no t merely minor war s , b u t any armed c o n f l i c t between 
52 
n a t i o n s , smal l o r g r e a t . 
The p r i n c i p l e i s fo l lowed t h a t a l l the main f e a t u r e s of 
t h e whole p l a n s h a l l be inc luded as a " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l e g i s l a -
t i o n " , having in mind t h a t t he n a t i o n s w i l l be more l i k e l y t o 
a c c e p t t h e p l a n if a l l i t s p r i n c i p a l p r o v i s i o n s a r e c l e a r l y s e t 
f o r t h in the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l document i t s e l f . The e f f e c t would 
be b ind ing t h e n a t i o n s i n advance no t on ly t o a l l the fginda-
menta ls bu t a l s o t o many impor t an t d e t a i l s , and thus t o l e ave 
f o r the General Assembly a more l i m i t e d l e g i s l a t i v e scope t han 
53 
might be supposed. 
5 2 . C la rk and Sohn, o p . c i t » ^ p . g5-to/^j 
5 3 , I b i d . , p . xi-n. 
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Since» however the General Assembly, even wi th e l a b o r a t e 
" c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l eg i s l a t i on** , would need to have some d e f i n i t e 
l e g i s l a t i v e powers , t h e p l a n c a l l s for a r e v i s i o n of the system 
of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e Assembly. Hence, for t h e s u r v i v a l of 
t h e u n i t e d Nat ions one n a t i o n one vo te formula has to be changed 
and t o s u b s t i t u t e more e q u i t a b l e system - t h e idea of weighted 
54 
v o t i n g has been s u g g e s t e d . 
However, the s t r e n g t h e n e d p o s i t i o n of the General Assembly 
w i t h i t s i n c r e a s e d membership, a lmos t a l l of them being under-
developed ( i n c l u d i n g the m i n i s t a t e s ) has made the si:5)er powers 
r e l u c t a n t to e n t r u s t r e a l power t o a body where they do not have 
a v e t o . To avo id a c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the ma jo r i t y w i t h i n the 
Genera l Assembly, t he idea of weighted v o t i n g have been s u g g e s -
t e d t o a r r e s t o r r e v e r s e the vo t i ng behaviour i n the General 
Assembly which w o r r i e s the Western powers and makes the T h i r d -
World happy. But t h i s would r a i s e many q u e s t i o n s w i t h o u t , 
p e r h a p s , s o l v i n g the problems and, a s p o i n t e d out by Claud I n i s , 
adequa te answers have t o be found t o q u e r r i e s such a s , "what s h a l l 
be wighted? What f a c t o r s - pop t t l a t i on , l i t e r a c y , wea l th , 
i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h , budge ta ry c o n t r i b u t i o n . 
54 . C la rk and Sohn, o p « c i t . , p . xx 
177 
e t c . ~ shou ld be inc luded / and i t in what p r o p o r t i o n , in a 
55 
formula fo r a weighted vo t i ng?" For t h e purpose of weighted/ 
t h e p o p u l a t i o n - a c c e n t u a t i n g and power -accen tua t ing formulae 
56 
have been s u g g e s t e d . 
The scheme fo r weighted v o t i n g a r e e s p e c i a l l y r e l e v a n t 
t o t h e w o r k a b i l i t y of this " u n i t i n g fo r peace Reso lu t i on" ,and 
t h e o t h e r peace-keeping a p p r o a c h e s . N a t u r a l l y , the S t a t e s which 
c o n t r i b u t e roost of t h e m a t e r i a l s , men and money a r e l i k e l y want 
t o have a g r e a t e r say in how t h e o p e r a t i o n i s s e t up and c a r r i e d 
o u t and i t was though t t h a t t h e Super powers be ing h e a v i l y popula-
t e d and c o n t r i b u t i n g the major p o r t i o n to a l l t h e UN o p e r a t i o n s , 
however, t h e C la rk and Sohn p roposa l for weighted vo t ing w i l l 
be a c c e p t a b l e t o them as the C l a r k and Sohn p l a n was the most 
f u l l y developed and comprehensive of t h e v a r i o u s p r o p o s a l s con-
c e r n i n g weighted v o t i n g . Small s t a t e s t h a t r e t a i n some vo t ing 
power and t h a t a r e no t faced by a ve to might a l s o be w i l l i n g t o 
a c c e p t such a scheme, e s p e c i a l l y i f they were g iven a r e a l s t a k e 
i n t h e v e n t u r e , such a s i g n i f i c a n t r e l i e f i n the terms of 
55. Claud Inis, L. Jr., op.cit*, p. 136. 
56. Palk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S.H. (ed.), The Strategy of 
World order. Vol. 3, World Law Fund, New York, 1966, 
pp. 272, 294. 
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international trac3e or greatly increased helf with economic 
57 
development. 
The principles governing the proposed representation 
plan are: 
(1) that every member Nation, however small, should be 
entitled to some representation; 
(2) that there should be a reasonable upper limit upon the 
representation of even the largest member Nation; and 
(3) that, subject to these provisions, representation should 
be apportioned by grov;ps of nations according to their 
relative populations without attempting to reflect any 
such factors as relative natural resources productive 
58 
capacity, trade or literacy. 
In harmony with these principles, the concrete proposal 
is that all nations recognized as independent states and therefore, 
eligible for membership, shall be divided into following six 
57. Palk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S. H. (ed.), op«cit«* p. 299. 
58. Clark and Sohn, op.cit., p. 25 
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categories, "each conprising a groi;^ of natioiis in accordance 
with their populations"j 
The 4 largest nations 
The 8 next largest nations 
The 2o next largest nations 
The 30 next largest nations 
The 34 next largest nations 
The 3 smallest nations (under 
1,000,000) 
99 nations 
30 Representatives each = 120 
15 Representatives each =120 
06 Representative each =120 
04 Representatives each =120 
02 Representatives each = 68 
1 Representatives each = 3 
551 Representatives 
(The authors of the plan divided only 99 nations into different 
categories which they thought would be there in 1965) . 
The authors of the plan proposed that all the member 
Nations would be divided into categories measured by their 
relative populations; all the nations within a particular cate-
gory would have a specified equal representation; and every nation 
without exception, would have some representation while a 
reasonable limit would be put upon the representation of the 
largest nations. However, the same maximum representation were 
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a l l o t t e d to the uni ted Sta tes and the Soviet Russia takiny into 
cons idera t ion the fac t t h a t "ne i ther could poss ib ly accept a • 
p lan \inder which the other was given a la rger voice " . The 
same maxiniuin r ep resen ta t ion were a l l o t t e d " t o the two grea t 
Asian nations - mainland China and India - which by tramendous 
margins have the l a r g e s t populations in the world". France, West 
Germany, I t a l y , the United Kingdom, Braz i l , Indonesia, japan 
and Pakis tan, were t r ea t ed as middle-sized s t a t e s and equal 
r ep resen ta t ion was a l l o t t e d to them. In the same way, the 
p r i n c i p l e of equal r ep resen ta t ion , as the basis of populat ion, 
59 
was appl ied t o the other four ca t ego r i e s . The plan was, however, 
60 
not acceptable to the big powers for various reasons . The small 
s t a t e s , on the other hand re sen t fu l "of the g r ea t Powers' 
predominance elsewhere in the organization"", regarded the 
General Assembly "as a necessary and proper s tronghold of equa l i -
ta r ian ism", are unl ikely to favour a proposal which would 
61 
undermine t h e i r advantageous pos i t i on in the organ iza t ion . I t 
was a "comprehensive plan for world peace under world law which 
59 . Clark and.Sohn, o p . c i t . , pp . 25 to 27. 
60 . Falk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S.H., o p . c i t . , pp . 297-300. 
6 1 . Ahmad, I sh t i aq , ' "The General Assembly of the uni ted Nations; 
A Study of Changing St ruc ture of power", Indian Journal of 
P o l i t i c s , VOL. x i i , itos. 1-2, April-August, 1978, p . 64. 
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c o u l d have been eve r fo rmula ted and, must have been adopted; 
i f n o t , c o n s i d e r e d a t l e a s t i t would have been s e r i o u s l y 
62 
deba t ed th roughou t the viorld" . 
The United Nat ions i s an a s s o c i a t i o n of s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s , 
each of which i s de termined t o p r o t e c t i t s own i n t e r e s t when 
they a r e c h a l l e n g e d . However, A r t i c l e 2(7) p r o t e c t s t h e 
s o v e r e i g n r i g h t s by fo rb idd ing t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of the United 
Nat ions ' i n m a t t e r s which a r e e s s e n t i a l l y w i t h i n t h e domest ic 
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j u r i s d i c t i o n of any s t a t e ' . This c l a u s e however, overemphasizes 
t h i s p r i n c i p a l of s o v e r e i g n t y b u t i t i s ex t remely d i f f i c u l t when 
a p a r t i c u l a r problems s e i z e s t o be a ma t t e r of n a t i o n a l concern 
and becomes the concern of I n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y . 
However, A r t i c l e 2(7) of the Cha r t e r i s the most c o n t r o -
v e r s i a l , and t h e r e f o r e the most -quoted p r o v i s i o n of the Char t e r 
i n t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s of United Nat ions o r g a n s . This i s 6o becausei 
F i r s t l y , on account of i t s i n d i f f e r e n t d r a f t i n g the t e x t of 
A r t i c l e i s amendable to v a r r i e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . 
6 2 . C l a r k , G. and Sohn, L . B . , o p . c i t . , p . 28, 
6 3 . Goodspeed, S,S»f o p » c i t : . , p . 613 , 
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Secondly. the domestic jur isdict ion provision of the Charter, 
because of i t s wide scope* the ambiguous phraseology used and 
cer ta in other reasons is more diffuse in i t s meaning than the 
l ike provision in the covenant. 
Thirdly# the provision (very much like the veto provision 
incorporated in Article 27(3) of the Charter) being essential ly 
a great power imposition on the other members of San Francisco 
Conference, what discussion there was on i t a t the Conference 
is largely unreal and unavailing for the purposes of interpre-
ta t ion . . . . 
Fpurt^iiLv, the Charter being both a mult i lateral t reaty , to which 
a large number of sovereign s ta tes are s ignator ies , as well as 
the consti tut ion of a world organization, there is apparent in 
i t s implementation a continuous struggle between the inherent 
r i g id i t y of a t reaty and the unavoidable suppleness of a consti-
tut ion; the former quality follows from the residuary sovereignty 
of the s ignator ies , and the l a t t e r from the need for effective-
ness. Also, the domestic jur isdic t ion principle of the Charter 
seeks to be a l imitat ion on the functions and powers of an 
organization whose competence includes quite a few subjects 
t rad i t ional ly fal l ing within the domestic jur isdict ion of s t a t es , 
and these powers and f\inctions are minutely described in the 
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Charter than in any other multipartite treaty of a comparable 
nature. The ostensible divergence between the purposes of the 
Charter, which are necessarily worded in general terms, and the 
principles of the Charter, which are comparatively more speci-
fically worded, has only accentuated this differential approach 
64 
to the interpretation of the text of Art. 2(7). 
However, the provision of Art. 2(7) has not had in the 
working of the United Nations organs the exaggerated impact that 
it might have been expected to have - anyhow it has been a source 
of abuse, obstructidn or at least confusion in the deliberations 
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of the United Nations. 
So in view of a l l these cons idera t ions , i t i s suggested 
t h a t the opera t ion of Domestic J u r i s d i c t i o n p r i nc ip l e Art . 2(7) 
in the Charter be amended. M.S. Rajan suggested t h a t Art.2(7) 
could be made more s a t i s f a c t o r y by following poss ib le ac t i ons ; 
( i) '•By i t ou t r i gh t de le t ion from the Charter of non-
app l ica t ion of the provis ion in p r a c t i c e ; 
64. Rajan, M.S., United Nations and Domestic J u r i s d i c t i o n , Asia 
publishing House, London, New York, 1961, pp. 48-9 . 
6 5 . Ib id^. p . 394. 
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( i i ) by verbal or subs t an t i a l change in the t ex t of the 
provis ion; 
( i i i ) by l imi t ing the extent of the pr inc ip le* and 
(iv) an a u t h o r i t a t i v e i n t e rp r e t a t i on of the re levan t terms 
66 
and phrases of the t e x t of the provision**. 
But a l l these attempts for changing the term of "Domestic 
J u r i s d i c t i o n " 'principle or dele t ing i t together is impracticable 
in the present temper of In te rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s . M.S. Rajan 
sa id t h a t only course l e f t is to l e t the United Nations organs 
continue to take adhoc dec is ions . Hence, the attempts a t any 
formal rev is ion of the domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n might well be 
postponed to some indef in i t e future v/hen the precedents and~ 
conventions es tab l i shed by adhoc decisions . . . . Further, in 
numerous concrete cases in which the issue of domestic j u r i s -
d ic t ion was r a i s ed by the members, the cr ippl ing e f fec t t h a t 
• j u r i s t i c pessimist* might warrant . The charge t h a t t h i s would 
cons t i t u t e 'amendment by i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ' or a back-door amendment 
of the Charter . Consequently, a f t e r discussions M.S. Rajan said 
t h a t the bes t course is to leave the divergence of in t e rp re t a t ion 
66. Rajan, M.S., o p . c i t . , pp. 394-95. 
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of the provis ion of Ar t . 2(7) to be deciaed by each concerxied 
organ, in each concrete case and whenever the issue of j u r i s -
d i c t i o n is pressed. In any case t h a t i s what United Nations 
organiza t ions have done and would in a l l p robab i l i t y doing in 
67 
fu tu re . 
Furthermore/ Clark and Sohn proposed t h a t the present 
unqual i f ied p roh ib i t i on in Ar t . 2(7) agains t in te rvent ion in 
mat ters of domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n of any s t a t e is p l a in ly 
i ncons i s t en t with the plan for un iversa l , enforceable and complete 
disarmament and various new powers r e l a t i n g to the prevention of 
war which the un i ted Nations would possess . For example, while 
i t i s now taken for granted t h a t a n a t i o n ' s r i g h t to maintain 
m i l i t a r y forces i s wholly within i t s domestic jurisdict4.on, t h i s 
r i g h t would be e n t i r e l y e l iminated by the disarmament plan which 
r equ i r e s not merely the reduct ion but the gradual a b o l i t i o n of 
68 
the mi l i t a ry forces of each and every nat ion in the world. 
To remove t h i s con t rad ic t ion and other inconsis tencies 
which would e x i s t by reason of the enlarged powers for the 
prevent ion of war, i t i s proposed to qualify the present r e s t r i c -
t i o n by s t a t i n g t h a t the prohib i ted in te rvent ion in matter of 
6 7 . Rajan, M.S., o p . c i t . . pp. 404 to 406. 
68 , Clark, G. and Sohn, B. Louis, o p . c i t . , p . 10. 
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" d o m e s t i c j u r i s d i c t i o n " s h a l l "no t p r e j u d i c e such a c t i o n as 
may be neces sa ry t o ma in t a in I n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and S e c u r i t y " . 
I n a d d i t i o n i t has been thought wise to add the f u r t h e r q u a l i -
f i c a t i o n t h a t t h e making of non-binding recommendations as 
" h e r e i n a f t e r a u t h o r i z e d " s h a l l no t be c o n s t r u e d as a forb idden 
69 
i n t e r v e n t i o n in m a t t e r s of "domes t ic j u r i s d i c t i o n " . 
However» i t shou ld be emphasized t h a t t h e proposed t e x t 
by C l a r k and Sohn r e t a i n s the broad p r i n c i p l e t h a t the n a t i o n a l 
a u t h o r i t y over t r a d i t i o n a l l y domest ic a f f a i r s i s t o be d i s t u r b e d 
only when Uni ted Nat ions a u t h o r i t y i s c l e a r l y r e q u i r e d t o p r e v e n t 
t h e c l ami ty of modern war. Thus, whi le t h e r e v i s i o n contem-
p l a t e s g r e a t l y e n l a r g e d powers i n m a t t e r s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to 
t h e p r e v e n t i o n of war, i nc lud ing disarmament, i t does not con-
t e m p l a t e t h e c r e a t i o n of a s u p e r n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y wi th compulsory 
powers t o i n t e r f e r e i n any domest ic m a t t e r s whatever u n l e s s , and 
t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t I n t e r n a t i o n a l peace i s endangered . In s h o r t , 
t h e purpose i s to p rov ide the United Nat ions wi th e f f e c t i v e 
70 
powers t o p r e v e n t the n a t i o n s from "murdering each o t h e r " . 
The development of an I n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r which i s 
e n s h r i n e d in an a c c e p t e d code of world Law and gua ran t eed by the 
e f f e c t i v e world p o l i c e f o r c e , has long been a human a s p i r a t i o n . 
6 9 . C l a rk , G. and Sohn, B. Lou i s , o p . c i t . , p p . 1 0 - 1 1 . 
70 . I b i d . , p . 1 1 . 
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The cen t ra l problem of world order i s the ex ten t to which the 
organized in t e rna t iona l community possesses the actual and 
p o t e n t i a l capaci ty to prevent war, or more p r e c i s e l y , t o decrease 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y the l ike l ihood tha t p r inc ipa l nat ions would for 
whatever reason, have recourse to major v io lence . ODnsequently, 
the World Peace through world law is e s s e n t i a l for a happy, 
heal thy and prosperous In te rna t iona l o rde r . Hence, the United 
Nations has e s t ab l i shed a system of co l l e c t i ve s ecu r i t y under 
Chapter VII of the Charter . The language of A r t i c l e 43 through 
A r t i c l e 49 makes i t c l e a r . I t is the more r e a l i s t i c idea of 
peace-keeping. The idea t ha t conventional mi l i t a ry methods -
or to put i t b lunt ly war - can be used or on behalf of the United 
Nations to counter aggression and secure the peace, seems now 
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to be r a t h e r imprac t i ca l . 
Since 1948, there has never been a time in which, in one 
or several p a r t s of the world, a groqp of force comprising 
m i l i t a r y personnel was not operat ing in the name of the uni ted 
Nations . Whether in the form of observer groi:^s, or of a m i l i -
t a r y force such as t h a t in Korea or of a "peace-keeping" force 
l i k e UNEP in the Middle East or ONUC in the Congo - and whether 
7 1 . Falk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S.H., o p . c i t . , pp. 524 to 527. 
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200 or 20,000 s t r o n g - United Nations M i l i t a r y f o r c e s have 
i n f a c t p l ayed a no t i n s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t in main ta in ing the 
peace and s e c u r i t y of t he wor ld . But a f t e r a l l t he p r e s e n t 
w r i t e r s have l?een f o r c e d t h a t the problems can be p r o p e r l y 
s o l v e d excep t by e s t a b l i s h i n g a permanent " u n i t e d Nat ions 
72 
M i l i t a r y Force* f o r peace-keep ing p u r p o s e s . 
However/ t h e r e i s no s c a r c i t y of p l ans fo r " i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
P o l i c e Forces'* o r "Uni ted Nat ions peace Forces" o r however a 
Force fo r t h e Uni ted Nat ions may be c a l l e d . C la rk and Sohn 
a l s o made a p r o p o s a l fo r a world p o l i c e t o be o r g a n i z e d and 
m a i n t a i n e d by the Uni ted Natiorjs and t o be c a l l e d the ""united 
Nat ions Peace Force" and s h a l l c o n s i s t of two components: a f u l l -
t ime s t and ing f o r c e p a r t i a l l y t r a i n e d i n d i v i d u a l r e s e r v i s t s 
s u b j e c t t o c a l l fo r s e r v i c e wi th t h e s t a n d i n g fo r ce i n case of 
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n e e d . C l a r k and Sohn s a i d t h a t " t h i s p l a n r e s t s on two b a s i c 
a s sumpt ions . The f i r s t i s t h a t i n o r d e r t o p rov ide the n a t i o n s 
of the world wi th adequa te p r o t e c t i o n / a permanent and i n d i s -
p u t a b l y e f f e c t i v e s u p e r n a t i o n a l f o r ce must be p rov ided to t ake 
t h e p l a c e of n a t i o n a l armaments. The second b a s i c assumption 
72, Falk / R.A. and MendlovitZ/ S.H./ o p . c i t . / p p . 6 1 0 - 1 1 . 
7 3 . Clark / G. and Sohn/ B. L o u i s , o p . c i t . / p . 314 . 
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is that it would not be feasible to maintain an adequate world 
police force unless national disarmament is not only universal 
but also complete. While a world Police Force can and should 
be moderate in numbers, it must be strong enough to provide 
reliable protection against any foreseeable violation of world 
74 
peace*. 
Thomas C. Schell ing i s qu i te pess imis t i c about the Clark 
and Sohn approach. Schell ing seems to assume higher requirement 
of mi l i t a ry ef fec t iveness for the pol ice Force. He en t ru s t s a 
f a r l e ss ambitions ro l e to such a force than 60 Clark and Sojin. 
Schel l ing thinks of the force as an "army**, whereas Clark and 
Sohn conceive of i t as a "Police es tabl ishment" . A pol ice 
department doesn ' t .need a s t r a t egy of a foreign pol icy in 
S c h e l l i n g ' s sense t o carry on i t s bus iness , whereas an army does. 
s c h e l l i n g r a i s e s many problems connected with defining the 
mission of the Police force in a world of continuirrj c o n f l i c t . 
He pro jec t ing the ex i s t i ng world of tensions and h o s t a l i t y 
i n to a disarmed world, i s of the opinion t h a t the pol ice Force 
w i l l e i t h e r have to remain aloof from dangerous s i t u a t i o n s of 
v io lence , or take s ides in the world power s t ruggle and thereby 
75 
a l i e n a t e an important segment of the world community. But 
74. Clark G., and Sohn, B. Louis, o p . c i t . , pp . 314-15. 
75 . Falk, R.A. and Mendlovitz, S.H., o p . c i t . , p . 692. 
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inspite of this critical evaluation the proposal for the 
establishment of Permanent International Military Force is 
essential which might be to help "innocent** states to rearm 
in time to take on the "aggressor". For the purpose the Charter 
needs amendment. For the maintenance of the rule of law in 
the field of war prevention is to provide the judicial and quasi-
judicial institutions of the united Nations. It is proposed 
to accomplish this through the establishment of institutions 
and machinery for the adjustment of or adjudication of disputes 
between nations or a sort likely to endanger peace, and also by 
providing institutions and machinery for the application bot|i 
to individuals and nations of the Charter and laws of the United 
76 
Nations in respect of the maintenance of Peace. 
However/ a separate chapter of the Charter deals with the 
international court of justice. It is declared that the Court 
shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations", and 
the statute of the Court is to form an integral part of the 
77 
Charter. The Court, 's unique Character as a principal organ of 
the united Nations stems primarily from the fact that it is a 
76. Clark, G., and Sohn, B. Louis, op.cit.. p. 335. 
77. Fenwick, Charles, G., International Law, Appletan Century 
Crofts, Inc., New York, 1948, p. 187. 
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78 
"judicial" rather than a "political" organ. The Charter speci-
fically declares that all members of the United Nations are 
79 
ipsofacto parties to the statute of the international court. 
As the principal judicial organ, the Court# has two major 
functions: first, it renders advisory opinions on legal questions 
at the request of he Security Council, the General Assembly and 
other organ or agencies authorized by the later to request opinions; 
80 
second, it decides contentious case between states.With respect 
to those international disputes which are susceptible of settlement 
upon legal principles, it is proposed to empower the General 
Assembly to direct the submission of any such dispute to the 
international court of justice. Whenever the Assembly finds that 
its continuance is likely to endanger international peace. In 
case of such submission, the court would have conpulsory juris-
diction to decide the case, even if one of the parties should 
refuse to come before the Court. Compulsory jurisdiction would 
also conferred upon the court in certain other respects as, for 
example, any dispute relating to the interpretation of the treaties 
or other international agreement alleged to conflict with the 
81 
Charter. 
78. Goodrich, L.M., Hambro, E. and Simon, A.P. op.cit.^ 
79. Fenwick, op.cit., p. 187. 
8 0 . Goodr ich, LM. Hambro and Simon, A . P . , o p . c i t . . p . 549 . 
8 1 . C l a rk , G. and Sohn, B. Lou i s , o p . c i t . . p p . x x x i i i and xxxiv 
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But however^ one of the d e f i c i e n c i e s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
l e g a l system as compared wi th n a t i o n a l system i s the l ack of 
compulsory j u r i s d i c t i o n . S t a t e s s t i l l being very j e a l o u s of 
t h e i r n a t i o n a l sove re ign ty* w i l l not normally consen t for compul-
s o r y j u r i s d i c t i o n t o be enjoyed by t h e Courts more so# the 
powerful n a t i o n s , no one can e x p e c t / would a c c e p t t h e compulsory 
82 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e . 
This has been ( the problem of conpulsory j u r i s d i c t i o n ) a 
83 
s o u r c e of c o n t r o v e r s y a t San F ranc i sco Conference and A r t i c l e 
36(2) which i s known as " p p t i o n a l clause** emerged as compromise 
between the advoca tes and opponents of t he compulsory j u r i s d i c -
t i o n . The A r t i c l e 36(2) rtins as fol lows? 
The s t a t e s p a r t i e s to t h e p r e s e n t s t a t u t e may a t 
any time d e c l a r e t h a t they r e c o g n i z e as compul-
so ry i p s o f a c t o and wi thout s p e c i a l agreement , i n 
r e l a t i o n t o many o t h e r s t a t e s a c c e p t i n g the same 
o b l i g a t i o n , t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t i n a l l 
l e g a l d i s p u t e s concerning$ 
8 2 . Bennet , A . L . , o p . c i t . » p . 163 . 
8 3 . Goodrich/ Kambro and Simon/ A . P . / O P . c i t . / p . 652. 
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(a) t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a t r e a t y ; 
(b) any q u e s t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l Law; 
(c) the e x i s t e n c e of any f a c t which, i f e s t a b l i s h e d , 
would c o n s t i t u t e a b reach of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o b l i g a t i o n ; 
(d) t h e n a t u r e or e x t e n t of the s e p a r a t i o n t o be made for 
the breach of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n . 
Dfespite of working of A r t i c l e 36(2) which r e f e r s t o the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t i n " a l l d isputes '* ennumerated in c l a u s e 
(a) to (d) i t w e l l - s e t t l e d t h a t s t a t e may a t t a c h r e s e r v a t i o n s t o 
t h e i r accep tance of the o p t i o n a l c l a u s e . What remains u n s e t t l e d 
84 
a r e the l i m i t s , i f any to such r e s e r v a t i o n s . 
These d e c l a r a t i o n s , S t a rke e x p l a i n s may be mades (a) 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y ; (b) on c o n d i t i o n s of r e c i p r o c i t y on t h e p a r t of 
s e v e r a l s t a t e s or c e r t a i n s t a t e s ; o r (c) for a c e r t a i n t ime o n l y . 
According as such d e c l a r a t i o n a r e made, and p rov id ing 
t h a t the d i s p u t e i s of l e g a l c h a r a c t e r and t h a t i t f a l l s w i t h i n 
t h e c a t e g o r i e s s p e c i f i e d the Courts j u r i s d i c t i o n becomes compulsory 
8 4 . Goodspeed, S . S . , o p . c i t . , p p . 318-19 . 
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The Court i s empowered t o dedide whether a p a r t i c u l a r d i s p u t e i s 
85 
o r i s not one of t h e kind mentioned in t h e o p t i o n a l c l a u s e . 
However, A r t i c l d 36 , s e c t i o n 2 , was an a t t e m p t t o b u i l d 
a b r i d g e between the p r i n c i p l e of s o v e r e i g n t y and t h a t of compul-
s o r y j u r i s d i c t i o n . The aim was t o open an a r e a i n which a degree 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r cou ld be e s t a b l i s h e d th rough the j u d i c i a l 
86 
p r o c e s s . There i s a l s o a p r o v i s i o n for e n l a r g i n g the compulsory 
87 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Court ( A r t i c l e 3 6 ) . 
S t a r k e e x p l a i n s t h a t t o p r e s e r v e c o n t i n u i t y , as b e f o r e , 
w i th the permanent c o u r t . A r t i c l e 36 pa rag raph 5 of the s t a t u t e 
p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e d e c l a r a t i o n made under the " o p t i o n a l c l a u s e " 
i n e a r l i e r s t a t u t e , t o be accep tance of the compulsory j u r i s d i c t i o n 
of t h e p r e s e n t c o u r t f o r t h e p e r i o d which they s t i l l have to 
r u n , and i n accordance w i t h t h e i r t e r m s . This p r o v i s i o n has been 
88 
t h e s u b j e c t of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by t h e p r e s e n t c o u r t . 
At t h e San F ranc i s co Conference, some d e l e g a t i o n had 
u rged t h a t t h e s t a t u t e shou ld p rov ide fo r some compulsory j u r i s -
d i c t i o n of the Cour t over l e g a l d i s p u t e s bu t o t h e r s hoped t h a t 
8 5 . S t a r k e , J . C . , An I n t r o d u c t i o n to I n t e r n a t i o n a l ;,Qndon_, 
London, B u t t e r w o r t h s , 1963/ p . 3 7 3 . " 
8 6 . Bennet , A . L . , o p . c i t . , p . 164. 
8 7 . va rghese , P a y a p p i l y , I n t e r n a t i o n a l ;^ aw and o r q a n i z a t i o n . 
Law P u b l i s h e r s , Lai Bagh Road, Lucknow, 1962, p . 652 . 
88 . J . C . S t a r k e , o p . c i t . , p . 374. 
195 
this result could be practically obtained through more wide-
spread acceptance of the "optional clause". This expectations 
has not been fulfilled to date. The majority of the present 
declarations in force are subject to the condition of recipro-
city. Many of them also include reservations, excluding certain 
kind of disputes from compulsory jurisdiction. The reservations 
as to juriltdiction are to some extent standardised, covering 
interalia the exclusion of; 
(i) Past disputes/ or disputes relating to prior situation 
or facts; 
(ii) disputes for which other methods of settlements are 
available; 
(iii) disputes as to questions within the domestic or national 
jurisdiction of the declaring state; 
(iv) disputes arising out of war or hostalities; and 
(v) disputes between memberstates of the British Commonwealth. 
Too many of the reservations are/ however, merely escape 
clauses or consciously designed loopholes. Such a system 
89 
of "optional" or compulsory jurisdiction verges on absurdity. 
89. J.C. Starke, op.cit., p. 3 74. 
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Furthermore, a number of points affecting the operation 
of the "optional clause" have been settled of the present Court: 
(a) Where a declaration, sxjbject to a condition of reciprocity, 
has been made by a state seeks to invoke compulsory 
jurisdiction by the Court by taking advantage of any 
wider reservations, including the "automatic" or 
"self-judging" form of reservation made by the 
state in its declaration as in the Norwegian Loans case. 
(b) if a dispute between states relates to matters exclusi-
vely within the category of "legal disputes" referred 
to in Article 36 paragraph 2. 
(c) A declaration made almost immediately before and for the 
purpose of any application to the Court is not invalid, 
nor an abuse of the process of the Court. 
(d) If a matter has properly come before the Court under 
Article 36(2), the Court jurisdiction is not divested 
by the unilateral act of the respondent state in termina-
ting its declaration in whole or in part. Since 1950, 
however, increasing use has been made of its facilities 
and by the end of 1957 more than a dDzen cases had come 
before it. For example Corfu Channel case between 
Albania and United Kingdom. Case concerning the Areal 
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Incident case of July 2 7, 1955 (Preliminary objection) 
The preach Vihar Temple Case (preliminary objections) 
e t c . have been s e t t l e d by the In t e rna t iona l Court of 
Ju s t i ce and the other above mentioned condi t ions have 
90 
a l so been occurred in these condi t ions . 
The e f fec t of the exercise of the compulsory j u r i s d i c t i o n 
by the Court i s c l a r i f i e d by the provis ion of Ar t i c l e 94 of the 
United Nations Charter . Under th i s Ar t i c l e each member of the 
United Nations undertakes to coroploy with the decis ion of the 
Court in any case to which i t i s a p a r t y . Further , i f any party 
to a case f a i l s to perform the ob l iga t ions incumbent upon i t 
under a judgement rendered by the Court, the other par ty may 
make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give 
e f f e c t to the judgement. There are no provisions whereby the 
Court may enforce i t s dec i s ions , and t h i s of coxirse ser ious 
91 
weakness. Therefore* there is l i t t l e t r a f f i c in ICJ. 
Consequently, an in t e rna t iona l legal order through the 
j u d i c i a l process i s d i f f i c u l t to give the Court compulsory 
j i r i s d i c t i o n and to make i t an a u t h o r i t a t i v e i n t e r p r e t e r of 
90 . J .C . S tarke , o p . c i t . , pp. 3 73 to 3 76. 
9 1 . I b i d . . p . 376. 
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t h e C h a r t e r , the C h a r t e r needs atnendnent. So however, a compre-
hens ive p l a n i s p roposed by C la rk and Sohn which inc ludes t h e 
g r a n t t o t h e e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e of compulsory 
j u r i s d i c t i o n i n c e r t a i n c a t e g o r i e s of l e g a l d i s p u t e s ; t h e c r e a t i o n 
o§ an e n t i r e l y new t r i b u n a l - t o deal wi th n o n - l e g a l d i s p u t e s ; 
and the c r e a t i o n of a new c o n c i l i a t i o n agency - t h e world 
c o n c i l i a t i o n Board - t o dea l th rough c o n c i l i a t i o n and media t ion 
w i th any i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s whether of a ' ' legal '* or " n o n - l e g a l " 
c h a r a c t e r . They a l s o proposed t h a t t h e r e shou ld be a system of 
Uni ted Nat ions r e g i o n a l Courts s u b o r d i n a t e t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Cour t of j u s t i c e , i n o r d e r t o p rov ide adequate machinery fo r 
d e a l i n g wi th o f fences a g a i n s t t h e c h a r t e r o r laws of the United 
Nat ions and adequate sa fegua rds a g a i n s t p o s s i b l e abuse of power 
92 
by any organ o r o f f i c i a l of t he Uni ted Nat ions i t s e l f . 
i n o r d e r t o s t r e n g t h e n the a u t h o r i t y and independence of 
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e Clark and Sohn proposed t o 
make the fo l lowing p r i n c i p a l changes i n t h e s t a t u t e of the 
C h a r t e r because i t i s the e s s e n t i a l for world p e a c e : 
(1) The judges of. t he Court would be e l e c t e d , no t by 
c o n c u r r e n t a c t i o n of t h e General Assembly and t h e 
9 2 . C l a rk , G., and Sohn, B. L o u i s , o p . c i t . , p . 335 . 
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Securi ty Council, but by the General Assembly aione, 
from a l i s t of candidates prepared by the Executive 
Council on the basis of nations received from the 
members of the highest courts of j u s t i c e of member 
Nations, from nat ional and in t e rna t iona l assoc ia t ions 
of in t e rna t iona l lawyers and from professors of 
In t e rna t iona l Law. The Council s h a l l present three 
candidates for each vacancy. 
(2) To ensure g r ea t e r independence for the judges of the 
Court, the judges would be e l ec t ed not for nine-year 
terms, as provided by the present s t a t u t e , but for l i f e . 
This l i f e tenure would, however, be subject to the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of dismissal if, in the unanimous opinion 
of his col leagues , a judge is no longer able properly 
to perform his functions o r , as now provided, has in 
t h e i r unanimous opinion "ceased to f u l f i l the required 
conditions'* of his t enure . 
(3) In con t r a s t to the provis ion of the present s t a t u t e tha t 
"only s t a t e s may be p a r t i e s in cases before the Court", 
access to the cour t would a l so be granted* (a) to the 
uni ted Nations; (b) to i t s spec ia l i zed agencies; (c) 
to regional in t e rna t iona l organizat ions when authorized 
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by the General Assembly; (d) to individuals and 
private andpublic organization in certain cases of 
appeal from the regional courts of the united Nations. 
(4) The jikrisdiction of the Court (which/ apart from 
special agreement, is merely optional under the present 
statute) would be made compulsory with respect to the 
following categories of disputes between any nation and 
the United Nations, between two or more nations, between 
one or more nations and one or more international organi-
zations and between two or more International organizations; 
(a) any disputes relating to the interpretation or 
application of the revised Charter; 
(b) any dispute relating to the constitutionality of any 
law, regulation or decision made or adopted under the 
revised Charter* and any dispute relating to the 
interpretation or application of any such law, regula-
tion or decision; 
(c) any dispute relating to legal questions involved in an 
international, dispute or situation if the General Assembly 
(or the Executive Council, when acting in the matter 
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pursuant to authority from the Assembly) should 
decide that the continuance of that dispute or situa-
tion is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security and should direct 
that such l^gal questions be submitted to the Court 
pursuant to Article 36 of the revised Charter; 
(d) any dispute relating to the inter pre tat icn of 
application of the constitutions of specialized 
agencies; 
(e) any dispute relating to the interpretation or applica-
tion of treaties and other international agreements or 
instruments registered with the secretariat of the 
United Nations under Article 102 of the revised Charter 
(f) any dispute relating to the validity of a treaty or 
other international agreement or instrument/ or of a 
constitution or law of any member Nations/ which is 
alleged to be in conflict with the revised Charter 
(or with any law or regulation enacted thereunder); 
(g) any other dispute where recourse to the Court against 
the united Nations is specifically provided for in the 
revised Charter or in any law or regulation enacted 
thereunder» 
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(5) The i n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e viould r e t a i n a l l 
i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n under t r e a t i e s and c o n v e n t i o n s , and 
under d e c l a r a t i o n s made p u r s u a n t t o pa ragraph 2 of 
A r t i c l e 36 of t h e p r e s e n t s t a t u t e of t he Court# as such 
j u r i s d i c t i o n e x i s t s a t the t ime the r e v i s e d Char te r 
comes i n t o f o r c e . 
(6) The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e would a l s o hear 
appea l s from d e c i s i o n s of the r e g i o n a l Courts of the 
Uni ted Nat ions i n those cases i n which such appea l s a r e 
p e r m i t t e d by laws e n a c t e d by t h e General Assembly. 
(7) The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Cour t of J u s t i c e would have a gene ra l 
power of s u p e r v i s i o n over the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the 
r e g i o n a l C o u r t s , 
(8) The judgements of t he I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e 
would be e n f o r c e a b l e by measures t o be adopted by the 
General Assembly under pa rag raph 2 of A r t i c l e 94 of the 
93 
r e v i s e d C h a r t e r . 
9 3 , C l a rk , G . , and Sohn, B. L o u i s , o c . c i t . , p p . 336 t o 338. 
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Clark and Sohn said that "the intention is not dispensed 
with anything which has proved useful, but rather to revise, 
supplement and strengthen the existing structure so that the 
united Nations will be fully and unquestionably equipped to 
accomplish its basic purpose - the maintenance of international 
peace". 
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the 
united Nations would work more satisfactorily if the textual 
shortcomings and defects are reminded. The success of an 
international organization in the present stage of international 
society depend upon the perfection of its constituent instrument. 
AS John Foster Dulles has well observed: "it is never possible 
to achieve great goals, such as peace, justice, and human 
freedom, by mechanistic devices. It is easy to write a Charter 
or constitution that proclaims noble ends, but their achievement 
is not merely a matter of organization; fulfilment depends 
more on the will, the preservance, and the capacity of the 
members in support of the organization. The United Nations is 
a living organization made up of member states* it is, it will 
94 
be, what they make it". 
94, Rajan, M.S., op.cit., pp. 396-96. 
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However, Wilcox, F. and Marcy, C M . assuming continued 
cooperation among the Five major power, and the likelihood of 
the early conclusion of the peace treaties, suggest that even 
if a Conference to review the Charter is to be held in the 
near future, the basis of the different assumptions that might 
include at least the following: 
(1) that, for a substantial period in the futxire, there 
may ^ continued tensions between the free and the 
communist world; 
(2) that there exist the possibility that these tensions 
might lead to war; and 
(3) that atomic and hydrogen weapons, if used in war, might 
be expected to place in jeopardy the very survival of 
mankind. 
Whether assumption of this kind would justify seeking 
changes in the united Nations system is one of the question that 
95 
must be considered frankly. 
95. Wilcox, F. and Marcy, CM., Proposal for Changes in th^ 
united Nations, The Brooking Institution, Washington, 1955, 
p. 456. 
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There are few who blatne the united Nations for the post 
war deterioration in International Relations and for existing 
tensions. On the other hand/ there are many who believe that 
the united Nations could be a nore effective instrument than i t 
has been for reducing tension, or a t leas t for preventing ten-
sions from increasing to the point where peace might be threa-
tened. I t is the belief that has inspired many of the proposed 
changes in the United Nations system. An examination of the 
proposals reviewed in th is study indicates that they can be 
grouped/ for the most part/ into four broad categories: Firs t 
are numerous suggestions that more power and authority be given 
to the United Nations by such changes as abolishing the veto* 
establishing an International police force, and/ in general/ by 
moving towards t t e creation of some kind of st^jernational 
organization. Second are proposals that would not substantially 
a l t e r the nature of the system but would seek to improve i t s 
operations by giving l i f e to a r t i c l e s of the Charter that have 
l a in dormant, developing raec-hanism for the maintenance of 
the Charter but re la ted thereto, and* in general/ overhauling 
some parts of the existing machinery of the United Nations. 
Third are the plans call ing for reducing the authority of the 
united Nations by limiting i t s ac t iv i t i e s in the f ie ld of enfor-
cement action or in economic^ social and humanitarian matters. 
Finally/ there are the far-reaching suggestions to a l t e r radically 
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the nature of the present organization, not by moving in the 
direction of supernationality but rather by changing the 
composition of the United Nations through the expulsion of 
96 
certain states or the withdrawal of others. 
Hov»ever, changes in the United Nations system may come 
about in a variety of ways other than by amending the Charter. 
The Charter has been profoundly influenced by interpretation/ 
custom and usage, the failure on the part of member states to 
Implement certain articles, the conclusion of various treaties or 
agreements including regional defense pacts, and by the changed 
conditions in the international situation. Furthermore, if the 
United Nations Charter is viewed as a "constitution* that creates 
a "government*, it may be interpreted, gradually changed by 
custom, and subject to a process of growth similar to that which 
has taken place with respect to the constitution of the most 
sovereign states. But if the Charter is viewed as a "treaty** or 
a "contract" it is not a flexible instrument and is not subject 
to the informal change in t fundamental sense. It is of course, 
virtually impossible, to draft any instrument whether it be called 
a treaty, a contract, or a constitution, that does not have some 
96. Wilcox, P. and Marcy, CM., pp.cit., p. 458. 
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element of f l e x i b i l i t y about i t . A document such as the united 
Nations Charter i s unavoidably more f l ex ib le in nature than 
97 
many other wr i t t en inst ruments . 
Consequently, if the uni ted Nations is to develope without 
amendment to the Charter , i t is necessary to s t r i k e a balance 
somewhere between the extreme pos i t ions of loose and s t r i c t 
cons t ruc t ion . The idea t ha t the Charter i s an instrument 33 
f l ex ib l e that# if an amendment i s not f e a s ib l e , the same r e s u l t 
may be obtained by i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or by the passage of spec ia l 
r e s o l u t i o n , may be dangerous not only for individual member 
s t a t e s but for the organiza t ion i t s e l f . Even within the area of 
balance between two extremes of loose and s t r i c t cons t ruc t ion , 
the re i s considerable room for gradual growth and development. 
But t h i s roust be an evolut ionary process accepted by the g rea t 
na j o r i t y of members. I t i s e s s e n t i a l in considering the propo-
s a l s t h a t the techniques of change not endanger the proposals 
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themselves. 
However, from the above arguments we reach to the conclusion 
t h a t the amendment of the Charter , i s not the course l i k e l y to 
9 7. Wilcox, F. and Marcy CM., o p . c i t . , p . 460. 
9 8 , I b i d . . p . 461 . 
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fur ther the cause of world peace a t present t ime. Since the 
nat ions of the world are c e r t a i n l y not ready now anymore than 
in 1945, to tu rn the United Nations in to a Super-national body, 
endowed with the mi l i t a ry and economic power to enforce i t s 
decis ions upon unwilling members, i t would be po in t l e s s to make 
a l t e r a t i o n s in the lega l s t r u c t u r e which did not correspond 
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t o the r e a l i t i e s of the world community. 
Any amendment of the Charter cannot prove a helpful method 
for s trengthening the uni ted Nations. Any change in the func-
t ions and operat ions of the United Nations should come about by 
way of convention and precedent . This i s a slow process and 
in many ways an unsa t i s fac tory l imi ta t ions beyond which i t cannot 
be used e f f ec t ive ly ; and to the ex ten t t h a t i t c rea tes a d iver-
gence between tthat the Charter a c tua l l y says and what in p rac t i ce 
f the members presume i t means, i t makes for uncer ta in ly , i f not 
a c t u a l dishonesty, and weakens the effect iveness of the Charter 
as the fundamental law. Nonetheless, i t i s a process with which 
a l l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t e s are fami l ia r , and which indeed is 
e s s e n t i a l if the c o n s t i t u t i o n is to process the necessary f l e x i -
b i l i t y , in adoptat ion to the changing need of modern in te rna t iona l 
s o c i e t y . So long as the process enables the uni ted Nations to 
99 . Prasad, Krishna, o p . c i t . , p . 152. 
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car ry out more e f fec t ive ly i t s bas ic purposes, i t w i l l be a 
method through which i t s evolut ion can proceed in harmony with 
the development of world opinion, the ul t imate foundation on 
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which the uni ted Nations must r e s t . 
Hence, no analys is of the United Nations Charter and 
i t s operat ion in p rac t i ce and no p o s i t i v e suggestions can lead 
t o any s u b s t a n t i a l improvement in the work of the organizat ion 
so long as there is suspicion and lack of good wi l l and 
understanding among i t s members p a r t i c u l a r l y amongst major powers. 
Even if the member s t a t e s were able to reach agreement on impor-
t a n t matters such as the l i m i t a t i o n of armaments, world s t a b i l i t y 
w i l l remain precarious un t i l there i s a change of hea r t . But 
the memberstates forget t h a t under the provis ion of the Charter; 
i t i s the duty of the members of the uni ted Nations to endeavoitr 
to remove causes of In te rna t iona l f r i c t i o n ; not to increase them 
by answering one unjus t i f ied t h r e a t to the peace with another. 
Moreover, i t should be a t once help to ease tension and reduce 
b i t t e r n e s s in the United Nations now proceeding, and give r ea l 
cause for hope t h a t cooperation between a l l powers, g rea t or 
smal l , w i l l be achieved on a bas is not of mere to lerance , but of 
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r e a l comradeship. So t h a t the United Nations could be in a 
100. Frasad, Krishna, o p . c i t . , p . 152, 
101. E v a t t . , H.V., The United Nations, Oxford University Press , 
London, Melbourne, 1948, pp. 13-7 to Ift l . 
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p o s i t i o n to work e f fec t ive ly for peace and progress and there 
w i l l be a hea l thy , happy and prosperous In te rna t iona l Society. 
Fortunately the present i n t e rna t i ona l s i t u a t i o n is very 
hopeful. For the super powers, owing to stattnanship of Reagan 
and Gorbachev, the U.N. i s no more a ta lk ing shop or debating 
c lub . The U.N. i s acknowledged, once again, an instrument of 
peace r a the r than a platform of d i s sen t ion . Therefore, any 
amendment, if necessary, could be made with the consent of the 
two Super-powers, of course necessa r i ly to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of 
th i rd-wor ld s t a t e s , who, undoubtedly need the U.N. more than 
anyone e l s e . 
CONCLUSION 
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CONCLUSION 
Twentieth century has witnessed the horrors of two Wdrld 
wars. After each war, mankind has sought to establish a better 
world order which could ensure peace, security, welfare and 
justice. After first World War, League of Nations was established 
which was expected to provide a system of international coopera-
tion and collective secvirity. It was to provide a forum where 
nations could meet and discuss their disputes. Discussion and 
negotiation, it was expedted, will lead to satisfactory settlement. 
In fact it was established to prevent accidental war. But the 
League of Nations miserably failed in its task and the World 
War II broke out. The United Nations a revised version of the 
League of Nations came into being. The creation of the United 
Nations was a standard response of peace-loving nations for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security; to 
develope friendly relations among nations and to cooperate in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural 
or humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. However, the 
united Nations' founding fathers intended the organization to 
have a leading role in preserving and enforcing international 
security; this responsibility being vested in the Security Councils 
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The specific powers conferred on the Security Council in 
order to carry out its duties were laid dovn in Chapter VII of 
the proposals. The Security Council was to perform dual functions. 
It could investigate any dispute or any situation likely to 
result in international friction or give rise to a dispute* in 
order to determine whether its continuance might endanger the 
maintenance of International peace and security. Depending upon 
the degree of seriousness of a dispute or a situation, the Council 
would suggest appropriate procedures for the parties concerned 
to help the solution of the problem. It would determine the 
maintenance of international peace and security and take any 
measure necessary for the maintenance of international peace and 
security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the 
organization* 
Under the Chapter (VI) dealing with the pacific Settlement 
of Disputes, any state whether a member of the organization or 
not/ could bring to the attention of the Security Council any 
dispute or situation likely to disturb international peace and 
security. Parties to such dispute or situation were obliged 
first of all/ to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation/ 
conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement or other 
peaceful means of their own choice/ and the council could call 
upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means. If the 
213 
parties to such a dispute or a situation could not settle it 
by the means including above/ they should be of their own 
accord refer it to the council and the latter should in each 
case/ decide whether or not the continuance of the particular 
dispute might endanger the maintenance of international peace 
and security. If such a dispute or situation was considered 
by the cogincil as injurious to world peace/ it was empowered to 
recommend appropriate procedure or methods of adjustment. Justi-
ciable dispute were normally to be referred to the International 
Court of Justice and the Council could refer to the Court/ for 
its advice/ legal questions connected with other disputes. 
However/ the Council was expressely forbidden from interferring 
in situation or disputes arising out of matters which by interna-' 
tional Law fell exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of 
state concerned. 
Under the Chapter (VII) dealing with the determination of . 
threats to the peace or acts of aggression the Security Council 
would determine the existence of any threat to the peace/ breatth 
of peace or act of aggression and make recommendation or to 
decide upon the measures to be taken or to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. The measxires that could be 
taken by the Council fell within the purview of enforcement action 
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These measures could or could not include the use of armed 
forces. The Council could call upon the members of the organi-
zation to apply such measures as interruption of economic 
relations and means of communication and the severance of 
diplomatic relation. Should these measures prove inadequate, 
the Council could take armed action by air sea or land forces 
as may be necessary to maintain and restore peace and security 
and for this purpose* all members of the United Nations have 
undertaken to make available to the Security Council on its call 
armed forces/ assistance "and facilities for maintaining peace 
and security. 
Hence« in the performance of its functions of the 
maintenance of international p^ce and security/ the Security 
council had achieved a considerable measure of success in dealing 
with those situations where its permanent members/ for whatever 
reasons/ have had a sufficient interest in the maintenance and 
restoration of international peace and security. This uses so 
if they agreed on a common course of action/ for example Indonesiai 
crisis; initial stages of Palestine problem in 1950 and Kashmir 
problem etc. 
Only under exceptional conditions has the council been 
at all effective in dealing with threats to or breach of the 
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peace where the vital interests of the permanent menibers have 
been directly in conflict. But when the communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia (February 1948) the Soviet Blockade of Berlin 
(September 1948) and many other issues were brought before the 
Security Council/ they were vetoed by the Big powers particu-
larly by Soviet Russia. 
But when the North Korean attacked the Republic of Korea 
on June 25, 1950 the Security Qauncil was presented with a 
unique opportunity to take action in a situation involving the 
conflicting vital interest of the permanent members. A UN 
unified command under the UN flag with General Mac Arthur of the 
US as Supreme Commander was sent to assist the South Korea 
against the North Korea. 
It may be pointed out that the creation of the Unified 
command in Korea by the Security Council was possible solely becaus 
of the fortuitous absence of the Soviet representative. Hence, 
it was realized by the General Assembly that to prevent matters 
relating to peace and security from being "frozen* on the Security 
Council agenda which reduced to "impotence* the organization as 
a whole, it should assume some of the responsibility of the 
Council. Consequently, the General Assembly adopted three 
closely connected resolution, the first of which is usually termed 
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the 'Uniting for peace Resolution*, its intention was to create 
a nucleus of collective security outside the Security Council. 
It provides; 
"If the Security Council because of the lack of the 
unanimity of the permanent members/ fails to exercise 
its responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in any case where there appears 
to be threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of 
aggression* the General Assembly will consider the 
matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recomroendaticns to members for collective measures, 
including in the case of a breach of the peace or 
act of aggression, the use of armed force when neces-
sary* to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. If not in session at the time, the General 
Assembly may meet in an emergency special session within 
twenty four hours of the request therefor... .*• 
The adoption of the gniting for Peace Resolution was virtually an 
amendment of the Charter, making an additional provision as it 
were to chapter VII, providing for the contingency of the failure 
by the Security Council to exercise its primary responsibility by 
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reason of the lack o£ the unanimity of the permanent members* 
In addi t ion to t h i s t r a n s f e r - d e v i c e ' , which grea t ly 
enlarged the functions and competence of the General Assembly, 
i t i s the important s h i f t of - emergence power frpm the veto-ridden 
Securi ty Oauncil to the ve to - less General Assembly. 
The General Assembly of the uni ted Nations as observed by 
a keen analys t of the United Natior^ system became over the years 
the predoroinent p o l i t i c a l body of the world organiza t ion . The 
frequent i n a b i l i t y of the Securi ty Council to discharge function 
assigned to i t by the Charter has brought a change in the r e l a t i v e 
powers of t t e Council and the General Assembly. Member-states 
have increasingly extended the Assembly's r o l e in qtiestions invol-
ving the maintenance or r e s t o r a t i o n of in te rna t iona l peace and 
s e c u r i t y and many of them have looked with ever widening hope 
to t h i s organ for the so lu t ion of t h e i r problems. Assembly 
r e s o l u t i o n , moroever, while technica l ly only recommendations, 
have been viewed by some member coun t r i e s , with regard to ce r t a in 
matters and within c e r t a i n l i m i t s , as l ega l ly binding dec is ions . 
However, owing to the excessive use of veto , the importance of 
the Securi ty Council has been lowered in the eyes of the nations 
and the General Assembly became the only hope of maintaining 
world o rder . 
218 
A look a t the peace-keeping operat ion by the appl ica t ion 
of the Uniting for peace r e so lu t i on would reveal tha t what the 
Secur i ty Council had not been able to achieve because of the 
l ack of the unanimity and the consequent use of the veto , the 
General Assembly could e a s i l y do and on several occasions saved 
the world from d i s a s t e r . Some Assembly resolu t ions have 
af fec ted the means a t the disposal of s t a t e s in the i r r e l a t i ons 
by c rea t ing new peace-keeping techniques to i so la t e clashes 
between smaller nat ions or within a smaller nat ion from the large 
East-West s t r u g g l e . The communist r e t r e a t from South Korea, 
French and B r i t i s h evacuation of Egypt, the US withdrawal from 
Lebanon and the Soviet r e t r e a t from the Congo a f t e r the f a l l of 
Lumumba were sure ly fur thered by those techniques. However, 
these operat ions had themselves been a source of c r i s i s and the 
e n t i r e uni ted Nations system was threatened as i t did not serve 
the Big powers i n t e r e s t s . 
There was the c r i s i s over the financing of United 
Emergency fofce (UNEP) and the United Nations Congo operat ion 
(ONUC) between the Sv^er powers. The financing c r i s i s (the 
Expenses case) provided the opponents an opportunity to warn 
t h a t the United Nations is a ""sinkingship xinworthy of fur ther 
t r u s t of mankind" and the fr iends of the United Nations worried 
t h a t i t might not surv ive . In f a c t , the c r i s i s t h a t have 
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p a r a l i s e d the organiza t ion , was the product of many factors 
but the nost s a l i e n t was the p e r s i s t e n t refusa l of the Soviet 
Union and France t o pay t h e i r share of major peace-keeping 
operat ion ca r r i ed on Suez and the Congo. The c r i s i s was not 
r e a l l y about money as the amount involved was minor. I t was 
p o l i t i c a l . I t was a consequence of p o l i t i c a l default by Prance 
and Soviet Union without e i t h e r contention of f inanc ia l hardship 
or actxial i n a b i l i t y . Thereupon, the General Assembly requested 
the In te rna t iona l Court of Ju s t i ce to advise whether the expenses 
of the two forces cons t i t u t e ' t he expenses of the organization* 
wi th in the meaning of Ar t i c l e 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter 
of the uni ted Nations. Ar t i c l e 17(2) provides? 
"The expenses of the organiza t ion s h a l l be borne by 
the members as apportioned by the General Assembly". 
The Court by a vote of 9 to 5, agreed t h a t the financing of the 
UNEF and ONUC cons t i t u t e the expenses of the organizat ion within 
the meaning of Ar t i c l e 17(2) thereby confirming the author i ty of 
the General Assembly t o make the con t rovers ia l assessment. The 
opinion is important as i t cons t i t u t e s the "express j ud i c i a l 
approval of the p r a c t i c a l trazisfer of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the 
maintenance of peace from the Securi ty Council to the General 
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Assembly". However, the Soviet union and France refused t o 
pay even a f te r the advisory opinion. Thereuponjc the USA and i t s 
a l l i e s threatened to invoke Ar t i c l e 19 of the Charter which 
provides ; 
"A Member of the united Nations which Is in a r rears 
in the payment of i t s f inanc ia l cont r ibut ion to the 
organizat ion s h a l l have no vote in the General Assembly 
i f the amount of i t s a r r e a r s equals or exceeds the 
amount of i t s cont r ibut ion due from i t for the prece-
ding two fu l l yea r s . The General Assembly may, 
never theless permit such a member to vote if i t is 
s a t i s f i e d t h a t the f a i l u r e to pay i s due to conditions 
beyond the control of the members". 
The Soviet union threatened to leave the organizat ion i f 
i t was deprived of i t s vote in the General Assembly. Eventually, 
in August 1965, the USA and i t s a l l i e s gave way and agreed not to 
invoke Ar t i c l e 19; in r e t u r n , the Soviet Union promised to make 
a voluntary cont r ibu t ion towards the expenses of the two forces . 
The s h i f t of emphasis from the Securi ty Council t o the 
General Assembly has na tu ra l ly changed the balance of power and 
inf luence . The Big Five do not enjoy in the General Assembly the 
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same p r iv i l eged pos i t i on which they have in the Securi ty Council, 
This l og i ca l l y weakens t h e i r g r ip over the organiza t ion . Fur ther-
more, as the r e s u l t of the expansion of the membership of the 
General Assembly i t has grown from a body of fiftyone (51) 
meimbers to one hundred f i f tynine (159) , becaxise the ""universality" 
not "Se l ec t i v i t y " to guide the p r inc ip le of admission into the 
un i ted Nations. The majority of which is non-Western, under-r 
developed and who have gained t h e i r independence recen t ly . 
Roughly t h r e e - f i f t h s of the t o t a l membership belongs to the Afro-
Asian reg ions . Many of them . belong to the Third World 
including minis ta tes which are underdeveloped and the product of 
decolonizat ion p rocess . They view fu l l membership in the organi-
za t ion as the f ina l stamp of approval on t h e i r independence. 
In add i t ion , the Third World majority feels t h a t fur ther ministate 
membership would add to t h e i r preponderance in the united Nations 
as t h e i r voting behaviour reveals an ant i -western a t t i t u d e , 
undoubtedly so far as the voting r e s u l t s of the United Nations 
a r e concerned, the pos i t i on of the USA is weakened a f t e r 1960, but 
in comparison to the USSR, on the combined ca tegor ies of cold 
war, peace-keeping, arms control and disarmament i s sues , the 
un i t ed Sta tes continued to be general ly successful and the Soviet 
Union to be unsuccessful . However, ant i -western a t t i t u d e of* 
the Third World - (which includes microstates) has been a source 
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of i r r i t a n t for Western na t ions . They challenged the Big powers 
hegenony in the United Nations, AS therea f te r the process 
of decolonizat ion began to acce le ra te the UN became as arena of 
coiqpetit ion between the West and the Soviet Union for the 
sympathies of the s t i l l l a rge ly non-aligned Third World. In 
the process i t became the benef ic iary of the concessions which 
the United S ta tes and, to a l e s s ex ten t , the Soviet Uniop were 
w i l l i n g to make in order to c u l t i v a t e the sympathies of/ or 
• f r a t e rna l a s soc i a t i on ' with/ t h i s increasingly nunferous Asian 
and African membership, for i t was through the UN t h a t the l a t e r 
sought to make t h e i r presence f e l t . Yet t h i s period of compe-
t i t i v e coexistence*, did tend to over-est imate the s e n s i t i v i t y 
of the cen t ra l balance to Third World pressures and to under-
es t imate both the tensions and divis ions within the Third World 
i t s e l f and the v o l a t i l e and unpredicatable character of p o l i -
t i c s within so many Third World coun t r i e s . As t h i s has become 
evit tent the UN's a b i l i t y to a c t as an instrument for the powerless 
in wresting concessions from the powerful has tended to 
diminish or a t l e a s t been c a l l e d in to ques t ion. Hence, the Big 
Powers become day-by-day d i s i n t e r e s t e d in the functioning of the 
United Nations. Then there is a need for the amendment of the 
Char ter in such a way as to s a t i s f y a l l - Big and smal l . The 
followings are the suggested amendments of the Charter : 
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(1) The idea of veighted voting has been suggested to 
a r r e s t or reverse the voting behaviour in the United 
Nations (General Assembly) and for the surviva l of the 
United Nations one-nations-one vote formula has to be 
changed. 
(2) un ive r sa l i t y not s e l e c t i v i t y should be the guiding 
p r inc ip l e of admission in the uni ted Nations. All 
peace-loving nations are to be admitted. Consequently, 
the admission-process needs amendment so t h a t the 
admission of the peace-loving nations could be 
prevented unnecessar i ly . 
(3) The p r iv i l eged pos i t ion of the pernanent members in 
the Securi ty Council enjoying veto power has a l so come 
in sharp c r i t i c i s m . The power is given to them. But 
t h i s power should be amended in such a way t h a t i t is 
not unnecessari ly absurd. 
(4) Ar t i c l e 2(7) i . e . provis ion for noninterference in 
domestic a f f a i r s have Iseen suggested for amendment as 
under the p r e t ex t "domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n s " nations t ry 
to prevent the UN to impoae upon than some s o r t of 
amiable s o l u t i o n . 
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(5) The In te rna t iona l Court of Jus t i ce lacks compulsory 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . Consequently, on In ternat ional legal 
order through the j u d i c i a l process is d i f f i c u l t to 
give the Court compulsory j u r i s d i c t i o n to make i t 
an a u t h o r i t a t i v e i n t e r p r e t e r of the Charter/ so the 
Charter needs amendment. 
(6) In add i t ion , provis ion for the establishment 
of permanent In te rna t iona l Mil i tary Force is e s s e n t i a l 
t o he lp ' innocent s t a t e s to rearm them in time t o take 
on the aggressor . Hence, for t h i s purpose the Charter 
needs amendment. 
But a f t e r a l l i t i s necessary t o develope coope-
r a t i o n among a l l powers - g r ea t or small , so t ha t the 
United Nations may be in a pos i t ion to work ef fec t ive ly 
for peace and progress and happy, healthy and prosperous 
in t e rna t iona l soc ie ty could be pos s ib l e . 
However, the United Nations is many d i f ferent th ing , 
and f i r s t of a l l i t i s a de l ibe ra t ive body in vrtiich the 
nations t a l k through t h e i r r ep re sen t a t i ve s . The t a l k is 
not i t s e l f a guarantee of peace and harmony. There is 
something to be sa id for those who contend t h a t the very 
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process of debate, p a r t i c u l a r l y in pxiblic, may influence passions, 
harden opposing pos i t ions and increase t ens ions . Almost from 
the day of i t s c r ea t i on , two conceptions about the United 
Nations have been s t rugg l ing in the public mind: " I t c a n ' t 
l a s t " , and " i t s our only hope". Furthermore/ the united Nations, 
which i s the symbol of peace, should not only unable to control 
the race for armaments among the na t ions , but should i t s e l f be 
engaged in h o s t a l i t i e s and in e f fo r t s to c rea te an armed 
fofce . The security-minded would deprecate the United Nations 
as impotent to provide secur i ty and consider g rea te r nat ional 
armaments as the only p ro t ec t ion against aggress ion. 
The united Nations i s a secur i ty system. I t s tands both 
for the c o l l e c t i v e use of force to r e s i t aggression, and for the 
use of cons t ruc t ive and conc ia l i t ing measures to prevent and 
s t rengthen one another . The Charter assumes the need for secur i ty , 
na t iona l and r eg iona l , as well as c o l l e c t i v e . 
The united Nations i s a beginning of a vorld cornmianity and 
i t s Charter the beginniz^ of world law. I t i s in fac t our only 
hope", c e r t a in ly our only presen t hope, for achieving the grand 
object ives of peace, economic well-being and s o c i a l advancement. 
At the same t ime, the community is r iven with dissension, the law 
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fragmentary/ and underlying internat ional s i t u a t i o n fraught with 
c o n f l i c t . There are few p r a c t i c a l s t eps taken by the United 
Nations which show i t s strengthening of c o l l e c t i v e s ecur i ty and 
the contr ibut ion of e f f o r t s for negot ia t ion and c o n c i l i a t i o n . 
No one has doubted that the iiiost innportant tasks which the United 
have 
Nations could/undertaken are the e f f e c t i v e control of atomic 
energy and the regu la t ion of armaments. No one now hopes that 
these tasks can be f u l l y accomplished without dras t i c changes 
w h i c h the United Nations machinery cannot bring by i t s e l f . 
This does not mean that these" a l l - important undertaking should 
be dropped from the agenda of internat ional d i s c u s s i o n . The 
General Assembly has f irmly and r i g h t f u l l y i n s i s t e d that the 
unremetting e f f o r t to f ind a bas ic must go forward. The very 
f a c t of continuing d i scuss ion i s a demonstration that the goal 
of peaceful r e g u l a t i o n w i l l never be surrendered. 
Taking as a whole one may conclude as f o l l o w s : 
(1) Few in ternat iona l disputes are r e a l l y s e t t l e d ; 
(2) The UN has played, a useful r o l e in *<tefusing" nany 
disputes that might otherwise lead to in ternat ional 
exp los ions ; and 
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(3) the united Nations encouraged and i s encouraging the 
p a r t i e s t o a dispute to "seek s o l u t i o n by negotiation^ 
enquiry, tnedietion/ c o n c i l i a t i o n , r e s o r t to regional 
agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of t h e i r 
own cho i c e , 
Although the UN does not have many s t r i k i n g success in 
i t s c r e d i t in the handling of p o l i t i c a l d i s p u t e s , i t s s e r v i c e s 
as a mediator have been valuable in several in s tances . The work 
of the UN committee, good o f f i c e s in Indonesia, the s e r v i c e s of 
various UN commissions deal ing with Greek f r o n t i e r i n c i d e n t s , 
India and Pakistan and Pa les t ine and the indefat igable labours 
of court Bernadotte and Dr Ralph Bunch in the d e l i c a t e negot ia t ion 
between Jewish and Arab spokesman - a l l these d e s e r w high 
commendation, much more than has y e t been accorded. Although the 
e f f o r t s of other commissions and committees, such in the UN 
temporary commission on Korea and the technica l committee on 
Ber l in currency and Trade were l e s s f r u i t f u l , they were nontheless 
consc ientous and zea lous , and l a t e r l i m i t e d r e s u l t s were due t o 
circumstances "beyond t h e i r contro l" . In a l l o f the p o l i t i c a l 
d i sputes the UN played a useful and s i g n i f i c a n t , i f sometimes 
per ipheral and l i m i t e d r o l e . The value of UN presence in such 
c r i s i s areas as Kashmir, Korea, the Gaza S t r i p , West I r ian , 
the Congo and Cyprus can harBly be denied, although i t i s sometimes 
overlooked or deginerated. 
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More r e c e n t l y the UN Secretary-General , owing to the bet ter 
understanding amongst the Big powers, has played a very important 
r o l e not only in reducing tens ion from areas of c o n f l i c t s but 
a l s o so lv ing d isputes which could have l ed to a major confron-
t a t i o n involving big powers. While South Afr ica , Angola and 
Cuba announced that a c e a s e f i r e was in force from Monday. While 
the South West African People ' s organizat ion (SWAPO) announced 
t h a t November 1, 1988 has been s e t as a d e f i n i t e date for the 
inplemental ion of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, 
independence p lan for Namibia - ' a f t e r agreement was reached in 
the Geneva round of t a l k s between them - Iran and Iraq jumped the 
UN-declared August 20 truce date to declare that they would stop 
f i g h t i n g with immediate e f f e c t . For in both the agreements the 
United Nations played a v i t a l r o l e as an instrument for world 
peace and j u s t i c e . While Iran and Iraq stopped the war in 
l i n e with the UN Securi ty Council r e s o l u t i o n 598, the Geneva 
Agreements has as i t s guarantor the Security Counci l ' s f i v e 
Permanent members. South Africa a f t er year of defiance has spe -
c i f i c a l l y accepted the Securi ty Council r e s o l u t i o n 435 on 
Namibian independence and has asJced the Secretary-General to' 
begin i t s implementation from November 1, 1988. 
The uni ted Nations i s try ing i t s bes t for the se t t l ement 
of Afghan c r i s i s . The "proximity talk" between Afghanistan and 
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Pakistan was arranged by the Secretary-General of the united 
Nat ions . The United Nations held nany meetings to s o l v e the 
problem. 
Hence/ a f t e r s i x years of tough bargaining» Pakistan and 
Afghanistan s igned a peace accord in Geneva on 13th April 1988 
under i t s ae ige s in a bid to end the e i g h t year-o ld s t r i f e in 
Afghanistan v/hich has reported ly . Claimed thousands of l i v e s * 
The c r e d i t for t h i s achievement goes to a, untir ing Ecudarian 
Mr. Diego Cordozev/ who as UN mediator s ince February 1982, had 
always been on the move to meet representa t ive of Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Iran, the s o v i e t Union and the United S t a t e s . He 
even contacted deposed King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah and heard 
the views of the Afghan r e s i s t a n c e l e a d e r s . I t could a l s o not be 
denied that the United Nations found a s i g n i f i c a n t v i c tory in 
i t s e f f o r t over the presence of a Pa le s t ine Liberat ion Organiza-
t i o n (PLO) in New York a g a i n s t the US Government in i t s move to . 
c l o s e the P a l e s t i n e Liberat ion Organization in New York. 
Further, i t i s be t t er to exp la in that the united Nations 
was not able to s o l v e a l l the problems s u c c e s s f u l l y . Some problems 
are s t i l l remained unsolved such as the Kampuchea, West Bank and 
Arab-Israel c o n f l i c t and in all- these cases the united Nations was 
only a h e l p l e s s s p e c t a t o r . 
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In dealing with the secu r i ty problems, however, the UN 
has run in to obs t ruc t ions . The main secur i ty agencies of the 
Securi ty Council - the mi l i t a ry s ta f f committee/ the commission 
of conventional armaments, the atomic Energy Commission, 
prepared e labora te plans which the majority approved, but a l l 
of the plans encounted the g rea t powers deadlock has 
f r u s t r a t e d every e f fo r t to implement the secur i ty provisions of 
the Charter and hampered in te rna t iona l cooperation everywhere in 
post-war per iod . The UN has on mamy occasions f a i l ed while 
dealing with the s ecu r i t y problems but i t would be unfair to 
blame the United Nations for these f a i l u re l i e deeply embaded 
in nat ional ism, sovereignty and na t i on - s t a t e psychology# and 
a l so in the preserva t ion of human r a c e . But a f t e r a l l the UN 
Charter has t r i e d " to save succeeding generations from the 
scourage of war** - a pledge given urgency by the advent of nuclear 
weapons - and members' acceptance of the p r inc ip le of equal 
oppor tun i t i e s as giving substance to the notion of an inc ip ien t 
i n t e rna t i ona l community. There has , therefore been a process of 
i n t eg ra t ion as well as of fragmentation. In tegra t ion psychblo-. 
g i c a l l y and technologica l ly ; fragmentation: Poli^"ically, cul^urgl ly 
and ideo log ica l ly . 
Consequently, the United Nations is the present manifes-
t a t i o n of the na tura l legacy, passec from one generat ion to the 
next , of the continuous search for the warless world of peace and 
231 
prosperity, it has the aim to demonstrate that eventually all 
nations may develope mutual trust and resolve conflict* Today 
it is the only institution that can mirror the opinions of the 
world and through world opinion forge a common sense of 
universal justice. It not only can serve as a means for the 
integration of mankind but also may assist in the substantiation 
of human values lost a cynical denial of the search for truth 
engulf humanity. 
APPENDIX 
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HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS 
Accordingly, our respective Governments/ through represen-
tatives assembled in the City of San FranciscoK who have 
exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, 
have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and 
do hereby establish an international organization to be known 
as the united Nations. 
Chapter - I PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES 
Article 1 
The Purposes of the United Nations a r e : 
1 . To maintain in t e rna t iona l peace and s e c u r i t y , and to tha t 
ends to take e f fec t ive co l l e c t i ve measures for the prevention 
and removal of t h r ea t s to the peace, and for the suppression of 
a c t s of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring 
about by peacefxil means, and in conformity with the pr inc ip les 
of j u s t i c e and in te rna t iona l law, adjustment or set t lement of 
i n t e rna t iona l disputes or s i t ua t i ons which s i g h t lead to a 
breach of the peace; 
2 . To develop f r iendly r e l a t ions among naUions based on 
r e spec t for the p r i nc ip l e of equal r i g h t s and sel f -determinat ion 
of peoples , and to take other appropr ia te measures to s t rengthen 
un iversa l peace; 
3 . To achieve in te rna t iona l co-operat ion in solving in terna-
t i o n a l problems of an economic, s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l , or humanitarian 
cha rac t e r , and in promoting and encouraging respec t for human 
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r i g h t s and for fundamental freedom for a l l without d i s t i nc t i on as 
t o r ace , sex , language, or r e l i g i o n ; and 
4 . To be a centre for harmonizing the ac t ions of nations in the 
a t ta inment of these common ends. 
A r t i c l e 2 
The Organization and i t s Members, in p u r s u i t of the Purposes s t a t ed 
in Ar t i c l e 1, sha l l a c t in accordance with the following pr inciples 
1 . The Organization is based on the p r inc ip le of the sovereign 
e q u a l i t y of a l l i t s Members. 
2 . All Members, in order to ensure to a l l of them the r igh t s 
and benef i t s r e s u l t i n g from membership, s h a l l f u l f i l in good f a i t h 
the obl iga t ions assumed by them in accordance with the present 
Char te r . 
3 . All Members s h a l l s e t t l e t h e i r in te rna t iona l disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner t h a t in te rna t iona l peace and 
s e c u r i t y , and J u s t i c e , are not endangered. 
4 . All Members s h a l l r e f r a i n in t h e i r in te rna t iona l r e l a t ions 
from the t h r e a t or use of force aga ins t the t e r r i t o r i a l in t eg r i ty 
or p o l i t i c a l independence of any s t a t e , or in any other manner 
incons i s t en t with the purposes of the United Nations. 
5 . All Members s h a l l give the uni ted Nations every ass i s tance 
in any ac t ion i t takes in accordance with the present Charter, and 
s h a l l refi-rain from giving ass i s t ance to any Sta te against which 
the uni ted Nations is taking prevent ive or enforcement ac t ion . 
6 . The Organization s h a l l ensure t h a t Sta tes which are not Membei 
of the United Nations ac t in accordance with these pr inc ip les so 
f a r as may be necessary for the maintenance of in te rna t iona l peace 
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and security. 
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application 
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 
Chapter - II NEMBERSHIP 
Article 3 
The original Members of the United Nations shall be the States 
which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously 
signed the Declaration by united Nations of January 1, 1942, sign 
the present Charter aid ratify it in accordance with Article 110. 
Article 4 
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-
loving States which accept the obligations contained in the present 
Charter, and, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and 
willing to carry out these obligations. 
2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United 
Nations will be affected by a decision of the General Assembly 
upon the recommendation of the Security Council. 
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A r t i c l e 5 
A ineirber of the uni ted Nations aga ins t which preventive or enfor-
cement ac t ion has been taken by the Securi ty Council may be 
suspended from the exerc ise of the r i g h t s and p r iv i l eged of 
membership by the General Assembly v^on the recommendation of the 
s e c u r i t y Council, The exerc ise of these r i g h t s and pr iv i leges may 
be r e s to red by the Security Council. 
A r t i c l e 6 
A Member of the United Nations which has p e r s i s t e n t l y viola ted the 
p r i n c i p l e s contained in the p resen t Charter may be expelled from 
the organizat ion by the General Assembly upon the recommendation 
of the Securi ty Council . 
Chapter I I I ORGANS 
A r t i c l e 7 
1 . There are estciblished as the p r inc ipa l organs of the United 
Nations: a General Assembly, a Securi ty Council/ an Economic and 
Socia l Council, a Trusteeship Council, an In te rna t iona l Court of . 
c 
J u s t i c e , and a S e c r e t a r i a t . 
2 . Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be 
e s t a b l i s h e d in accordance with the present Char ter . 
A r t i c l e 8 
The united Nations s h a l l place no r e s t r i c t i o n s on the e l i g i b i l i t y 
* 
of men and vomen t o p a r t i c i p a t e in any capacity and under conditions 
1 
of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs. 
237 
Chapter IV THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
A r t i c l e 9 Composition 
1 . The General Assembly s h a l l c o n s i s t of a l l the Members of the 
uni ted Nat ions . 
2 , Each t^ember s h a l l have not more than f i v e representat ives 
i n the General Assembly. 
Functions and powers 
A r t i c l e 10 
The General Assembly nay discuss any questions or any matters withii 
the scope of the present Charter or r e l a t i n g t o the powers and 
funct ions of any organs provided for in the present Charter* and, 
except as provided in A r t i c l e 12, may make recommendations to the 
Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both 
on any such quest ions or matters . 
A r t i c l e 11 
1 . The General Assembly may consider the general pr inc ip l e s of 
cooperat ion in the maintenance of in ternat ional peace and s e c u r i t y , 
inc luding the p r i n c i p l e s governing disarmament and the regulat ion 
of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such 
p r i n c i p l e s to the Members or to the Securi ty Council or to both . 
2 , The General Assembly may d iscuss any quest ions r e l a t i n g to 
the maintenance of in ternat iona l peace and s e c u r i t y brought before 
i t by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, 
or by a S ta te which i s not a Member of the United Nations in 
accordance with A r t i c l e 35 , paragraph 2 , and, except as provided 
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in A r t i c l e 12/ may make recommendations with regard to any such 
quest ions to the S ta te or S ta tes concerned or to the Security 
Council or to both . Any such quest ion, on which ac t ion is neces-
s a r y , s h a l l be re fe r red to the Securi ty Council by the General 
Assembly e i t h e r before or a f t e r d i scuss ion . 
3 , The General Assembly may c a l l the a t t e n t i o n of the Security 
Council to s i t u a t i o n s which a re l i ke ly to endanger in ternat ional 
peace and s e c u r i t y . 
4 . The powers of the General Assembly s e t for th in th i s Ar t i c le 
s h a l l not l i m i t the general scope of A r t i c l e 10. 
A r t i c l e 12 
1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any 
dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present 
Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation 
with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security 
Council so requests. 
2, The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security 
Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any 
matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and 
security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and 
shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of 
the united Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, 
immediately the Security Council ceased to deal with such matters. 
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Artic le 13 
1. The General Assembly shall i n i t i a t e studies and make 
recommendations for the purpose of: 
(a) promoting international co-operation in the pol i t ica l field 
and encouraging the progressive development of international 
law and i t s codification; 
(b) promoting international co-operation in the economic, social , 
Cultural, educationa, and health f i e lds , and assist ing in 
the real izat ion of human r ights and fundamental freedoms 
for a l l without dist inct ion as to race, sex, language, or 
4 
religion* 
2 . The further respons ib i l i t i es , functions, and powers of the 
General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 
1(b) above are se t forth in Chapters IX and X. 
Art ic le 14 
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may 
recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, 
regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general 
welfare or friendly relations among nations,, including situations 
resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter 
setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 
Article. 15 
1. The General Assembly shall receive and consfider annual anci • 
special reports" from the Security Council, these reports shall 
include an account of the measures that the Security Council has 
decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security. 
240 
2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider rep6rts 
from the other organs of the united Nations. 
Article 16 
The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to 
the international trusteeship system as are assigned to i t under 
Chapter XII and XIII^ including the approval of the trusteeship 
agreements for areas not designated as s t ra teg ic . 
Art ic le 17 
1. The General Assembly shal l consider and approve the budget 
of the organization. 
2 . The expenses of the Organization shal l be borne by the Members 
as apportioned by the General Assembly. 
3 . The General Assembly shal l consider and approve any financial 
and budgetary arrangements with special ized agencies referred to 
in Art ic le 57 and shal l examine the administrative budgets of such 
spec ia l ized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the 
agencies concerned. 
^toting 
Art ic le 18 
1. Each Member of the General Assembly shal l have one vote. 
2 . Decisions of the General Assembly on lnportant questions 
sha l l be made by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and 
voting. These qyeations shal l includes recommendations wittf respect 
to the maintenance of international peace and security^ the e lect ion 
of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the e lect ion 
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of the members of the Economic and Soc ia l Counci l , the e l e c t i o n 
of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with para-
graph 1(c) of A r t i c l e 86, the actoiission of new Members to the 
uni ted Nat ions , the suspension of the r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s of 
membership, the expuls ion of Members, quest ions r e l a t i n g to the 
operat ion of the t rus teesh ip system, and budgetary ques t ions . 
3 . Decis ions on other ques t ions , including the determination 
ft 
of add i t iona l c a t e g o r i e s of quest ions to be decided by a t%#o-third 
major i ty , s h a l l be made by a majority of the Members present and 
v o t i n g . 
A r t i c l e 19 
A Member of the United Nations which i s in arrears in the payment 
of i t s f i n a n c i a l contr ibut ions to the Organization s h a l l have no 
vo te in the General Assembly i f the amount of i t s arrears equals 
or exceeds the amount of the contr ibut ions due from i t for the 
preceding two f u l l y e a r s . The General Assembly may, nevertheless< 
permit such a Member t o vote i f i t i s s a t i s f i e d that the f a i l u r e 
t o pay i s due t o condi t ions beyond the contro l of the Member. 
procedure 
A r t i c l e 20 
The General Assembly s h a l l meet in regular annual s e s s i o n s a'nd in 
such s p e c i a l s e s s i o n s as occas ion may require . Spec ia l s e s s ions 
s h a l l be convoked by the Secretary-General a t the request of the 
s e c u r i t y Council or of a majority of the Members of the United 
Nat ions . 
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Article 21 
The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedures. It 
shall elect its president for each session. 
Article 22 
The General Assennbly may establish such subsidiary organs as it 
deems necessary for the performance of its functions* 
Chapter V THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
Article 23 Composition 
I 
1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of 
the united Nations. The Republic of China« France# the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics/ the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland^ and the United States of America shall be 
permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly 
shall elect ten, other Members of the United Nations to be non-
permanent members of the Security Council* due regard being 
specially paid, in the first instance« to the contribution of 
Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international 
peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, 
and also to equitable geographical distribution. 
(I) AS amended, the original text of Article 23 reads as follows: 
1. The security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the 
United Nations, the Republic of China, Prance, the Union of Soviet' 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be perma-
nent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall 
elect six other Members of the united Nations to be non-permanent 
members of the Security Council...." contd... page 243 
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2 . The non-permanent members of the Security Oouncll shal l be 
e l ec ted for a terra of two years. In the f i r s t e lec t ion of the 
noD'-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the 
Security Council from eleven to f i f teen , two of the four additional 
members shal l be chosen for a term of one year. A ret ir ing member 
sha l l not be e l i g i b l e for immediate re -e l ec t ion . 
3 . Each member of the Security Council shal l have one represen-
tat ive* 
Functions and Powers 
Ar t i c l e 24 
1 . In order to ensure prompt and e f fec t ive action by the United 
Nations, i t s Members confer on the Security Council primary respon-
s i b i l i t y for the maintenance of international peace and security 
and agree that in carrying out i t s duties under th i s responsibi l i ty 
the Security Council acts on their behalf. 
2 . In discharging these duties the security Council shal l act 
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations. The spec i f i c powers granted to the Security Council for 
the discharge of these duties are la id down in Chapters VI,VII# 
VIII, and XII. 
3 . The Security Council shal l submit annual and, when necessary^ 
specia l reports to the General Assembly for i t s consideration. 
continued from page 242 
2 . The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be 
e l e c t e d for a term of two years. In the f i r s t e lec t ion of non-
permanent members, however, three shal l be chosen for a term of one 
yr . A ret ir ing member shal l not be e l i g i b l e for immediate re-electioi 
3 . Each member of the Security Council shal l have one 
representative • ** 
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Article 25 
The Members of the united Nations agree to accept and carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the 
present Charter. 
Article 26 
In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security with the least diversion for armaments 
of the world's human and economic resources/ the Security Council 
shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the 
Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be 
submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment 
of a system for the regulation of armanents. 
II 
Article 27 Voting 
1. Each member of the Security Council,shall have one vote. 
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall 
be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. 
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall 
be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the con-
curring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions 
under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to 
a dispute shall abstain from voting. 
~' AS amended, the original text of Article'27 rea~ds aS* follows: 
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be 
made by an affirmative vote of seven members. 
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made 
by an affirmative vote of seven members Including the concurring 
votes of the permanent members; provided that^ in <tecisions under 
Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispu-
te shall abstain from voting". 
• 
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Procedure 
A r t i c l e 28 
Z. The Securi ty Council s h a l l be so organized as to be able to 
function cont inuously. Each member o£ the Securi ty Oouncil s h a l l 
for t h i s purpose be represented a t a l l tiroes a t the sea t of the 
o rgan iza t ion . 
2 . The Secur i ty Council sha l l hold pe r iod ic meetings a t which 
each of i t s members may« if i t so desi res^ be represented ky a 
member of the government or by some other s p e c i a l l y designated 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . 
3 . The Securi ty Council may hold meetings a t such places other 
than the s e a t of the Organisation as in i t s judgment wil l ' best 
f a c i l i t a t e i t s work. 
A r t i c l e 29 
The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it 
deems necessary for the performance of its functions. 
Article 30 
The Security Oouncil shall adopt its own rules of procedure, 
including the method of selecting its President. 
Article 31 
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the 
Security Oouncil may participate« without vote, in the discussion 
of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the 
later consideres that the interests of that Member are specially 
• 
affected. 
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A r t i c l e 32 
Any Member o£ the United Nations which i s not a member of the 
Secur i ty Council or any Sta te which i s not a Member of the 
un i ted Nations, i f i t i s a party to a dispute under considerat ion 
by the Secur i ty Council , s h a l l be i n v i t e d to part ic ipate# without 
vote# in the d i s c u s s i o n r e l a t i n g to the d i spute . The s e c u r i t y 
Council s h a l l lay down such condi t ions as i t deems j u s t . f o r the 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a S ta te which i s not a Member of the United 
Nat ions . 
Chapter VI PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
A r t i c l e 33 
1 . The p a r t i e s to any dispute# the continuance of which i s 
l i k e l y to endanger the maintenance of in ternat iona l peace and 
secxirity , sha l l* f i r s t of a l l / seek a s o l u t i o n by negot ia t ion , 
enquiry, mediat ion, c o n c i l i a t i o n , a r b i t r a t i o n . Judic ia l se t t l ement , 
r e s o r t t o reg ional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
means of t h e i r own c h o i c e . 
2 , The S e c u r i t y Council s h a l l , when i t deems necessary, c a l l 
\xpoTi the p a r t i e s to s e t t l e t h e i r d ispute by such means. 
A r t i c l e 34 
The Secur i ty Council may i n v e s t i g a t e any d i spute , or any s i t u a t i o n 
which might l ead to in ternat iona l f r i c t i o n o r g ive r i s e to a d i s -
p u t e , in order to ctetermine whether the continuance of the dispute 
or s i t u a t i o n i s l i k e l y to endanger the maintenance of internat ional 
peace and s e c u r i t y . 
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Artic le 35 
1 . Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute # or 
any s i tuat ion of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the 
attent ion of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. 
2 . A State vfhich i s not a Member of the United Nations may 
bring to the at tent ion of the Security Council or of the General 
Assembly any dispute to which i t i s a party i f i t accepts in 
advance* for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of paci-
f i c settlement provided in the present charter. 
3 . The proceedings of the General Assembly in. respect of matters 
brought to i t s attention under this Article wi l l be subject to the 
provisions of ftrticle 11 and 12. 
Art ic le 36 
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the 
nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, 
recommended appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. 
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any 
procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already 
been adopted by the parties. 
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Securi^ 
Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes 
should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice 4-n accordance with the provisions of the 
Statute of the Court. 
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Art ic le 37 
1. Shoxild the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to 
in Artic le 33 f a i l to s e t t l e i t by the means indicated in that 
A r t i c l e , they shal l refer i t to the Security Council. 
2 . I f the Secur i ty Council deems that the continuance of the 
d i spute i s in f a c t l i k e l y to endanger the maintenance of interna-
t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y / i t s h a l l decide whether to take act ion 
under A r t i c l e 36 or to recommend such terms of se t t lement as i t 
may consider appropriate* 
A r t i c l e 38 
Without prejudice to the prov is ions of A r t i c l e s 33 to 37, the 
s e c u r i t y Council may, if a l l the p a r t i e s to any dispute so request , 
make recommendations to the p a r t i e s with a view to a p a c i f i c 
s e t t l ement of the d i spute . 
Chapter VII ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, 
BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AMD ACTS OF AGGRESSION 
A r t i c l e 39 
The security Coxoncii shall determine the existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. 
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A r t i c l e 40 
In order t o prevent an aggravation of the s i t u a t i o n , the Secxirity 
Council may, before naking the recommendations or deciding \3p0n 
the measures provided for in Ar t i c l e 39, c a l l upon the p a r t i e s 
concerned to comply with such provis ional measures as i t deems 
necessary or de s i r ab l e . Such provis ional measures sha l l be without 
pre judice to the r i g h t s , claims or pos i t i on of the p a r t i e s 
concerned. The Securi ty Council sha l l duly take account of f a i lu re 
t o comply with such provis ional measures. 
A r t i c l e 41 
The Secur i ty Council may decide what measures not involving the 
use of armed force are to be en¥>loyed to give e f f ec t to i t s deci -
s i o n s , and i t may c a l l upon the Members of the United Nations to 
apply such measures. These may include complete or p a r t i a l i n t e r -
rx:?>tion of economic r e l a t i o n s and of r a i l , sea , a i r , p o s t a l , t e l e -
g raph ic , radio and other means of communication, and the severance 
of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s . 
A r t i c l e 42 
Should the Secuirity Council consider t h a t measures provided for in 
A r t i c l e 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadeqxiate, i t 
may take such ac t ion by a i r , sea , or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or r e s t o r e in te rna t iona l oeace. anrt s*»curity. Such 
a c t i o n may include deraotistrations, b l^ f lU^ , and other operat ions by 
a i r , sea , or land fftrces of Members of the United Nations. 
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Article 43 
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to 
the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to 
make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accord-
ance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assis-
tance, and facilities, including rights of paasage, necessary for 
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and 
types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, 
and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided* 
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as 
possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be 
concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the 
Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to rati-
fication by the signatory States in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes. 
Article 44 
When the Security Council has decided to use force i t s h a l l , before 
ca l l ing tpon a Member not represented on i t to provi*^ armed forces 
in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite 
that Member, i f the Member so des ires , to participate in the deci-
sions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingent! 
of that Membfer's ^rroed forces. 
251 
Artic le 45 
In order to enable the United Nations to take iirgent military 
measures. Members shal l hold immediately available national a i r -
force contingents for combined international enforcement action. 
The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and 
plans for their combined action shal l be determined, within the 
l imi ts la id down in the special agreement or agreements referred 
to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of 
the Military Staff Committee. 
Art ic le 46 
Plans for the application of armed force shal l be made by the 
Secxirity Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. 
Art ic le 47 
1 . There shal l be established a Military Staff Committee to 
advise and a s s i s t the Security Council on a l l questions relating 
to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance 
of international peace and security , the enployment and command of 
forces placed at i t s disposal, the regulation of armaments, ^nd 
possible disarmament. 
2 . The Military Staff Committee shal l consist of the Chiefs of 
Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their 
representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently 
represented on the Cbroroittee shal l be invited by the committee to be 
associated with i t when the e f f i c i e n t discharge of the Committee's 
repons ib i l i t i e s requires the participation of that Member in i t s work. 
252 
3 . The Mil i tary Staff Committee s h a l l be responsible tinder t h e ' 
Secur i ty Council for the s t r a t e g i c d i r ec t ion of any armed forces 
placed a t the disposal of the Secur i ty Council. Questions r e l a t i ng 
to the command of such forces s h a l l be worked out subsequently. 
4 . The Mil i ta ry Staff Committee, with the au thor iza t ion of the 
Secur i ty Council and a f t e r consul ta t ion with appropriate regional 
agencies/ may e s t a b l i s h regional sub-committees. 
A r t i c l e 48 
1, The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council for the maintenance of international peace and "security shall 
be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, 
as the Security Council may determine. 
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the Unite* 
Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate interna-
tional agencies of which they are members. 
Article 49 
The Members of the United Nations s h a l l Join in affording mutual 
a s s i s t ance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security 
Counci l . 
A r t i c l e 50 
I f preventive or enforcement measures aga ins t any Sta te are taken by 
the secu r i ty Council, any other S t a t e , whether a Member of the United 
Nations or qpt, which finds i tself^donfronted witH spec ia l economic 
problems a r i s i n g from the carrying out of those measures s h a l l have 
the r i g h t to consul t the Securi ty Council with regard to a so lu t ion 
of those problems. 
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Article 51 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attacked occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right 
of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Counci: 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of 
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any tine 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
Chapter VIII REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Article 52 
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of 
regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters 
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as 
are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements 
or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations. 
2, The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrange-
ments or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to 
achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional 
arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to 
the Security Council. 
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3 . the Secur i ty Council s h a l l encourage the development of 
pac i f i c se t t lement of loca l disputes through such regional 
arrangements or by such regional agencies e i t h e r on the in i t i a t ive 
of the S ta tes concerned or by reference from the Securi ty Council 
4 . This A r t i c l e in no way impairs the app l ica t ion of Ar t i c les 
34 and 35 . 
A r t i c l e 53 
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such 
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its 
authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional 
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of 
the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any 
enemy State, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided 
for. pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed 
against such time as the organization may, on request of the 
Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for 
preventing further aggression by such a state. 
2. The term 'enemy State' as used in paragraph 1 of this Article 
applies to any State which during the Second World War has been an 
enemy of any signatory of the present Charter. 
Article 54 
The secur i ty Council s h a l l a t a l l tiroes be kept fu l ly informed of 
a c t i v i t i e s undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrange-
ments or by regional agencies for the maintenance of in te rna t iona l 
peace and sec \ i r i ty . 
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Chapter IX INTERIJATIONAL EC30N0MIC AND SOCIAL CO-OPERATION 
A r t i c l e 55 
With a view to the crea t ion of condit ions of s t a b i l i t y and w e l l -
being which are necessary for peaceful and f r i end ly r e l a t i o n s among 
nat ions based on r e s p e c t for the p r i n c i p l e of equal r i g h t s and s e l f 
determination of people^/ the United Nations s h a l l promotes 
(a) higher standards of l i v i n g , f u l l employment, and condit ions 
of economic and s o c i a l progress and development; 
(b) s o l u t i o n s of in ternat iona l economic, s o c i a l , hea l th , and 
r e l a t e d problems; and internat ional cu l tura l and educat io -
nal co-operat ion; and 
(c) universal r e s p e c t f o r , and observance of, human r i g h t s and 
fundamental freedoms for a l l without d i s t i n c t i o n as to race , 
s e x , langxjage, or r e l i g i o n . 
A r t i c l e 56 
A l l Members pledge themselves to take j o i n t and separate ac t ion in 
co-operat ion with the Organization for the achievement of the 
purposes s e t f o r t h in A r t i c l e 55. 
A r t i c l e 57 
1 . The various s p e c i a l i z e d a g e n c i e s , e s t a b l i s h e d by i n t e r -
governmental agreement and having wide in ternat iona l r e s p o n s i b i l i -
t i e s , as def ined in t h e i r b a s i c instruments, in economic, s o c i a l 
c u l t u r a l , educat iona, h e a l t h , and r e l a t e d f i e l d s , s h a l l be brought 
in to r e l a t i o n s h i p with the uni ted Nations in accordance with the 
prov i s ions of A r t i c l e 6 3 , 
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2. Such agencies thus brought Into relationship with the united 
Nations are hereinafter referred to as specia l ized agencies. ' 
Art ic le 58 
The Organization shall make recommendations for the co-ordination 
of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies. 
Article 59 
The Organization shall, where appropriate* initiate negotiations 
among the States concerned for the creation of any new specialized 
agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth 
in Article 55. 
Article 60 
Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organiza-
tion set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General 
Assembly, and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the 
Economic and Social Council/ which shall have for this purpose t):ie 
powers set forth in Chapter X. 
Chapter X THE ECONOMIC AKD SOCIAL COUNCIL 
Composition 
Article 61 
1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of twenty-s^ven 
Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly. 
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, nine members cf the 
Economic and.Social Council shall be elected each year for a term 
I 
of three years. A ret ir ing member shal l be e l i g i b l e for immediate 
re -e l ec t ion . 
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3. At the first election after the Increase in the ineinbership 
of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven 
members, in addition to the members elected in place of the six, 
members whose term of office expires at the end of that year, nine 
additional members shall be elected. Of these nine additional 
members, the term of office of three members so elected shall 
expire at the end of one year, and of three other members at the 
end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the 
General Assembly. 
4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have 
. Ill 
one representative. 
Functions and Powers 
Article 62 
1. The Economic and Social Council may make or ir.itiate studies 
and reports with respect to international economic, social« cultu-
ral, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommen-
dations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly» 
to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agen-
cies concerned. 
Ill As amended. The original text of Article 27 reads as follows: 
1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of eighteen 
Members... 
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, six members of the 
Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a 
term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for 
immediate re-election. 
3. At the first election, eighteen members of the Economic and 
Social Council shall be chosen. ' The term office of six members 
so chosen shall expire at the end of one year, and of six other 
members at the end of two years.... 
4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall be one 
representative**. 
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2. I t may nalte recommendations for the purrjose of promoting 
respec t for , and observance of, human r i g h t s and flindamental 
freedoms for a l l , 
3 . I t may orenare draf t conventions for submission to the General 
Assembly, v l t h resoect to masters f a l l i n g within i t s cDmoetence. 
4 . I t may c a l l , in accordance with the r u l e s rjrescribed by the 
United Nations, interrei t ional conferences on matters f a l l i ng within 
i t s competence. 
Ar t i c l e 63 
1. The Economic and Social Council may a l t e r into agreemen-^s with 
any of the agencies re fer red t o in Ar t ic le 57, defining the terms 
on which the agency concerned sha l l be brought into re la t ionsh in 
with the United Nations, Such agreements s h a l l be subject to 
aooroval by the General Assembly. 
2 . I t may co-ordira t e the a c t i v i t i e s of the suecial ized agencies 
through consult^-tion with and recommendations to auch agencies and 
through recommendations to the General Assembly and t o the Members 
of the United Nations. 
A r t i c l e 64 
1. The Economic and Social Council may take aT5Droorlat8 steos to 
obtain regular r eoor t s from the snecia l ized agencies . I t nay mafce 
nake arrangements with the Members of the United Nations and with 
the specia l ized agencies to obta in r epor t s on the s tens taken to give 
effect to i t s own recommendations and to recommendations on na t t e r s 
I 
f a l l i n g within i t s comoetence made by the General Assembly, 
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2. I t may communicate i t s observat ions on these repor t s to the 
General Assembly. 
A r t i c l e 65 
The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the 
Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its 
request. 
Article 66 
1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions 
as fall within its competence in connexion with the carrying out of 
the recommendations of the General Assembly. 
2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform 
services at the request of Members of the United Nations and at the 
request of specialized agencies, 
3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified else-
where in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the 
General Assembly. 
Voting 
Article 67 
1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one 
vote. 
2, Decision of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by 
a majority of the members present and voting. 
procedure 
Article 68 
The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic 
and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such 
other commissions as may be required for the performance of its 
functions. 
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Article 69 
The Economic and Social council shall invite any Member of the 
United Nations to participate, without vote, in its deliberations 
on the matter of particular concern to that Member. 
Article 70 
The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for represen-
tatives of the specialized agencies to participate, without vote, 
in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by 
it and for its representatives to participate in the deliberations 
of the specialized agencies. 
Article 71 
The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned 
with matters within its competence. 
Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, 
where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation 
with the Members of the United Nations concerned* 
Article 72 
1. The Economic and Social Council shall adopt its own rules of 
procedure, including the method of selecting its president. 
2. The Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in 
accordance with its rules, which shall include provisions for the 
convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members. 
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Chapter XI . DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF GOVERNING 
TERRITORIES 
A r t i c l e 73 
Members of t h e Uni ted Nat ions v?hich have o r assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t e r r i t o r i e s whose peop les have not y e t 
a t t a i n e d a f u l l measure of se l f -government r e c o g n i z e t h e p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t the i n t e r e s t s of the i n h a b i t a n t s of t h e s e t e r r i t o r i e s a r e 
paramount , and a c c e p t as a s a c r e d t r u s t t h e o b l i g a t i o n to promote t o 
t h e utmost , w i t h i n t h e system of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y 
e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e p r e s e n t C h a r t e r , the we l l -be ing of the inhabi tan ts 
of t h e s e t e r r i t o r i e s , and t o t h i s end: 
(a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples 
concerned, their p o l i t i c a l , economic, social , and educational 
advancement, thei r just treatment, and the i r protection 
against abuses; 
(b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the 
po l i t i ca l aspirations of the peoples, and to ass i s t them in 
the progressive development of their free pol i t ica l i n s t i t u -
t ions , according to the part icular circumstances of each 
,1 
territory and its peoples and their varying stages of 
advancement; 
(c) to further international peace and security; 
(d) to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage 
research, and to cooperate with one another and, when and 
where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with 
a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, 
and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and 
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(e) t o t r a n s m i t r e g u l a r l y t o the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l for information 
p u r p o s e s , s u b j e c t t o such l i m i t a t i o n as s e c u r i t y and c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s may r e q u i r e , s t a t i s t i c a l and o the r 
in fo rma t ion of a t e c h n i c a l n a t u r e r e l a t i n g t o economic, s o c i a l , 
and e d u c a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e t e r r i t o r i e s fo r which they 
a r e r e s p e c t i v e l y r e s p o n s i b l e o t h e r t han t hose t e r r i t o r i e s to 
which Chapters XII and X I I I a p p l y . 
A r t i c l e 74 
Members of t h e Uni ted Nations a l s o agree t h a t t h e i r p o l i c y in resp>ect 
of t h e t e r r i t o r i e s t o which t h i s Chapter a p p l i e s , no l e s s than in 
r e s p e c t of t h e i r m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a s > must be based on the genera l 
p r i n c i p l e of good n e i g h b o u r l i n e s s , due account be ing taken of the 
i n t e r e s t s and w e l l - b e i n g of the r e s t of t he wor ld , in s o c i a l , 
economic, and commercial m a t t e r s . 
Chapter XII INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM 
A r t i c l e 75 
The Uni ted Nat ions s h a l l e s t a b l i s h under i t s a u t h o r i t y an i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l t r u s t e e s h i p system for t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and s u p e r v i s i o n of 
such t e r r i t o r i e s a s may be p l a c e d the reunde r by subsequent i nd iv idua l 
a g r e e m e n t s . These t e r r i t o r i e s a r e h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as t r u s t 
t e r r i t o r i e s . 
A r t i c l e 76 
f 
The b a s i c o b j e c t i v e s of the t rxosteeship system, i n accordance with 
t h e Ptirposes of t h e United Nations l a i d down in A r t i c l e 1 of the 
p r e s e n t C h a r t e r , s h a l l b e : 
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(a) to fur ther in te rna t iona l peace and s e c u r i t y ; 
(b) to pronote the p o l i t i c a l , economic, s o c i a l , and educational 
advancement of the inhabi tants of the t r u s t t e r r i t o r i e s , and 
t h e i r progress ive development towards self-government or 
independence as may be appropriate to the p a r t i c u l a r circums-
tances of each t e r r i t o r y and i t s peoples and the freely 
expressed wishes of the people concerned, and as may be p rovi -
ded by the terms of each t ru s t ee sh ip agreement; 
(c) to encourage respec t for human r i g h t s and for fundamental 
freedoms for a l l without d i s t i n c t i o n as to race , sex, language, 
or r e l i g i o n , and to encourage recogni t ion of the interdepen-
dence of the peoples of the world; and 
(d) to ensure equal treatment in s o c i a l , economic and commercial 
matters for a l l Members of the United Nations and t h e i r 
na t i ona l s , and a l so equal treatment for the l a t e r in the 
adminis t ra t ion of j u s t i c e , without prejudice to the attainment 
of the foregoing object ives and subject to the provisions of 
Ar t i c l e 80. 
A r t i c l e 77 
1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the 
following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of 
trusteeship agreements? 
{mt territories now held under mandate; 
(b) territories which may be detached from enemy states as a 
result of the Second World War; and 
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(c) t e r r i t o r i e s vo lun ta r i ly placed under the system of Sta tes 
responsible for t he i r adminis t ra t ion . 
2 . I t wi l l be a matter for subsequent agreement as to v;hich 
t e r r i t o r i e s in the foregoing ca tegor ies wi l l be brought under the 
t ru s t eesh ip system and upon what terms. 
A r t i c l e 78 
The t rus t eesh ip system s h a l l not apply to t e r r i t o r i e s which have 
become Members of the United Nations, r e l a t i onsh ip among which sha l l 
be based on respec t for the p r i n c i p l e of sovereign equa l i t y . 
A r t i c l e 79 
The terms of t r u s t ee sh ip for each t e r r i t o r y to be placed uncter the 
t r u s t e e s h i p system, including any a l t e r a t i o n or amendment, sha l l be 
agreed upon by the S ta tes d i r e c t l y concerned, including the 
mandatory power in the case of t e r r i t o r i e s held under mandate by a 
Member of the United Nations, and s h a l l be approv .d as provided for 
in Ar t i c l e s 83 and 85. 
A r t i c l e 80 
1 . Except ajs may be agreed upon in individual t rus teesh ip 
agreements, mace under Ar t i c l e s 77, 129 and 81 , placing each t e r r i -
t o ry under the t rus t eesh ip system, and u n t i l such agreements have 
been concluded, nothing in t h i s Chapter s h a l l be construed in or 
of i t s e l f to a l t e r in any manner the r i gh t s whatsoever of any States 
or any peoples or the terms of ex is t ing in te rna t iona l instruments to 
I 
which Members of the uni ted Nations may respec t ive ly be p a r t i e s . 
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2, Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as 
giving grounds for delay or postponement of the neaotiation and 
conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other terri-
tories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77. 
Article 81 
The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms 
under which the trust territory will be administered and designate 
the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust 
territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering 
authority/ may be one or more States or the Organization itself. 
Article 82 
There may be designated* in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic 
area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory 
to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special 
agreement or agreements made under Article 43. 
Article 83 
2. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic 
areas, including the approval of the terms c*£ the trusteeship 
agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised 
by the Security Council. 
2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be appli-
cable to the people of each strategic area. 
3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the 
trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considera-
tions, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to 
266 
perforin those functions of the United Nations under the t rus teeship 
system r e l a t i n g to p o l i t i c a l , economic/ s o c i a l , and educational 
matters in the s t r a t e g i c a r e a s . 
A r t i c l e 84 
I t s h a l l be the duty of the administering au thor i ty to ensure tha t 
the t r u s t t e r r i t o r y s h a l l play i t s p a r t in the maintenance of 
i n t e rna t i ona l peace and s e c u r i t y . To t h i s end the acitiinistering au 
au tho r i t y may make use of volunteer forces , f a c i l i t i e s , and a s s i s -
tance from the Council undertaken in th i s regard by the administe-
r ing a u t h o r i t y , as well as for local defence and the maintenance 
of law and order within the t r u s t t e r r i t o r y . 
A r t i c l e 85 
1 . The functions of the United Nations with regard to t rus teeship 
agreements for a l l areas not designated as s t r a t e g i c , including the 
approval of the terms of the t ru s t eesh ip agreements and of the i r 
a l t e r a t i o n or amendment, sha l l be exercised by the General Assembly. 
2 . The Trusteeship Couijcil, operat ing under the au thor i ty of the 
General Assembly, s h a l l a s s i s t the General Assembly in carrying out 
these funct ions . 
Chapter XIII THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL 
Oon^josition 
A r t i c l e 86 
1 . The Trusteeship Council s h a l l cons i s t of the following 
Members of the United Nations; 
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(a) those Members administering trust territories; 
(b) such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are 
V -
not adn in i s te r ing t r u s t t e r r i t o r i e s ; and 
(c) as many other Members e lec ted for three-year terms by the 
General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure tha t the t o t a l 
number of members of the Trusteeship Council i s equally d i v i -
ded between those Members of the uni ted Nations which adminis-
t e r t r u s t t e r r i t o r i e s and those which do no t . 
2 . Each member of the Trusteeship Council s h a l l designate one 
s p e c i a l l y qua l i f i ed person to represen t i t t he re in • 
Functions and Powers 
A r t i c l e 87 
The General Assembly and/ under i t s au thor i ty / the Trusteeship 
Council/ in carrying out t h e i r functions/ may: 
(a) consider r epor t s submitted by the administering au thor i ty ; 
(b) accept p e t i t i o n s and examine them in consu l ta t ion with the 
administering au thor i ty ; 
(c) provide for periodic , v i s i t s to the respec t ive t r u s t t e r r i t o -
r i e s a t times agreed v j^on with the administer ing authori ty;and 
(d) take these and other act ions in conformity with the terms of 
the t ru s t eesh ip agreements. 
A r t i c l e 88 
The! Trusteeship Council sha l l formulate a quest ionnaire on the 
p o l i t i c a l , economic/ soc i a l / and edtJcational advancement of the 
inhabi tants of each t r u s t t e r r i t o r y / and the administering author i ty 
for each t r u s t t e r r i t o r y within the competence of the General Assembl; 
s h a l l make an annual r epor t to the General Assembly i^on the basis of 
such questionnaire* 
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Voting 
A r t i c l e 89 
1 . Each nember of the T r u s t e e s h i p Council s h a l l have one v o t e . 
2 . Dec is ions of the T r u s t e e s h i p Council s h a l l be made by a 
m a j o r i t y of t h e members p r e s e n t and v o t i n g . 
» 0.4 , ^r-. p rocedu re 
A r t i c l e 90 
1 , The T r u s t e e s h i p Counci l s h a l l adopt i t s own r u l e s of p r o - — c : 
cedure* i n c l u d i n g the method of s e l e c t i n g i t s p r e s i d e n t . 
2 . The T r u s t e e s h i p Council s h a l l meet as r e q u i r e d i n accordance 
w i th i t s r u l e s , which s h a l l i nc lude p r o v i s i o n for t h e convening of 
meet ings on the r e q u e s t of a m a j o r i t y of i t s members. 
A r t i c l e 91 
The Trusteeship Council shall* when appropriate, avail itself of the 
assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the specialized 
agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively 
concerned. 
Chapter XIV. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
A r t i c l e 92 
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of J u s t i c e s n a i l be the p r i n c i p a l j u d i c i a l 
o r g a n of t h e u n i t e d N a t i o n s . I t s h a l l func t ion i n accordance wi th 
t h e annexed S t a t u t e , which i s based upon the S t a t u t e of the permanent 
Cour t of I n t e r n a t i o n a l J u s t i c e and forms and i n t e g r a l p a r t of t he 
p r e s e n t C h a r t e r . 
269 
Article 93 
1. All Members of the united Nations are ipso facto parties to 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
2. A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may 
become a party to the Statute of the International Covurt of Justice 
on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly 
upon the recommendation of the Security Council. 
Article 94 
1. Each Member of the uni ted Nations undertakes to comply with 
the decision of the In te rna t iona l Court of Ju s t i c e in any case to 
which i t is a p a r t y . 
2 . If any par ty to a case f a i l s to perfprm the obl iga t ions incum-
bent i;5>on i t under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party 
may have recourse to the secur i ty Council* which may, if i t deems 
necessary/ make recommendations or decide upon measxjres to be 
taken to give e f fec t to the judgement. 
Ar t i c l e 95 
Nothing in the present Charter s h a l l prevent Members of the united 
Nations from en t ru s t i ng the so lu t ion of t h e i r differences to other 
t r i b u n a l s by v i r t ue of agreements already in exis tence or which may 
be concluded in the future* 
A r t i c l e 96 
1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the 
International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any 
legal question. 
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2 , Ot^er o rgans of the Uni ted Nations and s p e c i a l i z e d a g e n c i e s , 
which may a t any t ime be so a u t h o r i z e d by the General Assembly, may 
a l s o r e q u e s t a d v i s o r y op in ions of t te Court on l e g a l q u e s t i o n s 
a r i s i n g w i t h i n t h e scope of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . 
Chapter XV THE SECRETARIAT 
A r t i c l e 97 
The S e c r e t a r i a t s h a l l comprise a Sec re t a ry -Gene ra l and such s t a f f 
as the O r g a n i z a t i o n may r e q u i r e . The See re t a rynSene ra l s h a l l be 
appo in t ed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the 
S e c u r i t y Counc i l . He s h a l l be the ch ie f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o f f i c e r of 
t he O r g a n i z a t i o n . 
A r t i c l e 98 
The S e c r e t a r y - C e n e r a l s h a l l a c t in t h a t c a p a c i t y i n a l l meetings of 
t h e General Assembly, of the S e c u r i t y Counc i l , of the Economic and 
S o c i a l Counc i l , and of the T r u s t e e s h i p Counc i l , and s h a l l perform 
such o t h e r f unc t i ons as a r e e n t r u s t e d t o him by t h e s e o r g a n s . The 
S e q r e t a r y - G e n e r a l s h a l l make an annual r e p o r t t o the General Assembly 
on n-he work of t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n . 
A r t i c l e 99 
The Secre ta ryHSenera l may b r i n g t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of the S e c u r i t y 
Council any mat te r which in h i s op in ion may t h r e a t e n the maintenance 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y . 
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A r t i c l e 100 
1 , In the performance of t he i r dut ies the C^3cretary-General and 
the s ta f f sha l l not sseek or receive ins t ruc t ions from any Government 
or from any other au thor i ty external to the Organization. They sha l l 
r e f r a i n from any ac t ion which might r e f l e c t on t h e i r pos i t ion as 
i n t e rna t i ona l o f f i c i a l s responsible only to tlie Organization. 
2 , Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the 
exc lus ive ly in te rna t iona l character of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the 
Secretary-General and the s taff and not to seek to influence them 
in the discharge of the i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 
A r t i c l e 101 
1 . The s ta f f s h a l l be appointed by the SecretaryHSeneral under 
regu la t ions e s t ab l i shed by the General Assembly. 
2 . Appropriate s t a f f s sha l l be permanently assigned to the 
Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as 
r equ i red , to other organs of the United Nations. These s t a f f s sha l l 
form a p a r t of the S e c r e t a r i a t . 
3 . The paramount considerat ion in tjhe employment of the s ta f f 
and in the determination of the conditions of se rv ice sha l l be the 
necess i ty of securing the highest standards of e f f i c iency , compe-
tence , and i n t e g r i t y . Dxie regard sha l l be paid to the importance of 
r e c r u i t i n g the s t a f f on as wide a geographical bas is as poss ib l e . 
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Chapter XVI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
A r t i c l e 102 
1. Every t reaty ana every international agreement entered into 
by any Member of the united Nations after the present Charter cornea 
into force shal l as soon as possible be registered with the 
Secretar ia t and published by i t . 
2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which 
has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 1 of th is Article may invoke that t reaty or agreement 
before any organ of the united Nations. 
Art icle 103 
in the event of a confl ict between the obligations of the Members 
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obliga-
tions under any other international agreement, their obligations 
under the present Charter shall prevai l . 
Art icle 104 
The organization shal l enjoy in the te r r i tory of each of i t s Member 
such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of i t s 
functions and the fulfilment of i t s purposes. 
Art icle 105 
1. The Organization shall enjoy in the t e r r i to ry of each of i t s 
Members such privi leges and immunities as are necessary for the 
fulfilment of i t s purposes. 
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2 , R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Members of t he Uni ted Nations and 
o f f i c i a l s of t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n s h a l l s i m i l a r l y enjoy such pr ivv- le -
ges and immxinities as a r e necessa ry for t h e independent e x e r c i s e of 
t h e i r func t ions i n connexion with t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n . 
3 • The General Assembly may make recommendations wi th a view t o 
de t e rmin ing the d e t a i l s of t he a p p l i c a t i o n of pa rag raphs 1 and 2 of 
t h i s A r t i c l e or may propose convent ions t o t h e Members of the United 
Nat ions fo r t h i s purpose* 
Chapte r XVII. TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS 
A r t i c l e 106 
Pending t h e coming i n t o force of such s p e c i a l agreements r e f e r r e d 
t o in A r t i c l e 43 as in the op in ion of the S e c u r i t y Council enable 
i t t o beg in the e x e r c i s e of i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s under A r t i c l e 42 , 
t h e p a r t i e s to the Pour-Nat ion D e c l a r a t i o n , s i g n e d a t Moscow, 
October 30, 1943, and France s h a l l , in accordance wi th the p r o v i s i o n s 
of pa rag raph 5 of t h a t D e c l a r a t i o n , c o n s u l t wi th one another and 
a s o c c a s i o n r e q u i r e s wi th o t h e r Members of t h e Uni ted Nations with 
a view t o such j o i n t a c t i o n on beha l f of t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n as may be 
n e c e s s a r y fo r t h e purpose of main ta in ing i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and 
s e c u r i t y . 
A r t i c l e 107 
Nothing in the p r e s e n t Char te r s h a l l i n v a l i d a t e o r p r ec lude a c t i o n , 
i n r e l a t i o n t o any S t a t e which dur ing the Second World War has been ai 
enemy of any s i g n a t o r y t o the p r e s e n t C h a r t e r , t aken or a u t h o r i z e d as 
a r e s u l t of t h a t war by the Governments having r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for suet 
a c t i o n . 
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Chapter XVIII . AMENDMENTS 
A r t i c l e 108 
Amendments to the p r e s e n t €3iarter s h a l l come i n t o fo rce for a l l 
Members of t he Uni ted Nations when they have been adopted by a 
v o t e of two "-thirds of t h e members of t h e General Assembly and 
r a t i f i e d i n accordance wi th t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o -
c e s s e s by t w o - t h i r d s of t h e Members of the Uni ted Na t ions , 
i n c l u d i n g a l l the permanent members of t h e S e c u r i t y Counc i l . 
A r t i c l e 109 
1 . A ,,General Conference of t h e Members of the United Nations 
fo r the purpose of reviewing the p r e s e n t Char t e r may be he ld a t a 
d a t e and p l a c e t o be f i x e d by a t w o - t h i r d s vo te of the members 
of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the 
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . Each Member of the United Nations s h a l l have 
one vo te i n the c o n f e r e n c e . 
2 . Any a l t e r a t i o n of the p r e s e n t Char te r recommended by a 
t w o - t h i r d s vo te of t he conference s h a l l t a k e e f f e c t when r a t i f i e d 
in accordance wi th t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s e s by 
t w o - t h i r d s of the Members of t h e United Nations inc lud ing a l l t h e 
permanent members of the S e c u r i t y Counc i l . 
3 . I f such a conference has n o t been h e l d before the t e n t h 
anr^ual s e s s i o n of the General Assembly fo l lowing the coming i n t o 
fo rce of the p r e s e n t C h a r t e r , t h e p roposa l to c a l l such a confe-
rence s h a l l be p l a c e d on the agenda of t h a t s e s s i o n of the 
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General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by 
a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a 
vote of any seven members of the Security Council. 
Chapter XIX. RATIFICATION AND SIGNATURE 
Ar t i c l e 110 
1. The present Charter s h a l l be r a t i f i e d by the s ignatory Sta tes 
in accordance with t h e i r respec t ive c o n s t i t u t i o n a l processes . 
2 . The r a t i f i c a t i o n sha l l be deposited with the Government of the 
United Sta tes of America, which s h a l l notify a l l the s ignatory States 
of each deposit as well as the Secretary-General of the organizat ion 
when he has been appointed. 
3 . The present Charter sha l l come into force v^on the deposit of 
r a t i f i c a t i o n by the Republic of China, France, the union of Soviet 
S o c i a l i s t Republics, the uni ted Kingdom of Great Br i ta in and Northern 
I re land , and the United S ta tes of America, and by a majority of the 
other s ignatory S t a t e s . A protocol of the r a t i f i c a t i o n s deposited 
s h a l l thereupon be drawn up by the Government of the United States 
of America which sha l l communicate copies thereof to a l l the signatory 
S t a t e s . 
4 . The States s ignatory to the present Charter which r a t i f y i t 
a f t e r i t has come in to force wil l become o r ig ina l Members of the 
United Nations on the date of the deposit of t h e i r respec t ive 
r a t i f i c a t i o n s . 
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A r t i c l e 111 
The present Charter , of which the Chinese, French, Russian, 
Engl ish , and Spanish t ex t s are equal ly a u t h e n t i c , sha l l remain 
deposi ted in the archives of the Government of the Qnited Sta tes 
of America. Duly c e r t i f i e d copies thereof s h a l l be t ransmit ted 
by t h a t Government to the Governments of the o ther s ignatory 
S t a t e s . 
In f a i t h whereof the represen ta t ives of the Governments of 
the United Nations have signed the present Char ter . 
Done a t the City of San Francisco the twenty-s ixth day of 
June, one thousand nine hundred and f o r t y - f i v e . 
* * * * * * * * * 
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Appendix - I I 
'*U i^ITI^ 3& FOR PEACE" , 1950, A UN General Assembly reso lu t ion 
during the lorea War, prop3>sed by the US Secretary of S ta te Dean 
Acheson, so -ca l l ed "Acheson plan", adopted as Res. 337 A, B and C, 
Nov. 3 , 1950. The Res. A was adopted by 51 votes aga ins t 5 
(Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine SSR and USSR) and 2 
abs ta in ing (Argentina and Ind ia ) ; the Res. B by 50j 0 with 6 
abs ta in ing ; the Res.6 by 57s0. The t e x t is as followsi 
Resolution A 
The General Assembly, 
Recognizing t h a t the f i r s t two s t a t e d purposes of the uni ted 
Nations ares 
"TO maintain in t e rna t iona l peace and s e c u r i t y , and to t ha t ends to 
take e f fec t ive c o l l e c t i v e measures for the prevention and removal 
of th rea t s to the peace, and for the suppression of ac ts of aggres-
s ion or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the p r inc ip l e s of j u s t i c e and in terna-
t i o n a l law, adjustment or se t t lement of in te rna t iona l disputes or 
s i t u a t i o n s which might lead to a breach of the peace; 
"To (fevelop f r iendly r e l a t i o n s among nations based on respect for the 
p r inc ip l e of equal r i g h t s and se l f -de terminat ion of peoples , and to 
take other appropr ia te measures to s trengthen universal peace"; 
Reaffirming tha t i t remains to the primary duty of a l l Members of 
the United Nations, when involved in an in te rna t iona l d ispute , to 
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seek settlement of such a dispute by peaceful means through the 
procedures la id down in Chapter VI of the Charter, and recalling 
the successful achievements of the united Nations in th is regard 
on a number of previous occasions/ 
Finding that international tension exists on a dangerous scale. 
Recalling i t s resolution 290(IV) en t i t l ed ' 'Essentials of peace"/ 
which s ta tes that disregard of the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations is primarily responsible for the continuance of 
international tension, and desiring to contribute further to the 
objectives of that resolution. 
Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by the Security Council 
of i t s primary responsibil i ty for the maintenance of international 
peace and securi ty, and the duty of the permanent members to seek 
unanimity and to exercise r e s t r a in t in the use of the veto. 
Reaffirming that the in i t i a t ive in negotiating the agreements for 
armed forces provided for in Article 43 of the Charter belongs to 
the Security Council, and desiring to ensure that , pending the 
conclusion of such agreements, the United Nations has a t i t s 
disposal means for maintaining international peace and security. 
Conscious that fai lure of the Security Council to discharge i t s 
respons ib i l i t i es on behalf of a l l the Member States , part icularly 
those responsibi l i t ies referred to in the two preceding paragraphjs, 
does not rel ieve Member States of their obligations or the United 
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Nations of i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y under the Charter to maintain in te rna-
t i o r i l peace and secu r i ty / 
Recognizing in p a r t i c u l a r t h a t such f a i l u r e does not deprive the 
General Assembly of i t s r i g h t s or r e l i eve i t of i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of in te rna t iona l peace 
and s e c u r i t y . 
Recognizing t h a t discharge by the General Assembly of i t s responsi-
b i l i t i e s in these respects c a l l s for p o s s i b i l i t i e s of observation 
which would a sce r t a in the fac ts and expose aggressors ; for the 
exis tence of armed forces which could be used c o l l e c t i v e l y ; and for 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of timely recomtrendation by the General Assembly to 
Members of the United Nations for co l l e c t i ve ac t ion which, to be 
e f f e c t i v e , should be pronpt , 
A. 1. Resolves t h a t if the Securi ty Council because of lack of 
unanimity of the permanent members, f a i l s to exerc ise i t s primary 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the maintenance of i r t e r n a t i o n a l peace and secu-
r i t y in any cas^ where there appears to be a t h r e a t to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or ac t of aggression, the General Assembly sha l l 
consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to Members for <x»llective measures, including in the 
case of a breach of the peace or ac t of aggression the use of armed 
force when rtecessary, to maintain or r e s t o r e in te rna t iona l peace 
and secu r i t y . If not in session a t the t ime, the General Assembly 
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may meet in emergency spec ia l sess ion within twenty-four hours 
of the request t he re fo r . Such emergency spec ia l sess ion sha l l be 
c a l l e d i f requested by the Securi ty Council on the vote of any 
seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations, 
2 , Adopts for t h i s purpose the amendments to i t s ru les of p ro -
cedure s e t fo r th in the annex to the present r e so lu t ion ; 
B. 3 . Es tabl i shes a peace Observation Commission for which the 
calender years 1951 and 1952, sha l l be composed of fourteen 
Members, namely: China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, 
I r aq , I s r a e l , New Zealand, Pakis tan, Sweden, the union of Soviet 
S o c i a l i s t Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Br i ta in and Nor-
thern I re land , the United S ta tes of America and Uruguay, and which 
could observe and repor t on the s i t u a t i o n in any area where there 
e x i s t s i n t e rna t iona l tension the continiiance of which i s l i ke ly 
to endanger the maintenance of in te rna t iona l peace and se luri ty. 
Upon the i n v i t a t i o n or with the consent of the Sta te into whose 
t e r r i t o r y the Commission would go, the General Assembly, or the 
In ter im Committee when the Assembly is not in session, may u t i l i z e 
the Commission if the Securi ty Council i s not exercising the 
functions assigned to i t by the Charter with respec t to the matter 
in ques t ion. Decisions to u t i l i z e the Commission sha l l be made on 
the aff i rmative vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting. 
The Securi ty Council may also u t i l i z e the Commission in accordance 
with i t s au thor i ty under the Charter; 
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4 . The Commission s h a l l have au thor i ty in i t s d i sc re t ion to 
appoint subcommissions and to u t i l i z e the services of observers to 
( 
assist it in the performance of its functions; 
5. Recommends to all governments and authorities that they co-
operate with the Commission and assist it in the performance of its 
functions; 
6. Requests the Secretary General to provide the necessary staff 
and facilities, utilizing, where directed by the Commission, the 
United Nations panel of Field Observers envisaged in General 
Assembly resolutions 297 B(IV) s 
C.7, Invites each Members of the United Nations to survey its 
resources in order to determine the nature and scope of the 
assistance it may be in a position to render in support of any 
recommendations of the Security Council or of the General Assembly 
for the restoration of international peace and security; 
8. Recommenda to the Member States of the United Nations that 
each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so 
trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made 
available , in accordance with its constitutional processes, for 
service as a United Nations until or units, upon recommendation by 
the Security Council or General Assembly, without prejudice to 
the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter; 
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9. Invites the Members of the uni-ted Nations to inform the 
Collective Measxjres Committee provided for in paragraph II as 
soon as possible of the measxires taken in implementation of the 
preceding paragraph; 
10, Requests the Secretary General to appoint, with the appro-
val of the Committee provided for in paragraph 11, a panel of mili-
tary experts who could be made available, on request, to Member 
States wishing to obtain technical advice regarding the organization, 
training, and equipment for prompt service as United Nations units 
of the elements referred to in paragraph 8; 
D. 11. Establishes a Collective Measures Committee consisting of 
fourteen Members, namelys Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, 
Egypt, France, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, 
Venezuela and Yugoslavia, and directs the Committee, in accordance 
with the Secretary-General and with such Member States as the 
Committee finds appropriate, to study and make a report to the 
Security Council and the General Assembly, not later than 1 Sep-
tember 1951, on methods, including those in Section C of the 
present resolution, which might be used to maintain and strengthen 
international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes 
and Principles of the Charter, taking account of collective self-
defence and regional arrangements (Articles 51 and 52 of the 
Charter); 
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12. RecommencSs to a l l Member Sta tes t h a t they co-operate with 
the Committee and a s s i s t i t in the performance of i t s functions; 
13. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish the s ta f f and 
f a c i l i t i e s necessary for the e f fec t ive accomplishment of the 
purposes s e t fo r th in sec t ions C and D of the presen t reso lu t ion ; 
E. 14. The General Assembly, in adopting the proposals s e t for th 
above, i s fu l ly conscious t h a t enduring peace wi l l not be secured 
s o l e l y by c o l l e c t i v e s ecu r i t y arrangements aga ins t breaches of 
i n t e rna t i ona l peace an d ac ts of aggression, but tha t a genuine 
and l a s t i ng peace depends a l so upon the observance of a l l the 
p r inc ip l e s and Purposes es tab l i shed in the Charter of the United 
Nations, upon the implementation of the r e so lu t ions of the 
Secur i ty Council, the General Assembly and other p r inc ipa l organs 
of the United Nations intended to achieve the maintenance of 
in t e rna t iona l peace and secxirity, and e spec ia l ly upon respec t for 
and obserfvance of hvunan r i g h t s and fundamental freedoms for a l l and 
on the establishment and maintenance of condit ions of economic and 
s o c i a l well-being in a l l count r ies ; and accordingly 
15. Urges Member Sta tes to respec t fu l l y , and to in tens i fy , 
j o i n t ac t ion , in co-operat ion with the United Nations, to develop 
and s t imula te universal respec t for and observance of human r i g h t s 
and fundamental freedoms, and to in tensi fy individual and 
co l l e c t i ve e f for t s to achieve conditions of econnonr.ic c t a b i l i t y 
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and soc ia l p rogress , p a r t i c u l a r l y through the development of 
underdeveloped countr ies and a r ea s . 
Annex. The r u l e s of procedure of the General Assembly are amended 
in the following r e s p e c t s : 
1. The present t e x t of ru l e 8 sha l l become paragraph(a) of tha t 
r u l e , and a new paragraph(b) sha l l be added to read as follows: 
"Emergency spec ia l sessions pursuant to r e so lu t ion - (V) sha l l be 
convened within twenty-four hours of the r ece ip t by the Secretary-
General of a request for such a sess ion from the Securi ty Council, 
on the vote of any seven members thereof, or of a request from a 
majority of the Members of the United Nations expressed by vote in 
the Interim Committee or otherwise, or of the concurrence of a 
majority of Members as provided in ru l e 9" . 
2 . The present t ex t of ru l e 9 s h a l l become paragraph(a)of tha t 
r u l e and a new paragraph(b) sha l l be added to read as follows: 
"This ru l e sha l l apply a lso to a request by any Member for an 
emergency spec ia l sess ion pursuant to r e so lu t ion - (V) . In such a 
case the Secretary-General s h a l l communicate with other Members by 
the most expedit ious means of communication a v a i l a b l e . " 
3 . Rule 10 is amended by adding a t the end thereof the 
fol lowing: 
" I n the case of an emergency specia l sejssion convened pursuant to 
ru l e 8(b) , the Secretary-General sha l l notify the Members of the 
uni ted Nations a t l e a s t twelve hours in advance of the opening of 
the sess ion ." 
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4 . Rule 16 i s amended by adding a t the end thereof the following: 
"The provis ional agenda of an emergency spec ia l session sha l l be 
communicated to the Members of the United Nations simultaneously 
with the communication summoning the s e s s ion . " 
5 . Rule 19 i s amended by adding a t the end thereof the following: 
"During an emergency spec ia l sess ion addi t iona l items concerning the 
matters dea l t with in r e so lu t ion - (V) may be added to the agenda by 
a two-thi rds majority of the Members present and voting.** 
6 . There is added a new ru l e to precede ru le 65 to read as 
fol lows; 
"Notwithstanding the provis ions of any other ru l e and unless the 
General Assembly decides otherwise< the Assembly in case of an 
emergency spec ia l sess ion , sha l l convene in plenary sess ion onl>y and 
proceed d i r e c t l y to consider the item proposed for considerat ion in 
the request for the holding of the sess ion , without previous r e f e -
rence to the General Committee or to any other Committee; the 
p res iden t and v ice-pres idents for such emergency spec ia l session 
s h a l l be, r e spec t ive ly , the Chairman of those delegations from which 
were e lec ted the pres ident and Vice-Presidents of the previous 
sess ion . " 
Resolut ion B 
For the purpose of maintaining in te rna t iona l peace and secur i ty , in 
accordance with the Charter of the united Nations, and, in pa r t i cu l a r , 
with Chapters V, VI and VII of the Charter , 
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The General Assembly 
Recommends to the Secur i ty Council: 
That i t should take the necessary s teps to ensure t h a t the act ion 
provided for under the Charter i s taken with respec t to th rea t s to 
the peace, breaches of the peace or ac ts of aggression and with 
r e spec t to the peaceful se t t lement of disputes or s i t ua t i ons 
l i k e l y to endanger the maintenance of in t e rna t iona l peace and 
s e c u r i t y ; 
That i t should devise* measures for the e a r l i e s t app l ica t ion of 
A r t i c l e s 43, 45, 46 and 47 of the Charter of the United Nations 
regarding the placing of armed forces a t the disposal of the 
Secur i ty council by the Member S ta tes of the United Nations and the 
e f f ec t ive functioning of the Mil i tary Staff Committee. 
The above d i spos i t ions should in no manner prevent the General 
Assembly from f u l f i l l i n g i t s functions under reso lu t ion - (V) . 
Resolution C 
The General Assembly« 
Recognizing t h a t the primary function of the United Nations Organi-
za t ion is to maintain and promote peace, secur i ty and j u s t i c e 
among a l l na t ions , 
RecognizLne the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of a l l Mi^ntprs d*-ates ••o promo** 
t h - c>iuds of intern'*. 1-1 r>n»».l oe^ice In arcord»nc- with ••heir r»blj»a-
tioBS Ts orovided in the Char te r , 
Recognizing tha t the Charter charges the Secur i ty Council with the 
primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for maintaining in t e rna t iona l neace and 
s e c u r i t y . 
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Reaffirming the Imoortance of unanimity among the oermanent members 
of the Secur i ty Council on a l l nroblems which are l i k e l y to thre=L<-en 
v/orld oeace, 
Recal l ing General Assembly r e so lu t ion 190 ( I I I ) e n t i t l e d 
".\T)r)eal to the Great Powers to r enew t h e i r e f fo r t s to comoose 
the i r d i f ferences and e s t a b l i s h a l a s t i n g oeace," 
Recommends t o the tJermanent members of •^he tJecurity Council t h a t : 
(a) They meet and discuss , co l l ec t i ve ly or otherwise, and, if 
necessary, with other S ta tes concerned, a l l Problems which a r e 
l i k e l y to th rea ten in te rna t iona l oeace and hamoer the a c t i v i t i e s 
of the United Nations, with a view to t he i r resolving fundamental 
dif ferences and reaching agreement in accordance with the s o i r i t 
and l e t t e r of the Charter5 
(b) They advise the General Assembly and, when i t i s not in ses -
sion, the Members of the United Nations, as soon as aT)T)roDria+-e, of 
the i r c o n s u l t a t i o n s , " 
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 
288 
-BIBLIOGRAPHY 
gOOks 
Ayoob, Mohammad (ed) , Cpnf l ic t and Iq,tervention in the Third 
Worlds New Delhi , Vikas Publishing House, P v t . , L t d . , 
1980. 
Asher, R.E. , and Kotschnig, W.M., The United Nations and Prorootion 
of the General Welfare, Washington, Brooking Inst i tutuons 
1957. 
Alker, H.R. Jr . and Russet, B.M., World P p l i t i c s in the General 
Assembly, Yale Univers i ty Pres s , 1965. 
A l f r o s s , Const i tu t ion of the United Nations; Analys is of s^-ructure 
and Function, New York, Rine Hart and CSonpany, 1950. 
A t t l e e , C..R., The Future of the United Ng^tions, Bombay, Indian 
counc i l for Cultural R e l a t i o n s , 1 9 6 1 . 
Boweit, D.W., unite(^ Nations Forces; A l ieoal St^ udv of United 
Nations p r a c t i c e , London, Steuens and Sons, 1964. 
B a i l y , Sydney, D . , yhe General Assembly of the United Nations, 
London, Dunmow, Pa l l Mall Pres s , I960. 
,The General Assembly of the United-Nations, New Delhi , , 
Wiley Easten pr ivate L t d . , publ i shers , . 1960. 
Boyd,- AndretB, The united Nations -Organization (Hand Book) - - : rs 
• London, The P i l o t Press Limited, 1946, 
289 
Bentwich, Norman and Mar t in , A Qptrtmentary on the Char te r of t he 
u n i t e d N a t i o n s , London, Rou t f l edge , 1950. 
Bennet , A. L.» I n t e r n a t i o n a l Qpqaniza t ionss p r i n c i p l e s and 
P r o s p e c t s , New J e r s e y : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , Engle Wood-
c l i f f s , 1977. 
B i j u r , Marion, Working Together the Uni ted Nations Way, New York 
i n t e r c h a n g e , 1965. 
Bloomfield* L i n c o l n , P . , Evolu t ion o r Rpvolution^ Cambridge, 
Harvard u n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1957. 
Brownl ie , I ( e d ) . , Bpsic Documents in I n t e r n a t i o n a l j;,aw, 
Oxford Clarendon p r e s s , 1967. 
C o r d i e r , Andrew W. and Foote W.. Pi^blic papers of t h e Siacretary 
General of t h e u n i t e d Na t ions ; Trvgve Jjie 1949-53, 
London, Columbia U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1969. 
, Quest for Peace Columbia U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1965. 
Claude J r . , I n i s , L . , Swords I n t o plowshare? The Problem and 
P r o g r e s s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , New York: 
Random House, 1963. 
D o l i v e t , L o u i s , The, u n i t e d Na t ions , London: Phonnix House, 1946. 
E v a t t , H e r b e r t , Vere, The United Nations,, London^ Geoggrey 
Cambridge Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1948. 
F a l k , R.A. and Mandlovi tz , S.H. ( eds ) , -The S t r a t e g y of World Order , 
Vol. 3 , New York: World Law Fund, 1966. 
290 
Fenwick, Charles, G., International Law, New York, Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc. 1948, 
Feller, A,H., united Nations and World Community, Boston, 
Little, Brown and Company, 1953. 
Francis O Wilcox and Carl M. Marcy, Proposals for Change in the 
United Nations, Washington, D.C., The Brooking 
Institution, 1955. 
Goodrich, L.M., The United Nations, London, Stevens, 1960. 
Gerard, J. Mangone, A Short mstorv of International Organization,. 
New York/ McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954. 
Goodrich, L.M., "From League of Nations to United Nations", 
International organization. Vol. 1, February 194 7. 
Gordeker, Leon (ed) , The United Nations in International politics, 
Princeton University press, 1971. 
Gregg, R.W., and B. Markun (ed) , The United Nations System and 
its Functions, Selected Readings, East-West Student 
edition, 1970. 
Goodwin, G.L., World Institutions and World Order; An Inaugural 
Lecture, London, London School of Economics, 1964. 
Goodspeed, S.S., The Nature and Function of International 
Organization, New York: Oxford University press, 1959. 
Goodrich, L.M., Hambro, E. and Simons, A.P., Charter of th^ 
United Nations: Commentary and Documents, New York,London, 
Columbia University press, 1969. 
291 
Goodr ich , L.M./ The United Nations i n a Changing Worlds New York* 
London: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974. 
Gordenker , Leon, UN Secre ta rvK3enera l and the Maintenance of Peace , 
London, Columbia u n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1967. 
G r e n v i l l e , C la rk and Sohn, Lou i s , B . , World peace Through World 
Law, Cambridge Massachuse t t s , Harvard Un ive r s i t y p r e s s , 
1962. 
G r e i g , D.W., I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, London: B u t t e r w o r t h s , 1970. 
and Barkun, M. (ed) , The Uni ted Nations System and i t s 
F u n c t i o n s , New D e l h i : A f f i l i a t e d East-West p r e s s , 1968. 
j e n k s , C. Wi l f r ed , The proper Law of I n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n 
New York, Oceana P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1962. 
J e n u p , P h i l l i p * C , A Modern paw of N a t i o n s , New York; The 
Macmillan Oortpany, 1950. 
Kenneth J T w i t c h e t t (ed . ) The Evolving Uni ted Na t ions : A p r o s p e c t 
For Peace . London, Europa P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1971. 
Kay, David A . , The New Nations i n t h e Uni ted N a t i o n s : 1960-1970, 
New York, Columbia U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1970. 
Kelsen Hans, The Law of the United N a t i o n s , A C r i t i c a l Analys is 
of i t s Fxandamental Problems. London, S t e r e n s , 1950. 
K^an Rahroatullah, Impl ied Powers of t h e Uni ted Nations^ Delhip 
Vikas P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1970. 
2^a 
Luard/ E. (ed) The Evolution of Internat ional Organization«lion<3on» 
Thames and Hudson, 1966. 
Leonard/ L. Larry, Ij;^ternational Organization, New York, 
McGraw H i l l , 1951, 
L i e , Trygve, In the Cause of Peace, New York: The Macrnillan 
Company, 1954, 
Luard, Evan (ed) , The United Nations; How i t Works and What i t 
Does? London, The Macrnillan press Limited, 1979. 
, The Evolution of Internat ional Organizations, New York, 
Washington, Frederick A. praeger. Publ i shers , 1966. 
Maclaurin, John, United Nations and tower p o l i t i c s , London, 
George Al len and Unwin, 1951. 
Mangone Gerard J . , Short History of Ir^ternational organizat ion , 
New York, McGraw-Hill, 1954. 
Misra, K.p, and Narayanan (ed.) , Non-Alignment in Conteroporar;y 
Internat ional Re la t ions , New Delhi , Vikas Publishing 
House, p v t . , L t d . , 1981. 
M i l l e r , David Hunter, The Drafting of the Covenant, New York,1928. 
Murti, B.SN. Vietnam; The Cvcle of Peace, I l l u s i o n s and 
R e a l i t i e s , New Delhi , 1968. 
Maclber, Robert, M., The Nations and the united Nations. New York 
Manhattan Publishing Company, 1959. 
293 
Meigs# Cornel ia , The Great ppsian; Men and Events in iphe United 
Nations From 1945 to 1963, Boston, Toranto, L i t t l e 
Brown and Conpany« 1964. 
Markw, Zacher, Dag Hammerskiold's united Nations, Nfew York and 
London, Columbia Univers i ty p r e s s , 19 70. 
M i l l e r , R . I . , pag Hammersk1oId and C r i s i s Diplomacy, 
Oceania P u b l i c a t i o n s , I n c . , 1961. 
Morgenthau, Hans, J . , P o l i t i c s Among Nations; The Struggle For 
Power and Peace, Calcut ta , The Indian press p v t . , L td . , 
5th e d i t i o n , 1937. 
Niranjan Bhuinya, Internat ional Oyganization^ New Delhi , 
Assoc iated publishing House, 1970. 
Narayan, G.V L . , United Nations; Trusteeship of Non-Self Governing 
T e r r i t o r i e s , Geneva Impriroeries popular ies , 1951. 
N icho las , H.G., The United Nations as a P o l i t i c a l I n s t i t u t i 3 n . 
New York, Oxford Univers i ty Pres s , 19 71 . 
Osmanczyk, Edmud J a n . , Encyclopedia of the United Nations and 
Internat ional Agreements, London, Taylor and Francis , 
1985. 
pade l ford , Norman, J . and Goodrich, L . M . (ed> , The united Nations; 
Accomplishments and Prospedts , Vol. XIX, world peace 
Foundation, 1965. 
294 
p l i s c h k e , Elroer, System of Integrat ing the Internat ional 
Oonnmunitv. New York, D. Van Nostrand Company, I n c . , 
1964. 
Prasad Krishna, The united Nations and power P o l i t i c s , Agra, 
Seal Publ icat ion Centre, Om Niwas, Rajamandi, 1956. 
P o t t e r , pitman, B. , An Introduction to the Study of Internationa^. 
pp;qanization#. App l e ton-Century-Crofts , I n c . , 1948. 
Peterson , M.J,, The general Assembly in World p o l i t i c s , London, 
A l l en and Unwin, 1986 
R.CHingorani , Internat ional Law Through united Nations, Bcm&ay 
N.M. Tripathi Limited, \ 
Rajeshwar Dayal, Mission for Hammer3k1ol<^, the Congo C r i s i s , 
De lh i , O.U.P. 1976. 
Rajan, M.S., united Nations and Domestic J t i r i sd i c t ion , New Delhi 
New York, Asia Publishing House, 1961. 
R u s s e l , Ruth B. , A History of the united Nations Charter, 
Washington, The Brooking i n s t i t u t i o n , 1967, 
Reuter, Paul , Internat ional I n s t i t u t i o n s . London, George Al len 
and unwin L t d . , 1972. 
Russe l , R.B. and Mather, J . E . , A History of the united Nations 
Charter, Washington, D.C. , 1958, 
Saksena, K.P. , The United Nations and the C o l l e c t i y e Securi ty; 
A Hi s tor i ca l A n a l y s i s , Delhi , D.K. Publishing House, 
1974. 
295 
Saxena/ J.N.* AtnendinQ Procedure of the Consti tuent Instruments 
of In te rna t iona l Organizations/ New Delhi, Dhanwantra 
Medical and Law Book Hbu^e, 1972, 
Sandness, E. Roger, Spain and the uni ted Nations, Ifew York, 1966. 
Singh, L.P'# United Nations and the Birth of S t a t e s , New Delhi, 
G i t a n j a l i publishing House, 1986. 
Setalvad/ C. Moti la l , yhe Role of the United Nations in the 
Maintenance of World Peace, Asia Publishing House, 1967. 
Schewebel, Stephen M., The Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Cambridge, Haeward University p r e s s , 1961. -
S . J .R. Bilgrami, in te rna t iona l Opqanization, A View From within 
New Delhi, vikas publishing House, 1977. 
Singh Nagendra, Termination of Membership of in te rna t iona l 
organiza t ion . London, Stevens, 1958. 
Schwarzenberger, George, Committee on the Charter of the United 
Nations, Rpport on Problems of a United Nations Force, 
i n t e rna t iona l Law Associat ion, Hamburg Conference 1960, 
Smith, S . , A.De, Exceeding Small in Fauweett, J . E . S . and Higgins 
Rosalyn (ed), i n t e rna t iona l organizat ion Law in 
Moveroentj. London, New York, Oxford univers i ty Press , 
1974. 
S t a r k e , J .G . , IntroducAion to Ir^ternational ^iaw, London, 
ButterwortHsr 1977. 
29& 
8. Green/ L*Cw 
9. Grun# L.C., 
10. Gunter# M.M,/ 
11. 
12. j.F. Hoggs, 
"Membership in the united Nations"» Current 
Legal problems/ Vol. 2, 1949. 
"The Nature of War in Korea"/ International 
Law Quarterly, Vbl. 4, 1951. 
"The United Nations Ministate Problems," 
American Jpurnal of Ir.ternational ^ jaw, 
vol. 71, no. 1, January 1977. 
"What Happened to the United Nations 
Minis tate problem?" American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 71, no, 1, ^ an. 1977. 
"peace-Keeping Costs and Charter Obligation, 
Columbia j^av Rpview, New York, Vol. 62, 
13. Kelsen Hans, "Membership in the United Nations", 
Columbia Law Review, vol. 46, 1946. 
14. Keith, S. Peterson, "The Uses of the Uniting for peace 
Resolution since 1950," International 
Organization, vol. 13, No* 2, 1959. 
15. Leslie Molf 
phillipes 
"Why Third World?." Third World Quarterly, 
vol. 1, No. 1, 1979. 
16. Potter, Pitman, B., "Membership and Elepresentation in the UN" 
American Journal of International i^ aw^  
vol. 49, 1955. 
299 
17. Rowe/ Edward T»# "Changing pa t t e rn in the Voting Success 
of Memberstates in the United Nations 
General Assembly, 1945-1966,** Internationa] 
Organization/ Voi, 23, 1969. 
18. Tabata, shigejir-o, "Admission to the United Nations and 
Recognition of S t a t e s " , The Japanese 
lytternational Law, 1961, 
^f>xjrpal. Year books. Documentaries 
1 . Annual Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of 
the Organizat ion. 
2 . American Journal of In te rna t iona l Law (New York) 
3 . Aus t r a l l i an Foreign Affairs Record (Sydney) 
4 . Annual Review of the United Nations Affairs (New York) 
5 . B r i t i s h Year book of In te rna t iona l Law (London) 
6 . Documents on American Boreign Relat ions (Dostan) 
7. Encyclopedia Americana. 
8 . Encyclopedia B r i t i n i c a . 
9 . Everyman's United Nations? A Complete Handbook of the 
A c t i v i t i e s of the United Nations Durfng i t s f i r s t twenty 
yea r s , 1945-1965 (New Yorkj UN o f ^ i c ^ f Public Information, 
8th e d i t i o n , March 1968) . 
300 
10 , Everyman's United Nationss The Structure , Functions and 
Work of the Organization and i t s r e l a t e d Agencies During 
the y e a r s , 1945 to 1958 (New York: UN, Off ice of Public 
Information, 6th e d i t i o n , 1959) . 
1 1 . Harvard Internat ional Law (Massachusetta) 
1 2 , Indian Journal of Internat ional Law Quarterly (New Delhi) 
1 3 . Indian Journal of P o l i t i c s (Aligarh) 
14* i n t e r n a t i o n a l Affa irs (Moscow) 
1 5 . In ternat iona l Affa irs (London) 
1 6 . Keesing's Contemporary Archives 
17 . post war Foreign Pol icy preparation 
(Department of State Publ icat ion) 
1 8 . proposals for the Establishment of a General International 
Organization (Dept. of State B u l l e t i n ) . 
1 9 . S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbook of the League of Nations 
2 0 . Third World Quarterly (Londan) 
2 1 . UN ibcuroentaries 
I 
22. UN Yearbooks of the United Nations (New York) 
1 
23. Yearbook on Human Rights. 
301 
Newspapers 
1 . The Hindiostan Times (New Delhi) 
2 . The New York Times (New York) 
3 . TYie Times lLoT«3oTi> 
4 . The Times of India (New Delhi) 
5 . UN ^tonthly .Chronicle (New Delhi) 
6 . UN Weekly News l e t t e r (New Delhi) 
